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was made possible by the Ford Grant for Inter-
national Legal Studies and the Charles Clarence
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Part I
THE LAW OF SPACE
Introduction to Part I
THE FIRSTDAYof the Conference on the Law of Space and of Satel-
lite Communications was devoted to The Law of Space. The pur-
pose of this part of the program was to provide a broad perspective
of the legal problems that have arisen and will emerge in the space
age and to indicate to what degree informal legal thought had reached
a consensus or formulated tentative conclusions as to their resolution.
The interested reader will find in the following pages that the dis-
tinguished principal speakers and commentators performed their
assigned tasks with imagination and perception.
Their contributions not only give a valuable picture of the existing
state of agreement and disagreement but also project the possibilities
of future development. One cannot have heard or read these papers
without realizing how truly remarkuble it is that so much has been
thought and done in this existing new frontier of international law
in so short a space of time. It is hoped that these proceedings, in turn,
will serve to stimulate further thought and progress toward the
achievement of the rule of law in space and international affairs.
BRUNSON MAcCHEsNEY
The Emerging
Customary Law of Space
Myres S. McDougal
T___ MOSTINSISTENT QUESTION for any conference on the law of
space today must be how the peoples of the world can best clarify
the necessary general community policies, for resolution of the many
important problems arising from their interactions in space, in a
way which will appropriately reflect their genuine, common interests.
My assignment in this conference is that of outlining a framework
of inquiry in response to this question and of making a brief assess-
ment of the degree to which peoples have already begun, through
processes of customary development, to achieve an authoritative
consensus upon preferred policies.
MISCONCEPTIONS
The importance of the problems in legal regulation with which
we are concerned is, unfortunately, paralleled only by the pervasive-
ness of the misconceptions and confusions about them. Perhaps the
most pervasive, certainly the most destructive, misconception is that
which insists that we do not yet have any law of space at all. This
particular misconception is, further, commonly accompanied by a
clarion call for the assembling of a great multilateral conference to
create vast new law--perhaps even to agree upon a comprehensive
code for the regulation of all space activities. The enormous hold
which such misconceptions have upon both popular and professional
imagination could be illustrated from many different sources.
One particularly lucid illustration from popular sources is offered
by a recurrent editorial in the generally more dependable New York
Times. Thus, in one instance, following the launching of Telstar,
the Times complained that despite all man's great technological
achievements, we s_ili have no law of space. In its words:
Yet the cosmos today is a lawless dimension and there is no universal agree-
ment even on so elementary a question as where space begins--no boundary
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line between the region in which existing national and international law holds
sway and the region in which it does not. _
Summarizing some of the controversies which have already arisen be-
tween states, the editorial continued :
But in the absence of space law, the cosmos bears some resemblance to a Jungle.
Each nation with space capabilities does as it pleases. Such license must surely
become intolerable with the rapid expansion of man's capabilities in this new
arena of human action and with the certain increase in the years ahead of the
nations able to launch satellites, luniks and the like. 2
A most influential illustration from professional sources is offered
by Professor John C. Cooper, the dean of all air and space law
scholars. As late as 1961 Professor Cooper wrote:
It is quite impossible to apply international legal principles in a satisfactory
manner in any geographic area whose legal status is unknown. Today the legal
status of outer space is as vague and uncertain as was the legal status of the
high seas in the centuries before Grotius, in the Mare Liberum, focused atten-
tion on the need of the world to accept the doctrine of the freedom of
the seas .... My own view has also long been that no general customary inter-
national law exists covering the legal status of outer space2
The point I would emphasize, and will seek to demonstrate in de-
tail, is that these misconceptions do a great disservice to what we
have already achieved. They grievously undercut an existing con-
sensus among states about a great many problems, and by their over-
emphasis on explicit agreement and underemphasis upon custom in the
creation of international law, may make more difficult the taking of
appropriate measures to achieve a still greater consensus. What these
misconceptions ignore is that in any legal system formalized agree-
ments are of much less importance in affecting the expectations of
peoples about the requirements of future decision than is the whole
flow of their cooperative behavior and communication in the shaping
and sharing of values, sometimes called custom, in which they must
perforce at least approximate a realistic common interest.
One of the dangers inherent in these misconceptions may be docu-
mented by reference to a position recently taken by the Soviet Union.
In a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in April 1963 the representative
of the Soviet Union, Mr. Fedorenko, as advocate for a new platform
of principles submitted by his country for governing activities in
space, spoke as follows:
In the Soviet Delegation's view, the aim of the declaration should be the im-
position of binding legal obligations on States which would serve as the foun-
a New York Times, July 12, 1962, p. 28, col. 1.
• Id.
a Cooper, The Rule oF Law in Outer Space, 47 A.B.A.$. 28, 24, 25 (1961).
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dation of a permanent system of space law imbued with the ideas of peace and
friendly relations among the peoples. In international practice, questions con-
cerning the law of the land, sea and air were regulated by special multilateral
and bilateral agreements. In the past, the rules governing such subjects as
the law of the sea and diplomatic relations had taken shape very slowly, but
technological and scientific progress dictated its own time-Umits. The rapid
development of aviation at the beginning of the twentieth century had necessi-
tated the prompt conclusion of special agreements in that field. Now, the ex-
tremely rapid development of space technology made the legal regulation of
activity in outer space even more imperative. It was sometimes contended
that space law would develop by itself, through the accumulation of precedent
and experience. It was doubtful, however, that in that process the law would
be able to keep pace with the facts. Moreover, if relia_ace was to be placed on
custom, there was no point to the existence of the Sub-Committee.'
It should be noted that this distortion of the historic role of custom
in the prescription of international law principles, a distortion not
uncharacteristic of the Soviets, 5 was accompanied by demands for in-
clusion in the proposed explicit agreement of certain new principles--
such as those limiting space activities to state-owned craft, prohibiting
the use of artificial satellites for collection of intelligence information,
and requiring the consent of other states for many activities--which
could only be wholly unacceptable to non-Communist countries and
which would completely undercut other important principles which
had previously been regarded by many peoples, including the Soviets,
as accepted principles of international space law.
DELIMITATIONS OF GENERAL PROBLEM
It is not of course my pretense to dispose of some minor miracle
whereby we can easily erase these pervasive misconceptions, and their
attendant dangers, and move unerringly toward a public order of
space representing only unquestionable common interest. It is, how-
ever, my strong conviction, fortified by a recent comprehensive study, 6
that we can by a more careful delimitation of our general problem and
by the disciplined, systematic performance of certain intellectual
tasks, indispensable to any policy-oriented inquiry, greatly increase
our understanding as scholars and lawyers and perhaps increase the
probability of rational community decision. The more careful de-
limitation of our general problem will require that we seek (1) a corn-
' U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec., Comm. orP Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Sub-
Comm. (A,/AC.105/C.2/Sr.17) (April 19, 1963).
s CI. Tunkin, Remarks on the Juridical Nature of Customary Norms of Inter.
national Law, 49 CALIF. L. l_v. 419 (1961) ; Korovin, Peaeeyul Cooperation in
JYpa_, Int'l Aft., March 1961, p. 6 [Moscow].
a McDouaAL, LASSW_LL & VLASIC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDE_ XN SPACE (1963). All
the remarks offered here build heavily upon this book.
THEEMERGINGCUSTOMARYLAWOFSPACE 5
prehensive orientation in the Earth-space social processes which will
give rise to claims to authoritative decision, (2) an economic categor-
ization of the probable types of particular claims to authority, and
(3) a realistic perspective of the processes of authoritative decision
which the general community can be expected to maintain for the reso-
lution of controversies. The relevant intellectual tasks are interre-
lated and include at least the following: Clarification of the policies
about particular types of specific claims which we as responsible citi-
zens of the larger community of mankind are willing to recommend
to other responsible citizens; survey of past trends in decision to ascer-
tain the degree to which the contemporary expectations of the peoples
of the world presently agree upon these policies as requirements for
future decision; observation of the factors which have affected the
present degree of consensus and which may affect the course of future
decision; and, finally, consideration of the alternatives which may be
available to us to move future decision more into conformity with the
policies we recommend. I propose to attempt to indicate, of necessity
quite impressionistically, the potentialities of this type of approach.
Earth-Space Social Processes
For more careful delimitation of our general problem, it is neces-
sary that we begin, as in any legal discussion, with the facts to which
authoritative decision, the law, must respond. The facts with respect
to which a law of space is demanded are constituted, as was suggested
above, by our most comprehensive Earth-space community process.
Though in the beginning of space activity we have a community proc-
ess largely confined to the Earth, we are expanding out from the
Earth to the more distant reaches of space, farther and farther as
technological development accelerates. Two aspects of this expand-
ing process, easily observable in its major features, require especial
emphasis: First, the continuity of the process and, second, the inter-
dependences of all participants in it.
In a quick look at the major features of this process, it is easily ob-
servable that the people conducting activities in space are the same
people who have been acting on Earth. For convenience in inquiry
we may categorize effective participants as states, international gov-
ernmental organizations, political parties, pressure groups, private
associations, and individual human beings. It is observable also that
these actors, group and individual, pursue precisely the same objec-
tives which they have sought on Earth: they seek power, wealth,
enlightenment, respect, and so on--the whole range of human values.
The situations in which activities occur continue to remain, as pre-
viously, both organized and unorganized. The greatest changes are
6 LAW OF" SPACE AND OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
perhaps in the time and geographical features of interaction. One
aspect of the geographical features requiring special note is that space
activities occur in a domain which, like the oceans, admits of being
shared by many participants with only minor physical accommoda-
tion. Space is potentially a great sharable resource which can be
enjoyed by all mankind.
The base values initially employed in the exploitation are the same
as those previously employed on Earth and are, despite the contem-
porary predominance in activity by the two major powers, widely
distributed among mankind. The strategies employed by partici-
pants in the management of base values may change in modality as
access to space increases, but are still conveniently categorized as dip-
lomatic, ideological, economic, and military.
The outcomes in the shaping and sharing of values obtainable from
space activity we can only begin to anticipate. The potentialities for
both gain and loss are still largely beyond our imagination. Man's
knowledge about his Earth and the universe have already been ex-
traordinarily enriched. The possibilities for increased production of
goods and services from new modes of communication, transportation,
and weather control and from newly discovered resources can scarcely
be overestimated. Similar forecasts might be made for many other
values, such as health, skill, respect, and rectitude. Conversely, the
possibilities of equally unprecedented loss cannot rationally be mini-
mized : as the values acquirable in space increase, effective power dis-
positions on Earth will vastly change, and access to space has
obviously given mankind a new capability for destroying itself.
The most obvious aspect of these possible outcomes from space ac-
tivity is the high degree of their collective impact upon all peoples of
the world. The interdependences in the shaping and sharing of
values which have in recent decades characterized the Earth arena can
only intensify with the expanding conquest of space.
Types of Claims to Authority
With this brief orientation in the most comprehensive process of
interaction, we may now turn to the economic categorization of prob-
able types of specific claims to authority. It has already been indi-
cated that space is, like the oceans, potentially a great sharable
resource which can with appropriate minor accommodations be en-
joyed by all; hence the most relevant model for anticipating the prob-
able pattern of future claims about space would appear to be our past
experience with respect to the oceans and the air space above the
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oceans. 7 Building upon this model, as well as upon the types of
claims concerning space which have already been made or anticipated_
we may suggest a categorization under the following headings:
1. Claims relating to the establishment and ma;_ntenance of a process
of authoritative decision for resolving controversies
2. Claims relating to inclusive access to the domain of space--for
freedom of access to space, as to the oceans
3. Claims relating to inclusive competence over, and responsibility
for, activities in space
4. Claims relating to an occasional exclusive competence in space--
after the analogy of contiguous zones upon the oceans
5. Claims relating to the accommodation of inclusive and exclusive
competences in outer space and air space--the pseudo-problem of
boundaries
6. Claims relating to minimum order--preservation of peace
7. Claims relating to minimizing losses from lesser coercions and
deprivations---torts and crimes
8. Claims relating to the enjoyment and acquisition of the resources
of space
9. Claims relating to the conduct of organized, enterprisory activ-
ities in space
10. Claims relating to interactions with non-Earth advanced forms
of life
Processof Authoritative Decision
Shifting now to characterization of the process of authoritative
decision maintained by the general community for resolving contro-
versies about space activities, we may observe, contrary to those who
can see only a "lawless cosmos," that this process is, again, precisely
the same as is maintained for resolving controversies about Earth,
including ocean and air space, activities. The effective power elites
who have found it economic to maintain the comprehensive process of
authoritative decision on Earth, which we call international law, are
the same elites who dispose of effective power with respect to space
activities. These effective elites include, it may require emphasis, not
merely representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States_
but of all territorial communities, as well as of many nongovernmental
groups_ such as political parties, pressure groups, private associations,
For categorization of historic claims to authority with respect to ocean ac-
tivities see McDouoAL & BURXE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS : A CONTEM-
PORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (1962). The various analogies from
the international law of the sea invoked in the subsequent sections of this paper
are discussed in this book.
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and so on; nonspace powers may obviously apply sanctions to space
powers on Earth for securing conformity to general community pre-
scriptions about space activities. It is not to be expected that these
elites will find it economic either to establish a new process of authori-
tative decision or to dispense altogether with such process. Indeed,
it is easily observable that for the resolution of controversies about
space activities they are already making resort, as in the United
Nations, to the inherited Earth process.
It is common knowledge that the principal features of this inherited
Earth process--its "constitutive" features--are themselves a product
of customary development, though of course with a considerable assist
from the making and interpretation of great international agreements
such as the United Nations Charter. These constitutive features are
those which identify authoritative decision-makers, stipulate basic
objectives or policies, establish structures of authority, confer bases
of power, legitimize the employment of strategies or procedures, and
provide for the taking of specific decisions in the prescription and
application of policies. Some understanding of these features is in-
dispensable to realistic appreciation of how much space law we already
have.
The more important decision-makers in contemporary international
law are still the officials of nation-states. State officials serve not only
as claimants before authority on behalf of their particular communi-
ties but also, in reciprocal judgment upon each other, as prescribers
and appliers of policy on behalf of the general community. Inter-
national governmental organizations and their officials are, however,
playing an increasingly important role, and especially in relation to
space activities. Parties, pressure groups, and private associations
continue to perform functions in intelligence and recommendation.
The overriding community objective for which the process is main-
tained is that of identifying and securing common interests, while
rejecting assertions of egocentric special interest. The common inter-
ests sought to be protected are both inclusive, shared in like manner
by all states, and exclusive, unique in specific modality to particular
states but common in generic character to all. Both inclusive and
exclusive interests embrace both minimum order (the minimization
of unauthorized coercion) and optimum order (the promotion of the
greater production and wider sharing of all values).
The structures of authority maintained are both unorganized and
organized. The unorganized structures are in the day-to-day inter-
actions between foreign office and foreign office, the direct confronta-
tions of the officials of one state with those of another. The organized
structures are those of international governmental organizations, such
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as the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, and the
specialized agencies.
The most important base of power conferred upon decision-makers,
whether in organized or unorganized structures, is authority itself,
in the sense of community expectations about the lawfulness of deci-
sions. In addition to authority, international governmental orga-
nizations have all the effective bases of power--control over military
forces, resources, and so on--which their member states are willing
to accord them. State officials have at their disposal for support of
authoritative decision the same base values they enjoy for its
subversion.
Similarly, authoritative decision-makers may employ in support
of public order the same familiar strategies---diplomatic, ideological,
economic, and military--that are commonly employed in attacks upon
it. The improvements in technology which intensify the dangers
from these strategies when they are employed against community
interest could conceivably also enhance their effectiveness for sanction-
ing purposes.
A complete itemization of the specific kinds of decisions presently
authorized and employed by Earth-space constitutional process in the
making and application of authoritative general community policies,
about space and other activities, would include those relating to pre-
scribing, intelligence-serving, recommending, invoking, appraising,
and terminating. Though the particular modalities which are estab-
lished for the taking of some types of these decisions are much more
primitive than in the legislative, executive, judicial, and adminis-
trative institutions of the more mature nation-states, some provision
in principles and procedures is made for all. In view of our imme-
diate concern for the emerging principles of a customary law of space,
we may focus most sharply upon the decisions by which the prescrib-
ing function is performed--with special emphasis upon the role of
custom ill establishing community expectation, s
The modalities by which the prescribing function is performed in
tile contemporary Earth-space arena are commonly described as two:
Explicit agreement and the implicit communications of customary
behavior. The importance of relatively explicit agreement is in-
dicated not only by the recurrent calls, noted above, for the convening
of a great multilateral conference to agree upon a code of space law,
but also by the reasonably well developed, historic international law
of treaties, de.signed to facilitate identification and application of the
a A more detailed description of the comprehensive "constitutive" process of
the Earth-space arena and documentation of the assertions here made about the
nature of customary international law may be found in McDou_L, LASSWELL &
VLASlC, supra n_te 6, at ch. 1.
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parties' genuine shared expectations. It is believed, however, that in
the international arena, as in even the more mature national commu-
nities, the implicit communications of customary behavior play a much
more important role than agreement or other deliberate formulation.
Consider, for example, the case within the United States. We all
know that our "constitution" is not a collocation of words put on
parchment 170-odd years ago; it is rather the contemporary expecta-
tions, the subjectivities, of presently living people about all the phases
of constitutive process---about who should make the decisions, in what
structures of authority, by what criteria, and so on. These contem-
porary expectations are affected not merely by what was said and writ-
ten in the beginning but by the whole flow of communications and
cooperative behavior in applications since that time. Even the sim-
plest problem in interpretation must require recourse to many of the
same features in the context that are ordinarily consulted in identifica-
tion of customary law. If this is true even in a relatively mature
national community, how much more true it must be in the inter-
national community, which has even less agreement upon basic
charter.
The traditional formulation of the requirements for establishing
customary international law is relatively simple. It is commonly
stated that two essential elements are required: a "material" element
and a "psychological" element. The material element is said to con-
sist of certain uniformities in behavior, and the psychological of
certain subjectivities of "oughtness" attending the behavior. The
flow of past decisions suggests, however, that both these elements are
highly flexible and easily adapted to pursuit of peoples' genuine
expectations in context.
The uniformities in behavior considered relevant have included
not only the acts and utterances of officials, both national and inter-
national, but also those of private individuals and of representatives
of private associations and nongovernmental pressure groups. The
amount of repetition required in the behavior has varied greatly and
many different sources, oral as well as written, have been authorized
for evidence of uniformities.
The subjectivities of oughtness which have been honored for trans-
forming uniformities in behavior into expressions of authoritative
expectation have related to many different kinds of norms, as from
authority, morality, natural law, reason, and religion. The required
subjectivities have even been found to attend behavior which in the
beginning was commonly regarded as unlawful. It was in this fashion
that the law of blockade and war zones was drastically changed during
two world wars.
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It is important to note that the "uniformity" which has been re-
quired for behavior and attendant subjectivities is not that of univer-
sality, but of generality. The explicit consent of all states has not
been demanded for establishing the authority of a particular cus-
tomary decision---else custom would be equated with agreement. One
principal function of honoring prescription inferred from customary
behavior has been to permit states to submit to external law, without
too obvious affront to overblown conceptions of sovereignty.
The length of time required for the establishment of a customary
prescription has, further, been related to the certainty with which
contemporary expectations about the requirements of future decision
can be identified. In instances in which there has been no doubt about
these expectations, a very short time has been held to suffice. Thus,
the doctrine of the "continental shelf," authorizing a coastal state
to monopolize the subsoil riches of an adjacent shelf, was established
in less than 10 years by a series of unilateral claims, made with promise
of reciprocity by the claimant and without protest by others; the
Geneva Convention of 1958 merely ceremonialized what many
decision-makers had already accepted. Similarly, many of the rules
of the road at sea were, as illustrated in the famous Scotia case, 9
established by reference to a very brief practice of uniform national
statutes long before being embodied in international conventions.
Fortunately, the new authority structures provided by the United
Nations, especially in the General Assembly and in the Security Coun-
cil, make it much easier today quickly and certainly to ascertain peo-
ples' expectations about the requirements of future decision and may,
hence, among their other services greatly facilitate the traditional
process of customary prescription.
DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS TO AUTHORITY
With these broad outlines of a more careful delimitation of our
problem to reinforce us, we may now turn to a brief, systematic
examination of past decisions and future prospects with respect to
the various types of probably recurrent particular problems that have
been identified. In the compass available to us the most we can at-
tempt by way of performance of the several relevant intellectual tasks
must, however, be to give some indication of the general community
policies we would recommend and to note the degree to which general
community expectations already project these policies as requirements
for decision. We consider seriatim the types of claims previously
itemized.
°81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170 (1871).
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1. Establishmentand Maintenance of Processof Authoritative Decision
The constitutive process which presently regulates space activities
is, as we have seen, an inclusive process, established largely by cus-
tomary expectation. Few would suggest that this process is adequate
for the needs of the new Earth-space arena, but improvements will
be hard to come by because of the contention between free-society
and totalitarian public orders. Important changes are more likely
to come from the implicit communications of necessary collaboration
than from explicit agreement.
The very specific changes presently being proposed by the Soviet
Union would appear to be most destructive. The troika principle of
organization which they demand for structures of authority is
obviously a denial of that common interest for which constitutive
process is ordinarily established. The conception of the role of cus-
tom in the prescription of international law which they presently
project, as in the quotation above from Mr. Fedorenko, would equate
custom and explicit agreement and give a single state a veto over the
clarification of general community expectations. The conceptions
of state sovereignty, of aggression, and of intervention in their much
heralded principles of "peaceful coexistence" would change many of
the overriding "constitutional" principles of the comprehensive
process in a way greatly to favor the ultimate triumph of a totali-
tarian world public order. Certainly we cannot accept such changes
by agreement, and it is to be hoped that they will not be forced upon
us by customary development. 1°
2. InclusiveAccess to Domain of Space
The overwhelmingly significant feature of space for policy purposes
is of course its vastness---its boundlessness and inexhaustibility--
which makes it preeminently suitable for shared used by multiple par-
ticipants at a minimum cost in mutual interference. The rich out-
comes in the production and distribution of values which mankind has
achieved in recent decades through the inclusive enjoyment of the
oceans, the airspace above the oceans, international rivers, and the
polar regions clearly suggest that this newly accessible, sharable do-
main of space, with all of its potential riches, should be held open for
the free and equal access of all peoples who can attain the necessary
capabilities.
Fortunately, this recommended policy would appear today to be
already, without formal convention, an accepted principle of inter-
national law. It is the policy which, since the advent of the first
loc]. McWhinney, "PeaceFul Coexistence" and Soviet-Western International
Law, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 951 (1962).
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sputnik, has been consistently demanded by all national and interna-
tional officials as well as by the most eminent private spokesmen. The
states with space capabilities have uniformly projected and acted
upon a claim of inclusive,-reciprocal right; and even the states as yet
without capabilities have participated in this practice both by sus-
taining, cooperative activity and by failing to protest over-flights.
The policy has, further, been stated in utter explicitness by a United
Nations General Assembly resolution, unanimously adopted in 1961.11
Under these circumstances, general community expectations about the
requirements of future decision would appear completely certain, and
the traditional tests--both material and psychological--for the estab-
lishment of a customary prescription fully met.
Some of the provisions included by the Soviet Union in its latest.
draft declaration of principles for governing space activities could,
as has been suggested above, gravely encroach upon this previously
existing consensus. One such provision stipulates: "All activities of
any kind pertaining to the exploration and use of outer space shall
be carried out solely by States." 12 Another would require that "any
measures that might in any way hinder the exploration and use of
outer space for peaceful purposes by other countries may be imple-
mented only after prior discussion of and agreement upon such meas-
ures between the countries concerned." 13 Still another, without even
effort at definition insists: "The use of outer space for propagating
war, national or racial hatred or enmity between nations is inadmis-
sible."" It should be clear that responsibility for space activities can
be fixed without limiting such activities only to states, that protection
from extraordinarily dangerous activities in space can be secured
without according every state a veto upon all activity, and that harm-
ful propaganda can be appropriately regulated without impairing
rights of access to space. The importunate demands made by the
Soviet Union with respect to these matters might suggest that imme-
diate, explicit agreement offers no brighter prospects than customary
development for a clarification of genuine, common interest.
3. Inclusive Competence Over Activities
Man's experience upon the oceans would appear to suggest that in-
clusive rights of access to a sharable resource can be secured and pro-
tected only by an equally inclusive competence over the specific
n U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 16th Sess., Agenda Item No. 21 (A/RES/1721
(XVI)) (Jan. 3, 1962).
U.N. Gem Ass. Off. Rec., Comm. on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal
Sub-Comm. (A/AC.105/C.2/L.6) (April 16, 1.963).
/d.
1, Id.
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activities undertaken in exploitation of the resource. Indeed, even
the empirical reference of "inclusive access," as historically developed,
includes the notions that no state may claim the resource as its exclu-
sive base of power, with a continuing, comprehensive, and arbitrary
competence to exclude others from its use, and that all states have an
equal competence to prescribe and apply policies for regulating the
activities of their nationals in enjoyment of the resource.
The principles of jurisdiction developed for the relatively un-
organized arena of the oceans would appear, again, to afford an excel-
lent model for a regime of unorganized, inclusive competence in
space. One set of these provides, a_ we have seen in the discussion
of protection of freedom of access, that every state may decide for
itself whether to send ships out upo n the oceans and that no state
may arbitrarily preclude access by another state. A second set of
principles, designed to secure at least a minimum public order upon
the oceans, provides that every state has competence to prescribe and
apply policies in control of its ships upon the oceans and that no
state may prescribe and apply policies to the ships of other states
save for violations of international law. A final set of principles--
designed to establish with certainty what ships belong to what
states and, hence, to identify both who is responsible for the activities
of a ship and who may protect it against unauthorized assertions by
others---provides that no state may unilaterally question the com-
petence of another state to confer its nationality upon a shi p and
that, in cases of conflicting claim, simple priority in time in confer-
ment of nationality is to prevail.
In most of the utterances and behavior invoked above to establish
a customary prescription of freedom of access to space, jurisdictional
principles comparable to those which have been achieved for the
oceans were either explicitly stated or assumed to be applicable for
the regulation of activities in space. Hence, little, if any, further
crystallization of consensus would appear to be required to per-
mit the conclusion that these principles, too, represent established
customary international law.
ttow much beyond the establishment of this minimum, relatively
unorganized, inclusive competence for the regulation of activities in
space the peoples of the world may be willing to go must be left to the
future. It may be appropriate to hope, however, that no emerging
consensus about space will include the newly invented notion of
"genuine link" as a test for appraising the lawfulness of conferments
of nationality upon spacecraft. This notion, derived from the highly
questionable Nottebohm 15 decision about individual human beings
1955 I.C.J. REP. 4. These strictures are developed in McDouGAL _ BURKE,
supra note 7, at 1013 et seq.
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and recently applied by the Geneva Convention to ships, has never
been given empirical meaning in terms of rational community policy
and could carry as much threat to freedom of acc_s to space as it
does to the freedom of the oceans.
4. Occasional ExclusiveCompetence
Just as particular coastal states have in the past found themselves
uniquely and substantially threatened by activities upon the adjacent
ocean and in the adjacent air space over the oceans, so also may
the surface states of the Earth find themselves in the future uniquely
and substantially affected by activities in space. The threats to
coastal states have come from relatively proximate areas of the oceans_
but have extended to all basic internal community values, such as
security, health, economic well-being, and so on. The threats from
space may not be so geographically limited; they may come from the
most distant reaches of space, but could be equally extensive in their
impacts upon internal community values.
For the protection of coastal states subjected to unique threat the
general community has in recent decades under the concept of "con-
tiguous zones" and various equivalents honored the assertion, in adja-
cent areas of the oceans or airspace above the oceans, of such an
occasional exclusive competence in relation to the ships or aircraft
of other states as is reasonably necessary and proportionate to secure
certain important interests. The interests thus authorized to be
l)rotected have been regarded as open ended and have ranged from
_curity through health measures and immigration policies to fiscal-
inte_oTity. Even upon the oceans the concept of contiguity has been re-
garded as a relative one, and assertions of competence have been
honored at different distances for different purposes,, and often at
a very considerable distance. Thus, during World War II countries
in this hemisphere claimed a contiguous zone for security purposes
of some 1,300 miles at its utmost extent, and the United States and
Canada presently assert a contiguous zone for security with respect
to aircraft of 1 hour's flying time from their coasts. The kinds of
authority authorized to be applied have involved varying degrees
of effective control, from mere requirement of identification or sur-
veillance to seizure and destruction.
The test which has been developed in historic practice for apprais-
ing the lawfulness of particular assertions of occasional exclusive
competence by coastal states has been that of reasonableness--of neces-
sity and proportionality--as determined by the careful balancing of
important variables in context. The burden of establishing reason-
ableness is of course upon the state asserting the competence to apply
its authority to the craft of other states within the shared domain. '
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The factors taken into account in determinations of reasonableness
have included the importance of the interests sought to be protected_
the particular measures in authority claimed to be applicable to the
craft of other states_ the relation between the interests sought to be
protected and the measures demanded_ the kind of activities engaged
in by the craft of other states and the interests of the other states in
these activities_ the relation between claimed immunities from com-
petence and such interests_ the precise location of the contested ac-
tivities and the degree of their impact upon the coastal community_
any conditions suggesting necessity for unilateral action_ and_ finally_
the alternatives open to the various states for avoiding 'both injury and
the imposition of injury upon others.
Considering the enormous threats to security and other values which
space activities may impose upon particular states_ it would appear
highly probable that the states of the world will demand_ and recipro-
cally honor_ an occasional exclusive competence within the domain of
space not unlike that which has been established upon the oceans.
The consistent statements of the spokesmen of the Soviet Union with
respect to what they call %py satellites" and of spokesmen of the
United States with respect to nuclear-tipped missiles or other craft
would suggest such a development. Certainly, this would appear to
be the most economic modality by which the inclusive interests of all
states in the utmost freedom in enjoyment of space can be reconciled
with the occasional unique needs of particular states to take unilateral
measures for their self-protection. With respect to activities in space_
the notion of contiguity as a factor for determining reasonableness
will of course become largely irrelevant. By this anticipation and rec-
ommendation of customary development_ we do not intend to minimize
the difficulties which may ensue in making determinations of reason-
ableness--as, for example_ in distinguishing between scientific obser-
vation and espionage. In the contemporary highly unorganized
Earth-space arena_ in which the states of the world cannot effectively
be denied a competence to protect themselves under conditions of
grave threat_ there would appear to be simply no alternative. It is
to be hoped that the requirements of reciprocity and the potenti-
alities of retaliation may serve an appropriate policing function.
5. Accommodation of Inclusive and Exclusive Competences
If the general community is to authorize and protect both inclusive
and exclusive competences in outer space and also to continue to
recognize the relatively exclusive competence of states within their
territorial airspac% quite obviously some method must be provided
for accommodating these two very different types of competences
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when they conflict in particular instances. The modalities presently
being proposed for securing this necessary accommodation include
both the establishment of a boundary, such as is still being sought
between the territorial sea and the high seas, between "airspace '_ and
"outer space" and the adoption of a functional mode of analysis, com-
parable to that employed with respect to contiguous zones upon the
oceans and recommended above for the resolution of conflicts arising
even in the most distant reaches of space, which would assess the
reasonableness of particular types of activities in context and re-
gard the geographic location of activities as only one of many vari-
ables affecting reasonableness.
The proposals for seeking accommodation by the establishment of
an explicit boundary between airspace and outer space are legion,
and invoke many different criteria for the location of such a bound-
ary. The criteria most commonly invoked include interpretative
derivations from prescriptions in contemporary conventions relating
to airspace, the varying physical characteristics of space, the varying
capabilities of flight instrumentalities, the effective power of the
claimant state to assert its authority in space, and the physical limits
of the Earth's gravitational effect. It is not believed, however,
that any of these proposed criteria have any chance of general ac-
ceptance--for the reason that none of them bear any demonstrable
relation to the common interests of the peoples being asked to accept
them.
Consider for a moment what the common interests of all peoples
are in the accommodation of inclusive and exclusive competences.
First, there is the inclusive interest of everyone, emphasized in the
discussion of access claims, in the utmost possible use and exploitation
of a great sharaJble resource for common benefit. Second, there are
the exclusive interests of all particular communities, noted in the
discussion of claims to an occasional exclusive competence, in pro-
tecting themselves from unique threats and injuries from activities
in space. The fullest protection of the first interest would, contrary
to the various criteria being proposed, establish the surface of the
Earth as appropriate boundary--an outcome no one immediately
expects. For the protection of the second set of interests, no bound-
ary, whatever the criteria invoked, can have a very great relevance.
Substantial threats to particular territorial communities may come
from anywhere in space and may come horizontally as well as
vertically. Should every state seek to extend the boundaries of its
comprehensive, continuing competence upward and sidewise in the
degree it deems necessary for protecting its unique exclusive interests,
the result could only be endless strife and defeat of common interest.
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The one type of boundary which might make sense in common in-
terest would be a very low, somewhat arbitrarily fixed boundary, such
as the historic 3-mile limit for the territorial sea. A boundary of this
type might, like the territorial sea, serve two functions : it could mini-
mize the number of controversies which arise and it could aid in fixing
the burden of proof for such controversies as do arise. Operators of
spacecraft able to distinguish between the established inclusive and
exclusive domains might shun the exclusive; this may of course be a
very difficult judgment to make, even with a very low boundary.
Similarly, if a surface state interfered with activities above the bound-
ary, the burden could be placed upon it of justifying the reasonable-
ness of its assertion of exclusive competence; for activities below the
boundary, the burden could be placed upon the state of the nationality
of the spacecraft to establish innocent passage and absence of injury.
In a context, however, in which states are attempting to disturb their
long established consensus on a relatively narrow territorial sea, the
prospects would not appear overly bright for quick and universal
agreement upon a low boundary between airspace and outer space.
Fortunately, the alternative proposal for accommodation by func-
tional, contextual, multifactoral analysis has behind it the general
community's rich experience with contiguous zones and other forms
of occasional competence asserted upon the oceans. This experience
would appear to confirm such analysis as a most economic mode for
achieving the necessary delicate balance of inclusive and exclusive
interests, with an appropriate priority for overriding inclusive in-
terests. The requirements of mututtl restraint and reciprocal toler-
ance inherent in the shared enjoyment of any resource would, again,
appear most likely to stimulate a customary development toward
adoption of this mode of accommodation so soon as states acquire the
technological competence seriously to interfere with each other's
space activities. The public utterances of statesmen tend in this di-
rection and the peoples of the world are not likely to tolerate arbitrary
destructiveness.
6. Preservation of Minimum Order
Man's new access to space, along with the advent of thermonuclear
weapons, has increased enormously the comprehensiveness and in-
tensity of the major coercions which may be directed against the terri-
torial integrity and independence of states and has, hence, added vast
new dimensions to the task of maintaining minimum order among the
different territorial communities. The new Earth-space arena is, as
was its Earth forerunner, a military arena; highly intense expecta-
tions of violence, parochial identifications, and compulsions to sacri-
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flee on behalf of special interests continue to prevail. The claims to
authority that are already being made parallel those previously made
with respect to earth activities and exhibit two principal modalities:
First, demands for the characterization of particular coercions as per-
missible or impermissible and, second, demands for _he employment
of a wide range of community sanctioning techniques in the regula-
tion and control of impermissible coercions. 16
With respect to the first modality of claim, that demanding the
characterization of particular coercions as permissible or impermis-
sible, a practically universal consensus has emerged, without benefit
of formal agreement, that the basic distinctions of the United Nations
Charter are fully as applicable to states' activities in space as on Earth.
By virtue of these distinctions, it may be remembered, "acts of ag-
gression," "threats to the peace," and "breaches of the peace" are
regarded as impermissible, while "self-defens_" "collective self-
defense," and "community police action" are regarded as permissible.
In more factual terms_ coercions which create in the target state
realistic expectations, as third parties might determine, that it must
employ the military instrument in defense of its territorial integrity
and political independence are prohibited; coercions undertaken,
whether by the target state or the general community, in defense
against such initial, precipitating coercions are permissible.
As indispensable as are the basic distinctions of the United Nations
Charter to the maintenance of even a minimum public order in the
Earth-space community, the application of these distinctions under the
conditions of man's access to space must be infinitely more difficult
than ever before. Some indication of this difficulty may be observed
in the contemporary debate about the lawfulness of the Soviet-Cuban
quarantine imposed by the United States in the fall of 1962. Many
observers emphasizing various significant features of the context, such
as the bypassing of the United States' DEW warning line and the ex-
pansionist objectives of the Soviets, have concluded that the United
States was justified in making a proportional use of the military in-
strument in self-defense; other observers, emphasizing other features
of the context, have come to a different conclusion. If, however, the
case of the Soviet-Cuban quarantine is difficult, consider how much
more difficult rational general community decision will 'be when the
Earth is 'being circled by nuclear-tipped warheads, when reconnais-
sance spacecraft can catch the most minute details of activities on
Earth, and so on. It is not my suggestion that reliance upon the
lo More detailed discussion of these claims may be found in McDouoAL & FELI-
CIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL COERCION, ch8. 3, 4 (1961).
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development of a customary consensus, or any other presently known
alternative, can make this problem easy of solution.
With respect to the second modality of claim, that demanding the
employment of appropriate general community sanctioning techniques
in promotion of minimum order, certain other distinctions must be
taken. When the overriding goal of minimizing unauthorized coer-
cion and violence across particular community lines is closely exam-
ined, it may be seen to include a variety of subgoals, such as prevention
(the long-term preclusion of occasion for resort to unauthorized co-
ercion), deterrence (short-term preclusion of resort to .unauthorized
coercion in contexts of immediate threat), restoration of order (the
stopping or arrest of unauthorized coercion after it is underway),
rehabilitation (the short-term binding up of wounds), and reconstruc-
tion (long-term efforts to affect participants and conditions in such
a way as to preclude further resort to unauthorized coercion). For
the more immediate, better securing of such particularized subgoals as
these, the promise of customary development is of course quite limited.
The appropriate promotion of such objectives must require new, ex-
plicit agreement--as difficult as it is to achieve---upon new structures of
authority and new sanctioning procedures capable of employing our
developing technology for defense of, rather than attack upon, public
order. Should the necessary new agreement continue to be unobtain-
able, however, our only recourse will be to unilateral action projected
in the hope of creating expectations of future uniformities in conduct.
Th.us, the contemporary statements by United States officials that
the United States does not intend to place nuclear-tipped warheads
in orbit are obviously being made in invitation to the Russians to
engage in reciprocal restraint. Reciprocal restraint in minimizing
one threat could, in the historic manner of customary development,
expand to embrace the minimization of other threats.
7. Minimizing LossesFromlesserCoercionsand Deprivations
In the future exploration and enjoyment of space it can only be
anticipated that many different injuries, other than those sufficiently
substantial to amount to violations of minimum order, will be imposed
upon many participants in Earth-space social process. The occasions
of such injuries may include the conduct of hazardous activities, dis-
regard of safety standards, unsuccessful performance of launching
apparatus, malfunction of spacecraft, and so on. In any particular
instance, the injury may have been deliberately sought or may be
merely an incidental or unintended outcome. The range in types
of potential injury is enormous, but some of the more probable types
of events arising out of space activity about which states may make
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claims against other states include surface impacts, collisions, pollu-
tions or contaminations, interference with telecommunications, and
invasions of privacy.
The difficult policy issue confronting the general community with
respect to probable injuries from space activities is that of balancing
the inclusive interest of all peoples in encouraging the utmost possible
exploration and exploitation of space against the exclusive interest of
particular participants in not being subjected to unique burdens, with-
out deriving unique benefits, from space activities. Comprehensively
considered, an appropriate general community policy of minimizing
losses from unauthorized deprivations would include s_bgoals, com-
parable to those noted above with respect to major coercions, of preven-
tion, deterrence, restoration, r_habilitation, and reconstruction. With
respect to all five of the types of events specified as offering possibil-
ities of claims to authority, the general community can, fortunately,
draw upon a rich experience derived from analogous situations.
Though the future space problems may not be precisely the same, this
experience in analogous situations does create certain expectations
about appropriate future decision.
Thus, with respect to claims concerning impact with the surface
of the Earth, there is the experience from the regulation of extra-
hazardous activities within particular states, from air transport law,
and from the recent regulation of atomic energy. The sum of this
experience suggests certain trends in decision discernible with reason-
able clarity: (a) Toward the imposition of absolute liability; (b)
toward the limitation, by fixed maximums, of the aggregate amount
of liability; (c) toward the use of money damages, rather than the
injunction, as a remedy when the questioned activity is generally ben-
eficial; and (d) toward a requirement of compulsory insurances.
With respect to claims arising from collisions, there is the expe-
rience with ships and aircraft. This would suggest that the rules of
the road will be highly determinative and that liability will not be
based upon conceptions of absolute liability. When fault cannot be
ascertained, responsibility will probably be shared.
For claims concerning pollutions, there is a developing experience
from activities upon the oceans and in airspace and the traditional
national laws of nuisance. It may be recalled that in the famous
Trail Smelter 17ease Canada was held re_ponsibh for injuries caused
within the United States by noxious fumes originating in Canada.
Though it did not concede liability, the United States paid a large
sum to Japanese fishermen injured by its nuclear tests in the Pacific.
The probability is that distinctions will be taken between different
xT3 U.N. REP. II_T'L ARBITRAL AWARDS 1905 (1963).
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types of pollutions: for ultrahazardous activities, deliberately under-
taken, absolute liability may be imposed ; for less hazardous, ordinarily
beneficial activities the less onerous test of reasonableness from his-
toric "nuisance" doctrines may be applied.
For claims arising from interferences with telecommumcations, the
processes of customary crystallization of consensus are not likely to
prove adequate. Even within national communities special agencies
have been required for allocation of uses, for the licensing of users,
for the assignment of frequencies to specific users, and for the formu-
lation and application of standards with respect to transmission tech-
niques and equipment designed to minimize interferences. Future
developments with respect to space activities will largely depend upon
achievement of appropriate comprehensive arrangement for all uses
of the radio spectrum, including those relating to space activities,
and the establishment of effective structures of authority and sanction-
ing techniques.
The claims concerning invasions of privacy by observations from
space, other than those which endanger military security, will probably
get pretty short shrift. The interests of all mankind in the exploration
and use of space are too great to encourage the protection of a "right
of privacy" in territorial communities comparable to that which some
mature societies protect in the individual.
8. Enjoymentand Acquisition of Resources
Like the resources of the Earth, the presently known or anticipated
resources of space may conveniently be classified into three main cate-
gories: Spatial-extension resources, such as surfaces or voids, whose
distinctive characteristic is their utility as media of transportation
and communication; flow or renewable resources, which have "suc-
cessively available quantities" becoming available at different inter-
vals and are variously affected by human action; and stock or
nonrenewable resources, whose characteristic is that the "total physi-
cal quantity does not increase significantly with time" and which may
be either abundant or scarce. 18 Space resources of the first kind in-
clude the void of space, the surfaces of celestial bodies, and the con-
tiguous space surrounding celestial bodies. The more important
known flow resources are represented by cosmic rays, other radiations,
magnetic and gravitational forces, gases, meteorites, asteroids, and the
atmospheres of celestial bodies. Stock resources may include supplies
of minerals or other useful materials found on celestial bodies. With
The quoted words are from CIRIAcY-WANTRUP, RESOURCECONSERVATION : ECO-
NOMICSANDPOLICIES37-38, 35 (1952), from whom the second and third categori-
zations are adopted.
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respect to all these resources s and others still to be discovereds the
two principal types of claims to authority to be anticipated_ if man's
experience on Earth affords a useful guides are, first s those relating
to whether or not a resource may be subjected to exclusive appropria-
tion and s second_ those relating to the modalities by which a resource s
decided to be subject to such claim s may be appropriated.
It is familiar knowledge that s in response to claims of the first type_
many important resources of the Earth have been held to be not sub-
ject to exclusive appropriation. Among such resources are the oceans
and their riches s the airspace above the oceans s international rivers s
and the polar areas. The only resources which have been generally
held subject to exclusive appropriation are the indispensable com-
ponents of state territory: the land masses s immediately superincum-
bent airspace s internal waters s and closely proximate ocean areaa
The recognition has in recent times been nearly universal that s when
resources technologically admit of sharing_ inclusive use and compe-
tence make possible both a much greater production of all values
and a more certain fairness in the distribution of values. The dif-
ferent decision with respect to land masses may be accounted for both
by their physical characteristics s combining both spatial-extension
and stock resources and exhibiting difficult natural barriers to move-
ments and by the whole hi_tory of the development of the family and
tribe into the nation-state.
The expectations of the peoples of the world would appear s happily s
already to have crystallized into a consensus s as explicit and precise
as customary consensus ever is_ that the sharable resources of space_
like those of the Earth_ are to be held free of exclusive appropriation
and open to enjoyment by all on a basis of equality. The documen-
tation of this consensus for the void of space was offered in the dis-
cussion of the claims to inclusive access. The same official spokesmen_
national and international s and the same formal resolutions demand-
ing inclusive access to the void haves however, equally demanded
inclusive access and enjoyment with respect to other resources. Thus s
the important United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Inter-
national Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space_ of Decem-
ber 20, 1961 s adopted with the support of both the United States and
the Soviet Union and without a single dissenting vote, reads simply :
"Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by
all States in conformity with international law and are not subject
to national appropriation." 19 In the light of our present knowledges
it would not appear likely that any of the resources of space s other per-
1. supra note 12. See also U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Ree. 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17 at
6 (A./5026) (1961).
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haps than some of the scarce stock resources of the celestial bodies,
will be held subject to exclusive appropriation.
With respect to the second type of claim, that relating to the modal-
ities by which a resource subject to appropriation can be appropriated,
man's rich experience in the allocation of the continents of the :Earth
has, again, created expectations that only "effective occupation," as
contrasted with discovery and symbolic annexation, can serve com-
mon interest. It is only with respect to a few isolated islands in the
Pacific that symbolic activities have been found adequate to establish
exclusive title. The kind of "effective occupation" historically re-
quired for establishing exclusive claim to the larger land masses of
the Earth hast further, been not merely some single act of assertion
of naked power but rather a continuous and comprehensive process in
utilization and enjoyment. Such process has been required to include,
as elsewhere summarized:
• . . an identifiable participant taking effective control of the resource, as effec-
tiveness may be determined by the varying characteristics of the resource and
context, giving notice to the world through appropriate ceremonials or otherwise
of its intent to acquire, asserting authority over the resource in its management
as a continuing base of power, and employing the resource in strategies appro-
priate to its characteristics in the production of values. _
The adoption of a comparable requirement for any space resources
which may be held to be subject to exclusive appropriation could of
course r because of the very great difficulties which may be encountered
in establishing such effective occupation s greatly reinforce the sub-
stantive policy favoring the greatest possible inclusiveness in access
and enjoyment.
9. Conduct o| Organized Enterprisory Activities
It is not to be expected that the peoples of the world, in their
demands for new values, will stop short with the un_rrgarn_d
inclusive exploitation of space; much greater promise inheres, because •
of the augmentation in resources and skills made possible, in organized
inclusive exploitation. Increasing demands can be expected for the
establishment of many new international organizations, both public
and private, for the direct conduct of enterprisory activities, as con-
trasted with mere supervision or regulation, in exploi_tion and enjoy-
ment of the great shamble resources of space. This demand is already
insistently being made with respect to the communication activities,
which are to be subject to more detailed consideration later in this
conference. The kinds of claims to authority which can be expected
McDougal, Lasswell, Vlasic & Smith, The En$oymen_ and Acqu@it_r_ oi
Resource8 in Outer Space, 111 U. PA. L. R_-v. 521, 529 (1963).
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to accompany these demands for new inclusive organizations will no
doubt parallel those which have hitherto attended the establishment
and operation of any international organization. They will relate
to the constitution of an enterprise as a legal personality, separate
from its members or agents; to the recognition of this separate legal
personality by nonmembers; to the imposition of community limita-
tions upon the objectives of the enterprise; to regulation of access
by the enterprise for conduct of activities _both to outer space and to
the territorial domains of particular states; to the allocation and pro-
tection of base values (finances, powers of operation, privileges, and
immunities) ; to regulation of employment by the enterprise of strat-
egies in agreement and deprivation; to the appropriate distribution
of the benefits achieved or the losses incurred by the enterprise; and
to the termination of the enterprise.
The common interest of all peoples would appear to require the
utmost general community encouragement of the establishment of
appropriately inclusive, organized enterprisory activities. Important
models for this encouragement, creating expectations of the course of
future decision, can, fortunately, be found both in the vast customary,
constitutional law of international governmental organizations, de-
veloped during the last century, and in the even older private inter-
national law principles, designed to promote and sustain an inter-
national economy, which protect private enterprises in their activities
transcending state lines.
10. Interaction With Non-Earth Advanced Forms of Life
Many leading scientists now regard the presence of life, perhaps
in strange new forms, elsewhere in the universe as highly probable.
It may perhaps be conceded, without too great detrimeut to our
general thesis, that with respect to possible inCeractions between man
and non-Earth advanced forms of life, the historic expectations of
customary law forecast future decision with somewhat less clarity
than they do with respect to the other more definitely anticipatable
problems we have been considering. Such expectations may not,
however, be entirely irrelevant.
In considering the conceivable relevance of our Earth experience
in the management of these esoteric claims, we may pose three possi-
bilities: The non-Earth advanced forms of life may be our inferiors,
our equals, or our superiors in culture and technology. If they are
our inferiors, our experience with spheres-of-influence mandate or
trusteeship devices, direct intergovernmental administration, and a
vast variety of internal techniques in the devolution of authority and
control may all become relevant. If they are our equals, our whole
728--323
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Earth experience--as unfortunate as it has been in movement toward
unity--will of course continue to be relevant. If they are our su-
periors, the relevant decisions may not be ours to take. The problem
confronting more advanced forms of life may be that of segregating
and isolating us, pending our reeducation or elimination; some of
man's experience on Earth might possibly be pertinent to their re-
quired choices. Our problem might possibly be that of how grace-
fully to commit mass suicide.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Even so brief a r_sum_ of contemporary expectations about probable
future decision on the various types of important problems expected
to arise from space activities should suffice to establish, as we made
initial promise, that the critics who so clamantly bemoan the lack of
a law of space are needlessly, and dangerously, destructive of existing
achievement. The most comprehensive process of authoritative de-
cision previously established for the Earth arena--the basic "con-
stitutive" process of public and private international law--has al-
ready clearly been extended by customary consensus to the whole of
the Earth-space arena, and remains as available for the regulation of
activities in space as for the regulation of activities upon the oceans
or elsewhere. The more fundamental general community prescrip-
tions presently being formulated and projected by this progress for
the regulation of the various types of problems, furthermore, do not
depart importantly from the policies which a responsible citizen of the
larger community of mankind might recommend to other responsible
citizens in promotion of a comprehensive public order of human
dignity. In view of these developments, the fact that some of the
problems are not amenable to prescription other than by explicit agree-
ment should not be made cause, in responsible performance of in-
telligence and recommending functions, for undercutting the substan-
tial consensus already achieved on many problems without formal
agreement.
Whether the peoples of the world will be able to continue to main-
tain a comprehensive constitutive process capable of clarifying and
implementing their common interests with respect to space activities,
or with respect to any other activities anywhere located, must of
course depend upon many changing conditions in the whole Earth-
space community process. Should the Communists prevail in the
contemporary confrontation of totalitarian and free-society world
public orders, they can be expected to establish a monolithic, central-
ized constitutive process quite unlikely to clarify human dignity values
with respect to space or any other activities. In support of more op-
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timistic expectations, it may, however, be noted that in recent cen-
turies, at least, no single power or-bloc of powers has been able to
achieve the scientific and technological capabilities necessary to domi-
nation of the whole Earth arena and that during these centuries the
oceans of the world have been established and maintained, by states
having very different internal structures of effective control and
authority, as a great sharable resource, open for the free and inclusive
enjoyment of all peoples. Indeed, it may be emphasized that all the
progress toward a public order of space compatible with human dig-
nity values, recounted above, has been achieved despite the deep
division between the totalitarian and free-society public orders and
the expanding confrontation of rich and impoverished communities;
the inexorable necessities of interdependence or interdetermination in
shared enjoyment have exacted compromise in both ideological and
material aspirations. In line with these past trends, it is hardly to
be expected that in the calculable future any single power or bloc of
powers will attain the scientific and technological capability of estab-
lishing a durable effective control over the whole Earth-space arena,
but it can be realistically expected, as was indicated at the beginning
of this discussion, that the interdependences for all values of all
peoples everywhere will tremendously intensify. Under such condi-
tions it would not appear an entirely forlorn hope for proponents of a
free society to continue to seek alternatives for the promotion of a
constitutive process and public-order decisions more in accord with
their preferred values.
The alternatives open to us as responsible citizens of the larger
community of mankind for promoting a more appropriate compre-
hensive law and public order for the Earth-space arena depend in
measure upon who we are. For thos_ of us who are observers or
scholars--legal craftsmen outside government--the most urgent task
is that of improving our intelligence procedures and activities for
the better clarification of common interest and for the more effective
instigation of appropriate action by both officials and private citizens
at all levels in every particular community. It is our responsibility
to clarify in all necessary detail the relevant goals of a comprehen-
sive public order of human dignity, to supply the flow of information
which will give peoples a clearer perception of the realities which
condition their choices, and to suggest the measures which may affect
peoples' identifications toward a greater inelusivity, perhaps even
embracing non-Earth advanced forms of life. For those of us who
are officials, the responsibility is even greater: it is that of building
upon appropriate intelligence to make and implement the decisions
which will move mankind more certainly toward the preferred corn-
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prehensive law and public order. The new technological capabilities
afforded us by access to space give us, fortunately, some added hope
that we may eventually be able to discharge these responsibilities.
Comments
Carl Q. Christol
In his paper Professor McDougal has referred to many areas of
the law in addition to international law, including property, con-
tracts, torts, evidence, criminal law, constitutional law, !negotiable
instruments in the sense that he mentioned the law merchant--in
fact, the whole field of jurisprudence. He has given us a great amount
to think about. My remarks will deal with four questions re-
lated to Professor McDougal comments, with which I agree almost
entirely except possibly for slight differences in emphasis.
My first question is: What is going on in space ? There is nothing
going on in space that is not going on upon the Earth. It seems to me
that space is man oriented. The same old problems will arise there
that have been arising on the Earth for a long time. In addressing
ourselves to the social complex in the context of outer space there
is something that is new, however, and we should not lose sight of it.
The new factor is the matter of tempo.
Professor McDougal commented on this. He noted in effect that,
because of the rapidity with which things are happening, space and
time do not have quite the same meaning for the development of the
law of outer space that they had for the law of the _a. Tempo
has presented some new and interesting challenges, and if we lawyers
do not take into account the tempo of our times as it is affected by
what is going on in space, we are surely going to be overtaken by
events.
The second question is : From a strictly nationalistic point of view,
should there be a law for outer space ? In other words, before we
get to the problem of the specific forms for international space agree-
ments, and even before we get to the problem of customary law,
which is so important here, the question must be asked: Is it in the
interest of the United States to have a law of outer space? Or is it
in our interest to support the existence of a somewhat chaotic con-
dition in outer space--that is, a legal vacuum ?
The answer to this depends upon our analysis of American military
and scientific capability. Possibly, on an even broader scale,
• • J $
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it depends upon our intellectual preeminence. Although I do not pre-
tend to have any special information, it is my impression that we in
the free world are at a position in the world's sciantifie-teehnological
competition which permits us to think in terms of a legal order.
It seems unreasonable at this time to believe that one nation is so
far ahead of the others in science and technology that it can control
and dominate space, and therefore eliminate the notions of mutuality
of interest and reciprocity in the peaceful use of outer space.
In short, on balance, the United States is in a very favorable
competitive position in this whole area of intellectual preeminence.
And as a result of this, it seems to me we can talk in terms of sponsor-
ing and participating in a legal order for outer space.
Third, What has been and is the role of custom ._ As has been
pointed out, you cannot get away from the subject of custom in the
field of law. You cannot get away from it any more than you can
live without air. Despite the protestations of the Soviets, custom is
very much a part of the international decisional process and cannot
be ignored in our thinking about space.
Professor McDougal has talked about claims_ claims as put forth in
the international community. It is true that this is a way in which
custom grows and develops, and in which customary international law
--which is a fundamental source of international law--operates. The
claim concept recognizes that custom is a major process for the devel-
opment of international law. The world community lacks an effec-
tively centralized institutional process. At this point I might disagree
just a little with Professor McDougal, who seems to hold that such a
process is perhaps less primitive than I regard it. In any event, it
is true that the national organization of institutions on legislative-
executive-judicial-administrative bases is quite different from the situ-
ation at the international level. And, certainly, the United Nations
and other international organizations are doing a great deal to form-
ulate and put forward customary concepts. For this they are to be
applauded, but there is still a very great need to continue with the
development of space law through the processes of custom.
In considering the claim process one has to take into account all
of the factors in the social complex--the political_ the legal, the
scientific, the technological, and even the spiritual--and put these to-
gether and let them work. Out of the working--the boiling in the
caldron--of these factors will come a crystallization of ideas; concepts
will harden, and the dross will be rejected. Customary principles
will be accepted and in the course of time will be refined by rules.
But all of the claims which Professor McDougal has emphasized
depend on the mutuality of relationships, on rights and duties, on
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mutual self-interest, and on a certain amount of good faith. As he
pointed out, the claim process works only in the context of reciprocal
tolerances.
It is necessary to remember, with respect to the development of
customary law, that claims are first put forth unilaterally by a nation,
later by several nations, by the resource states, and finally, by the
entire community. Whereas I subscribe to the point made by Pro-
fessor McDougal that the entire community has to be consulted with
respect to the growth of the custom and customary law, still it is im-
portant to recognize that the resource states--in this instance, the
Unied States and the Soviet Union-- by reason of their capabilities or
conduct, their practices and activities, have a great deal of responsi-
bility and do preponderately guide and lead in the development of
custom.
Now, what do international lawyers look for when they seek to
determine whether a rule of customary international law does exist ._
It is easy to talk about custom, but how do we ascertain in a practical
way whether it exists, whether it has been recognized, and so on ?
First of all, we must look at conduct--conduct in the form of prac-
tice or usage. Second, we consider the length of time that the practice
has been engaged in. Professor McDougal was completely correct
when he said there is no fixed requirement as to any period of time.
Some writers say custom develops like a glacier, very slowly. Others
say it develops gradually. Others have pointed to situations in which
custom has developed rapidly. You cannot generalize; you have to
look at specific conduct or activity. Custom has developed slowly in
such areas as diplomatic practices, the immunities granted to coastal
fishing ships, and the law merchant. It has developed rapidly where
physical assets need to be used, such as in maritime rules of the road,
sovereignty over air space, rights in the continental shelf, and, even,
the free and peaceful uses of outer space. Rapid development has
resulted where proprietary rights, as in commercial activities, and
national security are at stake. Therefore, I would say with Professor
McDougal that the customary law of space in these tempestuous
times is developing rapidly.
Then there is the matter of frequency of occurrence--the matter of
repetition. Here we can turn to the satellites that were launched dur-
ing the International Geophysical Year (IGY) and subsequently.
We can also observe the specific functions, principally scientific, for
which such satellites were designed. By looking carefully at the prac-
tical operations actually pursued we can draw some conclusions as
to the real nature of customary space law.
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Uniformity of practice is another aspect. Is practice continuous
and uninterrupted ? Practice by whom ? Here again I would agree
with Professor McDougal that the practice can be that of individual
persons or groups of persons as well as of states or groups of states.
The practices of international organizations are also pertinent. The
IGY was logistically supported by national governments_ but it was
certainly planned and contemplated by private persons. They had a
great deal to do with the development of the orbiting of spacecraft
and vehicles for so-called "peaceful purposes."
Now, in addition, there is the matter of resource states--the effort
to broaden the base of resource states. When the United States has
launched meteorological or weather-forecasting satellites_ it has given
advance notice to the entire world of the prospective dates of such
launches. The United States has also made it possible for many states
with limited financial resources to equip themselves with machinery
and devices whereby they can monitor and participate in the read-
outs that have been coming from the weather satellites. So here are
the efforts to broaden the bases of participation and practice.
And certainly the United Nations--all of the nation-states partici-
pating there--have considered themselves entitled to discuss the
development of customary law and to participate in its formulation.
Another problem the international lawyer has to consider in think-
ing about existing customary law is: Upon whom is it binding ? This
is something that Professor McDougal did not touch upon very specif-
ically. It is true that there are new nation-states in the world today
that say_ "We came into being after your customary law was de-
veloped. And the customary law which is now in existence, to the
extent that it does exist, was based upon legal principles and concepts
over which we had no control and which are foreign to us." So they
are occasionally suggesting that they may challenge the efficacy of
customary law. This stand, of course, is being rejected, and properly
so, by those who derive advantages from an orderly way of doing
things, including orderly space activities.
This leads to the additional question, which was well stressed : Can
major states thwart the development of international customary law ?
Here the Soviet Union's sovereignty begins to show through. Their
concepts of peaceful coexistence, equal rights, respect for sovereignty_
nonaggression, and nonintervention all point in the direction that
international law--in their view--is to be produced essentially
through specific agreement. To use the terms of contract law, they
seem to follow the "will" theory, the concept of the express agreement,
memorialized in writing; whereas the Western World seems to be
following, at least in part, the "injurious reliance" theory, based upon
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the concept that acts speak louder than words. Custom is a suitable
source of such law.
Existing law must be found_ and for customary law this presents a
serious difficulty. A statute is tangible. Customary law is much
less so_ and therefore demands recourse to many references. One can
examine the statements of publicists, the records of diplomatic instruc-
tions and negotiations_ the statements of diplomats, judicial decisions,
resolutions of international organizations, the practices of interna-
tional organizations_ municipal laws_ treaties, and most importantly,
the existence of observable common conduct. For the last_ the
searcher must always hope that such conduct is so broadly respected as
to eliminate doubts as to its existence and the duty to Conform.
If the existence of customary international law is assumed, there
still remains the problem of conforming to it in the forum of claim.
Diplomatic negotiations may result in so much persuasion that cus-
tomary international law is honored. The international courts_ how-
ever, have raised hard problems respecting proof of custom. In the
Asylum case, for example, the World Court indicated that the party
relying on custom must prove that a rule exists and that it is binding
on the adversary party. The Court declared that it must be shown
that the rule invoked "is in accordance with a constant and uniform
practice by the States in question." In view of such difficulties as
these, it is my view that the concept of a customary international law,
possessing great utility as it does, should not be subjected to overly
tendentious strictures. It should be given a fair opportunity to
demonstrate the large services which it can provide to th_ interna-
tional community.
My fourth and final question is: Do we have any tentative answers
to the problem of customary law at this time ? There is great reluc-
tance among lawyers to talk about answers_ so I use the qualifying
adjective %entative." The answer is assuredly yes; we do have some
tentative answers.
This is to be seen in the conduct of states. This is to be seen in the
writings of international lawyers. Since conduct literally cannot
speak itself, one must speak for it. It is the role of international
lawyers to announce the existence of customary rules of laws. They
have been pointing out certain fundamental principles--not neces-
sarily rules, but fundamental principles---:of customary international
law. These are to be found in writings, in conduct, and more officially
in the resolutions adopted by the United Nations. The Unite_l Na-
tions resolutions, which have sometimes been referred to as soft laws_
as opposed to hard laws in the treaty sense, do, I think, reflect the sit-
uation with respect to customary international law at the present
time.
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In conclusion I will point up what I consider these customary prin-
ciples_ promulgated unanimously by the General Assembly, to be.
The first principle is that outer space is to be used for peaceful pur-
poses. This raises an important question as to the meaning of "peace-
ful." The position taken by our own State Department is that peace-
ful means a use which is nonaggressive and beneficial to mankind.
Therefore, it would appear that there can be peaceful nonaggressive
military uses of outer space. The current uses of space would seem to
come within the category of peaceful. Certainly the definition of
peacefuly whatever it may ultimately bey is going to be the product
of political-legal thinking. It will be the product of customary law
no less than express agreement.
Secondy it is quite clear that the free use of space for exploration
and for peaceful purposes has worked its way into customary inter-
national law. Furthery I think the resolutions of the United Nationsy
particularly Resolution 1721 (XVI) of 1961, indicate there may be
no national appropriation of outer space or of celestial bodies. And
alsos this particular resolution requires that space be governed by
international law and by the U.N. Charter. Here it seems to me are
the principles that have been developed by a customary process.
This is not to say that the Sovietsy as the other major resource states
have completely agreed with other states as to the detailed meaning
of such principles. As Professor McDougal pointed out, they have
been attacking the notion that space operations may be carried out
by private corporations. They are opposed to Telestar's private
status and to the United States Communications Satellite Corpora-
tiony which I judge most of us would consider to have certain private
aspects at least. They are hostile to the notion of propaganda being
carried out in spaces and seem to make some implied threats in terms
of reciprocity when they interject the problem of racial ideas into the
propaganda field.
Further s they have been inclined to argue that "espionagey" that
iss collection of intelligence data in a state by satellites_ is contrary to
international law. I think this is highly debatable. It may be that
espionage is contrary to national law. Whether international law
takes a stand on this use of spacey I am inclined to doubt. But at least
the Soviets are trying to work these ideas into the customary caldreny
and past the rejection process of custom. At the same time_ by attack-
ing customy they are making it difficulty as I see ity for the basic
principles of Resolution 1721 (XVI) to be extended and enlarged.
If we can agree that there are some of these principles in existence--
at least tentatively_then the next step is to derive rules from these
principles; for instances to work out the specific agreements with re-
spect to liability and the return of individuals in spacecraft that fall
within one country while carrying the flag of another country.
The "Freedom" of Outer Space:
Some Problems of Sovereignty,
Control, and Jurisdiction
JohnA. Johnson
OUTER SPACE IS :NOT A LAW'LESS DOMAIN. This is true despite the
alarms raised by some who seem to think that the absence of interna-
tional agreements legislating a new code for outer space signifies a
total lack of law and order in that new sphere of human activity.
As we become accustomed to the prospect of man's exploration and
utilization of outer space, and as we see more clearly the great divers-
ity of space operations--scientific, commercial, and military--I think
there is a growing awareness that the existing international legal order
embraces outer space and all of man's activities there. The legal
framework within which space activities have been conducted is by
no means a static one. It has been steadily growing and evolving
from the time of the first satellite launching.
The element of this legal structure which first excited the interest
of commentators is the relation of space activities to the principle
of territorial sovereignty. The rule of territorial sovereignty in the
airspace became firmly established as the direct result of World
War I and the world's first experience with the potential power of
military aviation. The Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Nav-
igation signed at Paris in 1919 proclaimed the "complete and exclu-
sive" sovereignty of each state in the airspace over its territory. This
rule was restated in Article 1 of the Chicago Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation of 1944. Although the Soviet Union is still
not a party to the Convention, it has asserted by its statutes, and has
vigorously enforced, claims to absolute sovereignty in its airspace.
"Airspace" is undefined in the Chicago Convention, and the Con-
vention places no limit on the upward extent of territorial sov-
ereignty. Although it is inconceivable that the Convention was in-
tended to assert an infinite extension of sovereignty, the fact remains
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that no nation has yet agreed that the airspace above its land and
territorial waters has any definite upward limit.
International law recognizes the right of each nation to exclude
from its "airspace" any object or activity whatsoevcr_ regardless of
its use or purpose. It is on the foundation of this unqualified power
of exclusion residing in the territorial sovereign that the various na-
tions have erected the present structure of bilateral and multilateral
aviation agreements which determine the conditions on which entry
into and the use of a nation's airspace are permitted.
Prior to the launching of the first Earth-orbiting satellites, it had
become apparent that the absence of agreement on the upward extent
of the space which is under the exclusive control of the underlying
state presented a potential legal problem. If territorial sovereignty
were to be regarded as reaching to the altitudes at which orbital
flight took place_ space activities could be conducted only on the
same basis as aviation, namely, by the explicit consent of every nation
over whose territory the spacecraft passed.
With this background in mind, the actual behavior of both the
space powers as well as all the other members of the community of
nations during the past 51/_ years is most significant. Neither the
United States nor the Soviet Union proceeded on the basis of obtain-
ing prior consent of other states in the conduct of their space activ-
ities. Beginning with the launching of the first sputnik in October
1957, during the International Geophysical Year_ numerous Earth-
orbiting satellites launched by both the United States and the Soviet
Union have repeatedly passed over the land and territorial waters of
every nation on Earth. No permission was sought in advance by
the launching st ate_ none was expressly _ven by any other state,
and not a single protest has be_n registered by any state to the over-
flight of spacecraft during these 51/_ years. The conclusion seems
inescapable that the nations of the world have not regarded territorial
sovereignty--that is, their power of unilateral exclusion--as extend-
ing as high as the point at which the orbiting of these satellites has
occurred.
It is not necessary, however, to conclude from this that terri-
torial sovereignty embraces, or should embrace_ all of the space
below the lowest altitude at which satellites have orbited. A wide
variety of proposed solutions to the so-called boundary problem have,
in fact, been put forward by commentators writing on the subject;
and I shall have more to say about this subject later. At this point_
however, I wish to emphasize that neither the United States nor the
Soviet Union has made any proposal for an international agreement
dealing with this problem, nor has it been the subject of systematic
study in the United Nations. Rather_ the emphasis up to the present
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time has been on establishing a rule of freedom in outer space, and
on recognizing that no portion of outer space, wherever the border
between it and territorial airspace may be, is subject to the exclusive
control of the underlying state.
In June 1959, the first United Nations committee to deal with outer-
space matters, the Ad Hoc Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (in which the Soviet Union did not participate), included the
following statement in its report:
During the International Geophysical Year 1957-1958 and subsequently, coun-
tries throughout the world proceeded on the premise of the permissibility of the
launching and flight of the space vehicles which were launched regardless of
what territory they passed "over" during the course of their flight through outer
space. The Committee, bearing in mind that its terms of reference refer ex-
clusively to the peaceful uses of outer space, believes that, with this practice,
there may have been initiated the recognition or establishment of a generally
accepted rule to the effect that, in principle, outer space is, on conditions of
equality, freely available for exploration and use by all in accordance with
existing or future international law or agreements.
The Ad Hoc Committee was aware, of course, of the so-called bound-
ary problem. Noting that "under the terms of existing international
conventions and customary international law, States have complete
and exclusive sovereignty in the air space above their territories and
territorial waters," the Committee made the following observation:
The current existence of a region in space which is not subject to the same
regime [as air space] raises such questions as where air space ends and outer
space begins. It was noted that these limits do not necessarily coincide. While
they have been much discussed in scholarly writing, there is no consensus among
publicists concerning the location of these limits.
The Committe concluded by recording the general belief of its mem-
bers "that the determination of precise limits for air space and outer
space did not present a legal problem calling for priority considera-
tion at this time.
In the period following the Committee report, the United States
and the Soviet Union continued their satellite launchings with increas-
ing frequency, without seeking the prior consent of other states, and
without encountering any objections to their overflight. When the
subject of outer space again came before the United Nations in Decem-
ber 1961, the tentative tone of the Ad Hoc Committee was replaced
by a forthright declaration. Without a single dissenting vote, the
United Nations General Assembly adopted, on December 20, 1961, a
resolution dealing with space activities which contains the following:
The General Assembly . . .
1. Commends to States for their guidance in the exploration and use of outer
space the following principles :
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(a) International law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies
to outer space and celestial bodies;
(b) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all
States in conformity with international law and are not subject to national
appropriation. . . .
The General Assembly's resolution did not attempt to define "outer
space." In commenting on this aspect of the subject prior to adoption
of the resolution, Ambassador Stevenson remarked:
The members of the committee will note tlmt we have not attempted to define
where outer space begins. In our judgment, it is premature to do this now.
The attempt to draw a boundary between air space and outer space must await
further experience and a consensus among nations.
Fortunately the value of the principles of freedom of space and celestial
bodies does not depend on the drawing of a boundary line. If I may cite the
analogy of the high seas, we have been able to confirm the principle of freedom
of the seas even in the absence of complete agreement as to where the seas begin.
The problem, however, it not "where outer space begins" but where
the upward reach of the exclusive power of the underlying state ends.
Under the existing state of the law, there is an area of space extending
upward from the surface of the Earth for an indefinite distance which
is controlled solely by the state below, with the unqualified power of
excluding others from its use. While it is safe to conclude that this
area does not extend so high as to include the orbital paths of satel-
lites, there is no agreement that it terminates at any lower altitude.
If the legal situation were to be left in this condition, it is doubtful
that it would provide a satisfactory basis for assuring the freedom of
space exploration during the coming years. If we are to achieve the
goal so clearly enunciated by our spokesmen in the United Nations--
namely, that man should enjoy the freedom to explore space just as
he has been free to venture forth on the high seas--international law
must recognize appropriate limitations on the "closed" space which is
under the exclusive control of each underlying state.
If we were concerned solely with the actual orbiting of spacecraft
about the Earth, there would be no problem. The problem exists,
however, because all spacecraft, before injection into orbit, must first
be launched through the airspace. Likewise, all space missions in-
volving reentry and landing--and here is where manned space flight
dominates the scene--require that the spacecraft move back through
the airspace on their return to Earth.
In the case of manned space flight, both the initial phase of launch
and injection into orbit and the terminal phase of reentry and landing
involve traverses of considerable distance, horizontally measured, at
altitudes less than that at which orbital flight occurs. Typically,
the terminal phase follows a "flatter" flight path, covering a greater
horizontal distance, than does the initial phase of manned space flight.
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Project Mercury demonstrates the point. At the time of firing
the retro-rockets which initiate reentry_ the astronaut is at an altitude
of about 100 miles_ approximately 2,600 miles from the intended
point of landing. In the first 2,000 miles after retro-fire_ the astronaut
comes down to an altitude of about 50 miles. While descending to an
altitude of 25 miles, he moves another 550 miles horizontally and
reaches a point only 50 miles from his destination. Thereafter he
descends very rapidly; and by the time he comes down to an altitude
of 10 mile$_ he is over the landing site and making a vertical descent.
As we proceed beyond Mercury with the Gemini and Apollo space-
craft, more extended and flatter reentry flight paths are clearly
foreseeable. It now appears that the manned vehicles which will
be developed over the next 5 to 10 years will reenter the atmosphere
rather steeply, level out, and glide at altitudes ranging from about 25 to
60 miles for distances perhaps as great as 7_000 to 10_000 miles before
landing. Such flights inevitably will pose the question of whether
the permission of any or all of the states underlying the reentry flight
path must be obtained because of the altitude of overflight.
I mentioned earlier that a wide variety of proposed solutions to
the so-called boundary problem have been put forward by com-
mentators writing about the subject. These proposals_ in the main_
have suggested boundaries derived from the physical characteristics
of the aerospace environment. For example, it has been suggested
that the territorial airspace should be defined as extending as high
as flight on purely aerodynamic principles is theoretically possible,
which is believed to be at an altitude of about 50 miles. It has also
been proposed that the line of demarcation be set at the lowe_t
altitude at which orbital flight of a satellite can occur.
It seems clear, however, that the problem of delimiting the ter-
ritorial air space is essentially a political one which will not be solved
in this manner.
The X-15, the latest of our research airplanes_ provides a good
starting point for an appreciation of the problems involved in trying
to draw a line on scientific or technological grounds between airspace
and outer space. Although the X-15 is an aircraft in that it has
wings and is supported in flight by aerodynamically generated lift_
it is also capable of semiballistic flight. Its maximum altitude for
sustained level flight is around 125,000 feet at a speed of about Mach
7. In semiballistic flighty however, it can achieve altitudes in excess
of 50 miles; and at the peak of such a climb_ it may be said to be
in a purely ballistic flight for a short period of time.
The difficulties are not reduced by an examination of the character-
istics of Earth-orbiting satellites. Any attempt to solve this problem
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by reference to the lowest altitude above the Earth's surface at
which an artificial satellite may be placed in orbit raises at least two
questions. First, what kind of a satellite are we talking about; and
second, what kind of an orbit are we talking about._
It appears that 90 to 100 miles is probably the lowest altitude at
which satellites of the average size and density of those which the
United States has launched to date can be placed in a purely cir-
cular orbit and accomplish at least one revolution about the Earth.
These satellites are of very lightweight construction, having only
about one-tenth the density of water. However, as we increase the
density of the satellite, we lower the altitude at which it is capable
of orbital flight. For example, it has been estimated that a tenfold
increase in density over that of our present satellites would probably
reduce the minimum altitude for a purely circular orbit by some 15
miles or so.
With respect to the nature of the orbit, it is evident that a satellite
in an elliptical orbit may come closer to the Earth at perigee and
still accomplish a single revolution than is possible for the same
satellite in a purely circular orbit.
A long-range object of advanced research and technology in the
aerospace field is to develop the capability of moving freely from
Earth to outer space and back again to Earth with a single craft
capable of utilizing aerodynamic flight, ballistic flight, and orbital
flight. The achievement of this goal will demonstrate in the most
convincing manner that there is in fact an air-space continuum, and
that it is not possible to arrive at a useful solution of the so-called
boundary problem on the basis of the difference between the regimes
of aerial flight and space flight or by reference to the physical
characteristics of the aerospace environment.
All such efforts are, in fact, somewhat akin to setting the boundary
between the high seas and territorial waters by reference to the
height of waves, the strength of ocean currents, or the depth of the
sea, or by seeking to determine the maximum distance from shore that
certain types of small craft might safely venture. Just to state such an
analogy is, of course, to demonstrate how useless and irrelevant such
criteria would be to the national and international interests involved
in such a determination.
The boundary problem, however, does not disappear with recog-
nition of the fact of the air-space continuum. Resorting again to the
analogy of the sea, it is obvious that the abili(y of the same vessel
to sail close to shore and in the middle of the ocean, utilizing with
equal facility the territorial waters and the high seas, has never
suggested that there should be no definable limit to the exclusive
power of the littoral state, even though agreement on such a limit
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is difficult to achieve. In fact, strenuous efforts have been made
by the United States and other nations in recent years to reach agree-
ment on such a limit.
Similarly, the prospect that a single craft may eventually operate
at all altitudes in the air-space continuum does not mean that there
is no need to limit with precision the exclusive power of the under-
lying state. In fact, it probably emphasizes the need for an eventual
solution. It might be preferable, however, not to refer to this
delimitation as a "boundary" between airspace and outer space, as
those terms seem to imply a distinction based on physical character-
istics, such as attentuation of the atmosphere, minimum orbital al-
titude, maximum altitude for aerodynamic lift, and so on.
Incidentally, the confusion resulting from the misplaced emphasis
by many commentators on physical characteristics and technological
criteria in seeking a solution of the boundary problem quite naturally
led to a reaction by others that went to the opposite extreme of deny-
ing the problem altogether.
I am certainly not suggesting that it would be easy to reach agree-
ment on the upward reach of territorial sovereignty, or even that the
time is ripe to make a serious effort in that direction. Nor do I
suggest that such an agreement would assist in distinguishing between
what space activities should be permitted and what should be prohib-
ited in outer space. An agreed upward limit on territorial sover-
eignty would not mean that activities which threaten peace and
security are to be tolerated in outer space, nor would it mean that a
state would not be free to take legitimate self-defensive measures in
relation to activities in outer space. The extent of territorial sover-
eignty is obviously not the criterion for such matters; the right of
self-defense is not confined to actions within the defending nation's
own territory.
While the concept of freedom has provided the dominant theme in
the development of the law of outer space up to the present time, it
by no means stands alone. There is another key term in our develop-
ing space law vocabulary : "control."
You will recall that the General Assembly resolution speaks of
freedom "in conformity with international law." Ambassador Ste-
venson, in his remarks in support of the resolution, did not spell out
what the restraints imposed by international law might be. However,
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organiza-
tion Affairs, Mr. Richard Gardner, took a cautious step in that direc-
tion in his remarks to the Section of International and Comparative
Law of the American Bar Association in August 1962. He said:
The U.N. program takes international law and the U.N. Charter as the stand-
ard for space activities. Mankind would thus be free to use space on the same
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basis as it uses the high seas--free of any restraint except those on illegal
activity such as aggression and exclusive use. This formula is designed to
promote the maximum exploitation of space technology in the service of human
needs. It is designed to prevent space and celestial bodies from becoming the
objects of competing national claims.
The records of the meetings of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space are a fruitful source of material in pursuing
this theme of freedom and control. In addressing the Committee
in March of last year, the U.S. Representative, Ambassador Plimpton,
after referring to the orbital flights of Colonel John Glenn and of
the Soviet astronauts Gagarin and Titov, said:
It is up to us to ensure that the freedom of space first enjoyed by those
intrepid explorers will remain unchallenged for all who follow them.
He went on to describe the principles of the General Assembly's
resolution as forming, in his words, "the basic foundation of a legal
regime for outer space," and said: "They represent a forward-looking
expression by the Assembly that outer space is indeed the province
of all mankind."
When the time came for the representative of the Soviet Union to
speak on the subject, he introduced some different terms, saying: o
The principles which have already been approved by the General Assembly
signify, in our view, that the activities of the States in outer space research
should be conducted in keeping with the recognized principles of peaceful co-
existence, sovereignty, equality, and noninterference in domestic affairs.
And then a new note comes into the dialogue. The Soviet repre-
sentative went on to say :
• . . we believe that the juridical subcommittee and our Committee, too, should
and must prepare provisions which would make it possible to control outer
space, and which would prohibit such experiments as might have a negative
influence on research conducted by other countries---research in the interests
of mankind--or which would create any kind of impediment or obstacle to
exploration or utilization of outer space for peaceful purposes by other countries.
At the meeting of the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in Geneva in June
1962, the Soviet Union submitted a document entitled "Draft Dec-
laration of the Basic Principles Governing Activities of States Per-
taining to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space." Two of its
provisions are of particular interest in connection with our subject of
the freedom of outer space. The first of these, paragraph 6 of the
draft declaration, reads as follows :
Cooperation and mutual assistance in the conquest of outer space shall be a
duty incumbent upon all States ; the implementation of any measures that might
in any way hinder the exploration or use of outer space for peaceful purposes by
other countries shall be permitted only after prior discussion of and agreement
upon such measures between the countries concerned.
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The Soviet proposal was accompanied by a strongly worded attack
on the United States, with particular emphasis on the announced inten-
tion of the United States to carry out high-altitude nuclear explosions
over the Pacific Ocean. The summary record of the meeting of
June 7, 1962, attributes the following to Professor Tunkin, the Soviet
representative :
The conquest of outer space raised another important problem, the solution
of which would do much to further international cooperation. He regretted
that the United States Government had not, despite criticism, stopped such ex-
periments as the scattering of copper needles and high-altitude nuclear ex-
plosions, the effects of which nfight impede the use of outer space by other
countries and be extremely dangerous. Cooperation in outer space was the
duty of all States, and it was therefore quite clear that actions by a State
which might hinder the exploration or use of outer space for peaceful purposes
by other countries could be permitted only by agreement between the countries
concerned.
The United States firmly opposed the Soviet proposal as an attempt
to introduce the veto into outer space activities, since it implied that
no state could carry out a space project if objections were raised by
one or more other countries that might consider themselves "con-
cerned." The United States has not failed, however, to recognize
the problem presented by a particular use of outer space which may
interfere with or have undesirable effects upon other uses of, or scien-
tific experiments in, outer space. The United States position was
stated in December 1962 at the United Nations by Senator Gore, U.S.
Representative to the General Assembly of the United Nations, in
these words:
The United States believes that nations which conduct activities in outer space
should take all reasonable steps to avoid experiments or other activities which
seriously threaten to deny or to limit the use of outer space to other nations.
This is consistent with well-established principles of international law. We
encourage prior international discussion concerning experimental activities in
space which may have undesirable effects, and we are prepared in the future,
as in the past, to consult with scientists of other countries as well as United
States scientists wherever practicable and consistent with our national security.
The testing of nuclear weapons in outer space is a special case in-
volving considerations going far beyond the freedom of outer space
itself. Without question, nuclear explosions in outer space may have
serious adverse effects upon the conduct of both manned and un-
manned space activities at certain altitudes. The remedy, however,
cannot be found in a simple prohibition of nuclear explosions in outer
space while the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere is per-
mitted to go on unchecked. Whatever the undesirable consequences
of nuclear explosions in outer space may be, they are relatively less
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harmful in their total cumulative effect than nuclear explosions in
the atmosphere.
The possible adverse effects of high-altitude nuclear explosions on
space activities is but one of many reasons for attaching the greatest
urgency to the achievement of an effectively policed prohibition of all
nuclear weapons testing. Until that is accomplished, the decision
on whether to utilize outer space for this purpose will be made in each
instance by the individual state concerned on the basis of its own
evaluation of the security interests to be served in relation to the
possibly detrimental effects on certain other uses of outer space. It
will obviously be unacceptable to permit a single nation or group of
nations to exercise a veto over the testing of nuclear weapons in outer
space so long as testing in other environments remains uncontrolled.
The other provision of the Soviet Draft Declaration of Basic Prin-
ciples submitted at the Geneva meeting which is of particular interest
is paragraph 8, which reads as follows:
The use of artificial satellites for the collection of intelligence information in
the territory of foreign States is incompatible with the objectives of mankind
in its conquest of outer space.
The United States responded to this provision by pointing out that
international law in no way prohibits the observation of objects
situated inside a country's territory from a point outside of that ter-
ritory, and that observation from outer space is no exception to the
general rule. In April 1968 Mr. Meeker, the United States represent-
ative to the Legal Subcommittee, in an address at Montreal reiterated
the United States position that observation from outer space, like ob-
servation from the high seas or from airspace above the high seas, is
consistent with international law. The fact that observation satellites
have military as well as scientific and commercial applications pro-
rides no basis for objection to them, Mr. Meeker said.
In the statement of United States policy made by Senator Gore at
the United Nations in December 1962, he reaffirmed the view of the
United States that outer space should be used for peaceful purposes
only. Defining "peaceful" purposes as those which are "nonaggres-
sive and beneficial," he said :
The question of military activities in space cannot be divorced from the
question of military activities on earth. To banish these activities in both en-
vironments, we must continue our efforts for general and complete disarmament.
Until this is achieved, the test of any space activity must not be whether it is
military or nonmilitary, but whether or not it is consistent with the United
Nations Charter and other obligations of international law.
In the Geneva disarmament conference, the United States has pro-
posed that there be prohibited, in the very first stage of the disarma-
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merit process, the placing in orbit of weapons capable of producing
mass destruction, and that limitations be imposed on the production_
stockpiling, and testing of boosters for space vehicles. States con-
ducting launchings of space vehicles would be required to provide
timely advance notification of such launchings to other states and to
the International Disarmament Organization in order to permit pre-
launch inspection of the space vehicle or missile to be launched. The
International Disarmament Organization would also establish and
operate any arrangements necessary for detecting unreported
launehings.
In addition to seeking an agreement along these lines that would
prevent the extension of armaments to outer space, the United States
repeatedly has made it clear that it has no intention of placing
weapons in outer space unless compelled to do so by actions of the
Soviet. Union ; and the United States has called upon the Soviet Union
likewise to refrain from taking steps which will extend the arms race
into outer space.
It is obvious that in the field of space activities the concept of "con-
trol" embraces a wide range of possible prohibitions and restraints.
Some would advance the freedom of space exploration and exploi-
tation, and others would virtually annihilate it. Freedom, of course,
is never totally unrestrained in any ordered society, and the freedom
to explore and use outer space is no exception. The freedom of which
the General Assembly resolution speaks is, I believe, freedom from
the claims of individual states, based on concepts of territorial
sovereignty, to prohibit or exclude, by unilateral action, the use by
others of outer space--freedom from the power of an individual state
to exclude others from enjoyment of this great new resource. In
other words, the resolution is intended to make it clear that outer
space is not subject to a legal regime like that of the territorial
airspace.
The resolution does not, however, mean that a state is free to use
outer space in such a manner as to preclude its use by others. It
would be of little worth to secure the freedom of outer space and ce-
lestial bodies from individual claims of "national appropriation," as
proclaimed by the General Assembly resolution, if enjoyment of that
freedom could be destroyed by the use which a single state might
make of it. Neither does the resolution imply that space activities
shall never be subjected to restraints imposed by the collective action
of the community of nations in the interest of a greater freedom for
all. Controls properly designed and rightly administered should
have the effect of freeing space for scientific exploration and beneficial
uses while, at the same time, freeing the peoples of the world from
the fear that their own safety is being jeopardized by space activities.
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SpencerM. Beresford
Certainly, I should agree in general with the emphasis placed by
Professor McDougal on the applicability and the importance of cus-
tomary law in relation to space activities. I further agree with him
and Mr. Johnson that outer space is not "a legal vacuum." On the
other hand_ it is not a plenum either. Of course, international law in
general is not a plenum by any means_ but I would like to think that
it is a seamless web. And while I agree that the ultimate structure
of space law will be stronger if it is built on existing foundations,
there are many gaps to be filled. It may not be a vacuum, but it is
nonetheless full of holes. Whether these gaps are filled by explicit
agreement or by custom really does not make very much difference.
International law has grown in both ways, by custom and by agree-
ment, and they frequently work together as well as against each other.
There are many substantial doubts concerning the applicability or
appropriateness of particular principles or rules, whether customary
or explicit, to space activities. Furthermore_ the fact that outer
space is not an absolute legal vacuum, or that particular rules of in-
ternational law could apply to space activitie.% does not make a con-
vincing argument against attempting international unification of
law relating to space activities.
In this connection, I think a distinction ought to be made between
customary international laws as a set of rules_ as something that could
be stated in terms of propositions relating to practices in the past, and,
on the other hand, the process of formulating rules through practice
and custom and acquiescence. At the beginning of his discussion
Professor McDougal seemed to me to be using the term mainly in the
first sense_ as a set of rules. And what he said is_ I think_ valid in
that sense. But perhaps even more important is the process of rule
formation_ the establishment of principles relating to space activities
through current and future practice and custom.
Both Professor McDougal and Mr. Johnson spoke about Soviet
attitudes and practices in customary international law and space ac-
tivities. I would like to make several additional remarks on that
subject.
To go back a little, I think Professor McDougal characterized the
United States and the Soviet Union as the "resource states," or the
"main resource states," meaning, I suppose, the chief nations partici-
pating in space activities at the present time. We should 'be careful
not to assume that these will be the only two spacefaring nations in
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the future. Several of the advanced nations of Western Europe have
made plans and, in fact, are beginning to make preparations for their
own entry into space activities, and by no means will or should be left
out of the formation of space law, whether by explicit agreement or
by custom.
Another matter is the role of such so-called principles as peaceful
coexistence and equality, and the like. These phrases are not used
in relation to space activities alone. They have been used in many
other contexts by the Soviet Union and by other Communist nations.
We should know that these phrases do not mean the same things that
they would mean if we used them. We should also know from ex-
perience that the role of these phrases is not simply negative--to deny
the existence or validity of customary international law_ for ex-
ample-but is also to substitute new concepts and n_w categories for
those which are now traditional.
Of course, the Soviets do not recognize the binding character of
customary international law. They regard it as a historical instru-
ment of domination and exploitation of other peoples by the bourgeois,
imperialist governments that dominated the scene at the time most of
this law was formed, and by their ruling classes, particularly those
of Great Britain.
This does not mean, of course, that the Soviet Union disregards
custom and practice as a creative force in forming international law.
On the contrary, what Mr. Johnson said about the Soviet view of
United Nations resolutions---that they were regarded as very soft law,
or mere recommendations until they were acted upon and given sub-
stance by custom and practice--shows that the Soviet Union does
respect custom and practice as a creator of law, but only if it is current
or future custom and practice, and only, of course, if the Communists
themselves are active in the process.
The Soviet attitude toward customary international law, regarded
as a set of rules formed in the past by practice and acquiescence, is not
very different from some of the attitudes that have been expressed by
colonial peoples, or recently colonial peoples, such as the Indians. An
article by S. N. Guha Roy in the American Journal of International
Law in 1961 brings out this point. His view, reminiscent of the Soviet
view, is that the set of rules formed mainly by the imperialist nations
in previous centuries is not binding on peoples who had no part in this
formation. This view is extreme but, obviously, it has some basis,
and even more obviously it must be taken into account. We must deal
with it not only by insisting that customary legal principles and rules
in international law are valid and should be binding on others_ as we
regard them as binding on us, but by continuously pointing out and
demonstrating their current relevance and justification, and by con-
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tinuously modifying, extending, and adapting them by practice or
custom or explicit agreement in the light of changing conditions.
Now I would like to consider more specifically the present legal
regime of outer space. It has been said that the absence of requests
for permission to put spacecraft into orbit and the absence of official
protests against the orbiting of spacecraft above national territory
demonstrate the speed with which customary law can develop. This
conclusion embodies a number of assumptions that I am not sure are
correct, by any means, about the status of customary international law
on this point.
It can be argued that there was never any need for such a rule of
customary international law--that is, a rule that outer space is free
to all nations for all uses, or for peaceful uses, or what have you, along
the lines of United Nations Resolution 1721. I would not say, myself,
that such a rule was created by the United Nations resolution, nor
would I say that it was created by the practice which was initiated with
the orbiting of Sputnik I and has been continued since by the United
States and the Soviet Union.
For it can be argued that satellite flights simply did not violate exist-
ing international law, either customary or explicit. As to explicit
international agreements_ the argument would run that nothing pro-
hibits this sort of activity. No general international agreement exists
that would prohibit it, other than the Chicago Convention, and space
vehicles, although flight devices, are clearly not "aircraft" within the
meaning of the Chicago Convention, particularly article 8 relating to
pilotless aircraft.
As to customary international law, the argument, which is neces-
sarily historical, becomes so complicated that it cannot be treated in
a short time. Suffice it to say that if we go back to the early days of
the formation of air law in the late 19th century--the days of Fauchille,
for example, and Westlake--the assumption was that the air, like the
high seas, was necessarily free in a sort of philosophical sense, and
should also be free as a matter of policy. It was not until the experi-
ence of World War I, when, of course_ the threat from the air became
obvious--the threat to national security and commercial interests--
and the economic nationalism which developed after World War I,
that the principle of air sovereignty became a fundamental part of in-
ternational law, by explicit agreement in the Paris Convention. That
provision, which was incorporated word for word in article I of the
Chicago Convention in 1944, states that every power has complete and
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.
If we inquire into the legal status of the airspace before this prin-
ciple of air sovereignty was incorporated in the Paris and Chicago
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Conventions, it is, as I say, possible to argue that under customary
international law, which we could find only by looking to an earlier
date than these conventions, access to the air was free to all nations.
In other words, the air sovereignty provision of the Paris Convention
may not have declared, but may rather have changed, the previous
customary international law. If this is so, satellite flights would not
need to be sanctioned by international law unless national sovereignty
in airspace is regarded as continuing indefinitely upward, or unless
there is some other form of national jurisdiction which permits na-
tional control of activities at such altitudes. In this regard, I am
reminded of Mr. Johnson's quotation of the argument that observation
from outer space is permissible unless it is prohibited by some specific
principle or rule of international law.
In regard to the matter of a boundary between the regimes govern-
ing aeronautics or aerodynamic flight and space activities or astronau-
tics, a question which has been debated at great length is whether it
is necessary to distinguish at all. Some legal distinction must be made,
however, in order to reconcile aviation and space activities simply
because air-space, as Mr. Johnson said, is a continumn--and hence
there is a practical problem, primarily a political problem.
The problem has several possible solutions. Proposals have been
made, of course, to solve it by the criterion of velocity, perhaps orbital
velocity, rather than altitude, or by defining specific proscribed uses
of outer space.
Mr. Johnson and Professor McDougal both advocated a relatively
low boundary, although they did not say why. And what do they
mean by low ?
Mr. Johnson says that the boundary would necessarily be arbitrary.
I suppose that means it would not bear any necessary relation to phys-
ical characteristics or operating criteria of space vehicles. Yet,
clearly, he thinks it should lie between the upper limit of aerodynamic
flight and the lower limit or burnout altitude of extended orbital flight.
To that extent, it is not arbitrary, of course. These are reasons, and
sound ones. In addition, for reasons which he did not state but which
clearly exist, Mr. Johnson wants it to be low. In that sense also, the
boundary will not be arbitrary.
Mr. Johnson also quoted statements by Ambassador Stevenson and
Mr. Gardner, in which they assimilate the law of the sea and the law
of outer space with respect to United Nations Resolution 1721. I
think this deserves one final comment. Ambassador Stevenson said to
Committee I of the United Nations General Assembly that Resolution
1721 would permit any nation to use outer space in the same way that
it could use the high seas. And Mr. Gardner said, at a later date,
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that under the resolution outer space will be free like the high seas,
"except for certain illegal activities."
I would like to raise a question about both these statements. I am
not sure that they are obvious, and I am not sure that they are correct.
When President Kennedy submitted his four-point program to the
United Nations in the fall of 1961, one of his proposals was that the
use of weapons of mass destruction be banned in outer space. Al-
though his other proposals were generally embodied in United Nations
Resolution 1721, this particular point was not. If it were accepted
that weapons of mass destruction should be banned from outer space,
there would then be a difference in that respect between the use of
outer space and the use of the high seas. That question has not been
resolved, nor have questions relating to the right of self-defense or to
peaceful uses of outer space--about which, of course, there is a strong
difference in interpretation between us and the Soviet bloc--or on
other questions that Mr. Johnson mentioned such as satellite commu-
nications, which the Soviets say may be used for war propaganda or
for fanning the fires of racial hatred.
In other words, it is not enough to say that now, under the resolu-
tion, outer space can be used as freely as the high seas. Very few
countries would really agree with that statement. They have mental
reservations as to restrictions that they would like to impose upon the
uses of outer space. Until these matters are brought into the open
and some agreement one way or another is reached on each of them,
the question of freedom to use outer space will not be resolved in inter-
national law.
Maxwell Cohen
Like Mr. Beresford, I feel that I can hardly ignore the impinge-
ment of Mr. Johnson's paper and Professor McDougars paper on each
other and on our thinking. Though I have been assigned particularly
to the problem of jurisdiction and control in space, the intellectual
infrastructure--the jurisprudential infrastructure--that is explicit
in Professor McDougal's paper necessarily affects anything that will
be said here about the problem of jurisdiction.
The first comment I would like to make is that in space problems
the analogy of jurisdiction in airspace, to which l_Ir. Beresford and,
of course, Mr. Johnson, referred, has a certain utility but also it is
distinctly limited in its value. Mr. Johnson did not mention a pos-
sibly significant aspect which the discussion about airspace should be
pointing to, as it affects the problem of outer space, namely, the role
of the International Civil Aviation Organization.
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The Chicago Convention may be viewed in two ways. It may be
viewed as in article I, as a statement declaratory of jurisdiction in
airspace. But it also must be seen as a great constitutional instru-
ment setting up an effective international organization, managing a
very large part of the problems of international transportation, par-
ticularly in regard to safety and navigation, and encouraging, of
course, the development of legal conventions to solve many important
and subordinate matters. This being so, one must ask whether there
are any lessons from the specialized agency experience of ICAO which
are projectable with respect to what may be taking place in space?
This question was not explored by Mr. Johnson or Mr. Beresford.
If Mr. Johnson is right--and I entirely agree with him--that we
are slowly losing the sense of difference between "airspace" and
"space" that we once had, then we must also lose the very substantial
diffidence we have had for a very long time in these discussions about
the role of ICAO.
In fact, ICAO is not even invited to the discussions of the United
Nations Outer Space Legal Subcommittee. The USSR is not a mem-
ber of ICAO. The feeling, therefore, has been that ICAO has no
direct role in space discussions and that it is concerned primarily with
the international air transportation problem.
If it is admitted that a continuum exists between airspace and space,
and that instrumentalities have become more sophisticated and move
easily between airspace and space_ then the role of ICAO appears to
be somewhat different. Indeed, ICAO already is directly concerned
with at least two aspects of space--reentry, which involves safety
navigation problems, and ICAO's share of space telecommunications,
since that share will affect the needs of international air transporta-
tion.
Therefore, our discussions might have dealt concretely with the en-
largement of the function of a well-established specialized agency and
the use which could be made of existing machinery with which the
international family has already had much experience. It seems
wrong to say that there is no machinery and that customary law must
suffice until we develop a sufficient sophistication or experience to jus-
tify the machinery, when machinery of a high order does exist and
is at the very edge of being able to assert jurisdiction in some space
matters.
My next point concerns the boundary problem. This problem has
had four rather interesting historical phases of development in a very
short time. The boundary problem becomes more and more irrele-
vant, however, for the reasons put forward by Mr. Johnson and Mr.
Beresford. But even the irrelevance of the boundary problem is more
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clearly apparent if "irrelevance" is put into the historical context out
of which irrelevance developed.
Between 1946-47 and 1957, before Sputnik I was launched, pioneers
such as John Cobb Cooper were writing articles asserting a 300-mile
zone and then, becoming unhappy with a 300-mile zone, switched to
600, found a lot of oppositionto that, and came back to 300. In any
case, there was a movement to have a zone of jurisdiction, a "con-
tiguous" zone, somewhere out in space--a theory approximating that
familiar in the law of the seas.
This first period lasted for a very short time but it certainly was
part of the conventional wisdom that continued until the middle
1950's, or a little later. With the reality of Sputnik I in 1957, we lost
confidence in the notion that airspace boundaries were manageable.
Although the satellite was orbiting at 100 miles, there were no pro-
tests by any state and no effective way of expressing a protest except
in words.
The facts of life now were that instrumentalities were being orbited
in areas below the outer limits of the zones that had been talked
about--the 300- or 600-mile zones--and no one could do anything about
it and no one was even protesting. Therefore we lost confidence,
during that early sputnik period, in boundaries. And I think the
correlative to the loss of confidence in the boundary theory and the
management of space was the emerging conception that space is
entirely free for everyone to use.
Hence, as Mr. Johnson implied in one part of his paper, there was
no immediate regime which could in fact determine who should or
should not be in space apart from very broad emerging conceptions,
perhaps the "mal-use" of space. So you have, on the one handy the
disintegration of the zonal theory; on the other hand, the emergence
of the concept that if you are lucky enough to be up _here and have
the technology to use it, you are free to use it. And if you are free r
there are no limitations on the peaceful use of space r whatever "peace-
fill" may mean.
The third period--and this was all telescoped in not much more
than 12 years--is when we recognized that "pure freedom" in space
itself was in some respects as unsatisfactory an answer to the emerg-
ing problems of technology as the zonal theory had been earlier.
Also, it was evident now that a new level of voluntary cooperation
had been reached in the international cooperation that emerged in
the International Geophysical Year, in the preparations for the Inter-
national Quiet Year of the Sun, and in the growing interest of the
International Telecommunications Union in the problems of space.
The idea that there could be massive cooperation even among those
who were ideologically and politically at odds with each other was
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proved sound by the great success of IGY, and I think the lessons
of the IGY are still with us.
I suggest, too, that the Kennedy-Khrushchev statement of Decem-
ber 5_ 1962, on the possibility of joint enterprises in space with partic-
ular reference to scientific and meteorological problems is a document
of some importance. Here are the two superpowers engaging in a
dialogue_ whatever the success or failure that may take place at other
levels_ and stating that there are certain space activities they ought to
pursue together. I do not know what has happened since the declara-
tion of December 5, 1962, in the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange.
Perhaps Mr. Carter from the State Department or Mr. Johnson from
NASA could tell us what flowed from the Kennedy-Khrushchev
exchange.
The fourth phase of the boundary question is the one we now are
entering. It is the reassertion of an interest in boundaries because
of the reevaluation of certain aspects of the technology. Our con-
cern with pollution, our concern with "observation" or espionag% the
recognition that orbiting instrumentalities can carry nuclear war-
heads and be directed with great accuracy to any spot on earth or
within a reasonable distance of that spot_ and, generally speaking_ the
new and sophisticated approach to reentry questions with the expec-
tation of instrumentalities that can reenter and glide under manned
control back to some chosen spot--all of these advances have reas-
serted the need to take a fresh look at the boundary question.
Therefore_ in the 1962-63 period we are boundary-minded again but
for a quite different series of reasons. No longer is it the abstract,
a pr/or/reasoning of John Cobb Cooper who 10 years ago advocated a
300-mile boundary, but now it is something quite specific and practi-
cal; namely, ought there be a roof over the subjacent state below
which no other state ought to be able to penetrate from space without
consent _.
Since we have these problems of pollution, problems of espionage_
and reentry developments of a new order_ should we not begin to re-
quire the consent of states in some way before a certain height of
space above them is utilized by other states? The David Davies
Memorial Institute Draft Code suggested that 75 miles upward would
be the most desirable distance but proposed that we settle for 50
miles. Arbitrary limits_ however_ are not as satisfactory as those
that are based on some knowledge and policy. What is significant
is the reconsideration of the boundary idea as a result of the factors
that have been mentioned.
The Cooper period is now behind us. The other three phases--the
loss of confidence in boundaries and the reassertion or the assertion
of freedom to use space; the discovery of great avenues of interna-
THE "FREEDOM" OF OUTER SPACE----COMRVIENTS 53
tional cooperation; and the reassertion of boundaries within the last
couple of years because of pollution, espionage, observation, aggres-
sion, and reentry--these overlap in point of time and to some extent
in point of function. And, it seems to me, these must color any
future debate we shall have about the nature of boundaries.
My third general point is that, on the whole, there seems to be a
wide measure of agreement, despite the "exclusive uses" to which
Professor l_IcDougal refers, as to the fact that international coopera-
tion is here. It seems to me to be already well appreciated. The
December 5th declaration of Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Kennedy indi-
cates how far that possibility may go between the two superpowers
concerned.
However, two questions must be asked. To what areas does inter-
national cooperation in space lend itself easily_. These would be
McDougal's "inclusive" areas, I presume. And second, What is the
machinery which naturally seems to be required--as men of experience
would view the matter when they approach these problems---for the
implementation of these cooperative uses_. If the machinery is to
be largely that of customary law, what areas might better be suited
to conventional law ? If it is to be the machinery of treaty law, will
it take the form of international cooperation between nations or the
coordination of international activities through international
agencies, public and private ._
There is the nation-to-nation cooperation, bilateral or multilateral,
or there is the establishment of supernational agencies, such as ICAO
itself---agencies that have an identity of their own. Within the prob-
lem of nation-to-nation cooperation, there is the subordinate question
which is peculiar to the United States, the "private-public agency"
debate as to whether the agencies which express a nation's activity in
space may be privately owned. Do these problems raise particular
questions of either international law or international politics ? They
obviously raise ideological questions for some states, as the USSR
indicates in its draft of June 1962 to the Legal Subcommittee of the
United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and
the draft of April 1963 presented at the Committee's meetings in
New York. One cannot be indifferent, therefore, to that subordinate
debate on the private-public aspects of nation-to-nation cooperative
techniques, even within the framework of a treaty.
I hope subsequent papers will look realistically at that problem
and ask whether the communications satellite system does not, by
the very nature of its expression of a particular American ideological
position, in the attempt to mix the private and public sectors of this
activity, unduly raise certain questions in the international forum
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which ought not to be there. Had there been a more realistic ap-
praisal of the international significance of mechanisms of this kind,
which are going to be utilized by many states, perhaps the notion of
emphasizing the private corporate side might have taken a sub-
ordinate place in American thinking.
Once we ask "what machinery" is the most effective for implementa-
tion in "what areas," the problems of evaluating the role of customary
versus conventional law in this whole field arise. Here, of course,
we are back very deeply into Professor McDougal's own primary area
of analysis.
Before going any further, I should like to say a word about Pro-
fessor McDougal--about his methods, his materials, his consequences
for law, and his consequences for space law. His is perhaps the
most original and creative mind in the English language, in our
time, with respect to some of the fundamental materials and con-
cepts of public international law. Characteristically, his paper sug-
gests some very profound jurisprudential questions. His method
seems to me to be a kind of sociolog_¢ of law, reminiscent of Ehrlich,
in which there is more sociology than law--where law becomes
drowned in the search for a theory of society. It seems also to have
something of the later Pound, in that there is an attempt to have
a value structure or a hierarchy of postulates upon which to build a
system.
McDougal also has a good deal about him, of course, of the later
American realist, in that he penetrates beyond the norms and obviously
wishes to dispose of law as a normative system. In the end, I have
the feeling that, methodologically, we are dealing here with a kind of
modern Protestant, peripatetic St. Thomas, from whom a new em-
pirical natural law is emerging in the guise of policy, or policy is
emerging in the guise of natural law.
Not long ago Roscoe Pound, in the Natural Law Forum, made a
distinction between "natural natural law" and "positive natural law."
I am going to suggest that we have a third one now because of Mc-
Dougal--an "empirical natural law." The concern for "minimum
order," the concern for placing his value structure on a factual basis,
the emphasis on reciprocity, and the emphasis on reasonableness which
dominate the McDougal analysis--all of this would not be as meaning-
ful if it were not put in its historical context. It must not be taken
out of the general stream of legal thought.
In the stream of that legal thought, many men for over 2,000 years
have sought for "order." They have sought for the reasons why
law takes the form it does. They have sought exactly the same an-
swers that McDougal is seeking, but the tools they employed were
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somewhat less elaborate and they did not have the immense range
of modern disciplines at their disposal, nor, perhaps, did they have
the courage to go as far afield meta-legaUy as McDougal does. Meth-
odologically, he belongs to that great tradition.
Therefore, it seems to me his is an effort to restate in mid-20th-
century terms, with all the disciplines of the behavioral and other
sciences at his disposal, what law looks like from the outside. This
often does not help too much the men operating from the inside. But
these ideas, in due course, percolate down to men on the inside who
must operate the machine, and on the inside they help develop a certain
overriding humility about so-called "norms." The operators see the
norms for the relativities they really are, the "subjectivities" they are,
to use McDougal's own term.
I once asked a student of McDougars whether he taught interna-
tional law with the apparatus of language he learned from McDougal
at Yale, and he said, "No, it really is difficult to do." I do not entirely
agree. The language Professor McDougal has given us is slowly
penetrating in many ways. Even Richard Gardner's term "exclusive
use" bears a very close relationship to Professor McDougal's own
terminology. What I am suggesting, therefore, is that Professor
McDougars method must be seen as a part of a very old tradition
in terms of natural law, in terms of the sociology of law_ and in terms
of the American realists, all now brought together in a special and
highly personal format.
Second, his materials are what makes his presentation in some
respects so dynamic and interesting, and in other respects so un-
manageable from the point of view of lawyership, because the materi-
als are so widely ranging. In a way, his illustrations are too rich.
One cannot look at his enormous production without having great
respect for his ability to prod a generation of graduate students into
doing research for him. At the same time, one has respect for his
own conceptions that underlie these massive materials.
But there are some difficulties in his methods and materials. Some
kind of normative system is part of a law-managing process. There
is a danger that his materials flood the processes of "abstraction,"
which is part of the art of lawyership and which must go on if the
lawyership is to exist at all. McDougal has a tendency, as his articles
on policy science have indicated and as his articles on international law
have revealed, to be so policy-minded that the emergence of a means
to manage an "order" gets lost in the process.
If law is merely a reflection of "subjectivities" and of reciprocity
limiting these subjectivities--if I misuse his language, I must apolo-
gize for it--then, in a way, we cannot look with much hope to disci-
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plining regimes that are not merely momentary reflections of policy.
I would think that the history of law is more than this, and that ideal
element in law, even if one wishes to be partly Hegelian, plays some
significant part in the management of a legal order. It seems to me
that ideal element does have an inhibiting effect on behavior apart
from self-interest and apart from reciprocity, although the latter
may be dominant. The legal order may have an intrinsic quality of
its own independently--or, if not idependently, at least identifiably--
apart from the larger questions of policy, where law is only a mirror
of policy.
Finally, the effect of this for space law is that Professor McDougal
tends to emphasize that there is no use in judging the needs of a law
of space by drafting or adopting codes prematurely. I agree on the
matter of timing but not on the outright rejection of codes as a tech-
nique. We can have declarations of principle; we can have very
useful conventions on limited matters which may even be "premature,"
but the prematurity has a disciplining effect thereafter.
Let me give you an illustration. In many of the common-law
provinces of Canada, if you had taken a public opinion poll as to
the desirability of fair-employment-practice acts forbidding the hir-
ing of persons on grounds of race, creed, or color, you probably would
have had a public opinion 65 percent against. The attitude would
have been, "We will get along without it." And yet, legislatures
passed these statutes because of the working idealism of the moment
plus pressure groups or for other reasons. The very existence of
the new norm itelf, legislatively enacted, had a profoundly educative
effect so that 10 years later, if you had taken the same poll, there would
have been quite a difference in the complexion of public opinion. It
seems to me one can push too far in the direction of depending on
public opinion and be somewhat excessively critical of experiments
with legislation, however imperfect and however premature at some
stages they may be.
To leave Professor McDougal now and return to the subject of
customary law versus treaty law_ I would suggest that there are at
least two or three areas clearly ready for conventional activity for
which customary law is quite unsuited. If one divides the subject
matter of the emerging regime of space into the "harmful" and "non-
harmful"--let us not use the word "peaceful" the harmful certainly
includes such aspects as contamination, pollution, espionage, and
testing.
Here are four areas in which we should be working for conventional
arrangements. I believe there is no likelihood that a satisfactory
customary rule, which will be inhibiting by itself for the benefit of
°_
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mankind, will emerge soon enough. As a citizen of Canada, a smaller
power, I am not prepared to risk my future on the early emergence
of such customary rules.
One of the dangers of relying upon customary law to the extent that
Professor McDougal and others seem to rely upon it is that it tends
to give the impression that you are rationalizing in policy terms and,
therefore, in law terms the technological headstart of the superpowers
by giving them a legal basis to justify what they are doing now and
will be doing in the future. It reminds me very much of economic
theory from Adam Smith to Ricardo in the early 19th century, when
that body of theory seemed devoted to justifying free trade. Since
the British had a 75-year headstart in the industrial revolution, free
trade was very good for the United Kingdom. Whatever may be
the ultimate theoretical validity of free trade---and I presume there
is a strong case for it--it happened to be an extremely valuable ideo-
logical instrument to rationalize the headstart of the British and to
delay industrialization in many of the markets from which primary
resources were obtained and to which manufactured goods were sold
by the British.
With only two major powers in space, we are unlikely to be able
to resist the effect of the dominant position they occupy in creating
particular habits of mind about the use of space in a customary way.
For these reasons I would certainly like to see serious conventional
arrangements applied to a number of the problems which some might
prefer to leave to custamary law.
I believe we are coming quite close to decisions in a number of these
areas. I am an optimist in the case of testing. I think the "overkill"
concern is so dominant in both Moscow and Washington that we may
not be more than a few years away from a major test-ban agreement,
and it may come even sooner.
With respect to such things as pollution and contamination in space,
we should be able to reach some conventional arrangements very soon.
But I would suggest that despite the great success of Resolution 1721
as declaratory of main principles, we need more than the evidence of
some few customary rules in evolution. The management of space
is going to be extremely difficult, but I am not necessarily a pessimist
about the evolution of effective regimes of law in outer space--both
conventional and customary.
728-323
International Organization
and Space
Abram Chayes
T_ FIRST_arrr_o_r_ _an_ SAT_L_a_, Sputnik I, was launched on
October 4, 1957. Thus the space age began within the lifetime of all
of us. I remember the _ense of awe with which I watched from the
deck of our home in Lexington_ Massachusetts, the thin white line
marking the orbit of one of man's first ventures into space climb
toward the zenith.
It is worth the effort to recollect your own reactions of those days.
In the intervening few years, space activity has become, if not a
commonplace, at least a familiar feature of our world. Between the
early months of 1962, when _ United Nations registry of space flights
was established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 1721
(XVI), and May 1963, 127 launches of objects into orbit and beyond
had been registered, 6 of them involving manned flight.
Now it is perhaps not quite as awe-inspiring that_ so soon after the
first space flight, Northwestern University Law School has been able
to assemble a 2-day conference on space law covering a half dozen
or more detailed topics to be discussed before an informed audience
by a score of men who have already attained the status of experts.
But I think it does deserve remark. The most familiar of clich6s
has it that the ills our modern flesh is heir to derive in large part from
the fact that man's social, political, and legal institutions have failed
to keep up with the breakneck pace of developing technology. But
conferences like this one exemplify an effort to subject this new do-
main of action to the rein of law, an effort that may seem wholly
natural, even instinctive, but that in fact reflects attitudes that are
historically very recent.
If man's law has not overtaken his science, at least it is gaining on
it. I am very sure that 6 years after the invention of the wheels
there was no such conference on legal implications. And one wonders
what the course of human history would have looked like if at that
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time there had been even a verbal consensus that the wheel should be
devoted to peaceful uses.
THE AGE OF EXPLORATION
Perhaps it seems farfetched to hark back to prehistory for evidence
that the gap has narrowed between the power of man's technology
and the power of his institutions of social control. Let me direct
your attention then to the three centuries from 1500 to 1800_ the last
great era of exploration, when again our ancestors penetrated and
subdued a new environment_--unknown, mysterious, h0stile_ forbid-
ding.
Then as now the technology of exploration and that of weapons were
closely associated. The conquest of the New World provided adven-
ture, employment_ reputation for men, and probably, on the whole,
deficits for states. Then too the barometer of national prestige fol-
lowed closely upon success or failure in exploration, exploitation, and
colonization.
Seen in the perspective of history_ this was a joint European effort
and brilliantly successful. When it is asked, as some do ask, what
good is served by a massive commitment of means to a race to the
Moon, when some indulge in a narrow calculus of resources and ends,
it is well to reflect on the results of this last age of exploration. The
growth in knowledge, the burgeoning of art, the expansion of political
and intellectual freedom we name the Renaissance, coincide in time
with those years of exploration and cannot be unconnected with them
in some casual sense. None in Tudor England, for instance, deciding
how much royal treasure should be ventured with Cabot or Drake_
could have foreseen these consequences. Exploration of the unknown
seems to have the effect of releasing enormous human energies of all
kinds. This thought may serve to induce a certain moderation in those
who deprecate our national space programs.
But the Age of Exploration, examined in detail, was also marked
by ruthless competition among the states involved and by almost con-
tinuous war. It is certainly too soon to say that we will be able to
avoid such hazards in our contemporary venture into the unknown.
After all, at the turn of the 16th century, Thomas More, Erasmus, and
their fellow humanists foresaw the dawn of a golden age of universal
peace and harmony, a vision that was to be bitterly betrayed before
many decades were out.
Yet there are features of the contemporary effort that we may regard
as hopeful and that contrast sharply with the situation 4 centuries ago.
In the first place, the technology of space itself imposes an important
degree of interdependence and cooperation among states. Second_ and
60 LAW OF SPACE AND'OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
most important_ are the international institutions in being and the
considerable experience with international organization, both of which
bear directly on the development of space law and the regulation of
activities in space.
GUIDING PRINCIPLES
In the last age of exploration there was little law, and what there
was derived from custom. In a world of nomadic nation-states_ the
principal teaching of custom was "hands off." Each state was left
free to pursue its own activities as it willed, subject, perhaps, to a
not very effective limitation that first in time was first in right. The
Papal effort to organize rights and opportunities by dividing the New
World between Spain and Portugal seems to us, and must have seemed
even then_ a peculiarly ineffectual gesture.
Custom has had its role in the development of space law_ as the
preceding papers have testified. Perhaps its most important contri-
bution thus far has been the notion that activities in space may be
carried on without the consent of the sovereign of the subjacent terri-
tory_ at least in the absence of harm or threat of harm.
But custom is slow to accumulate and its teaching cannot always
be read with clarity. Something faster and surer was needed if space
law was to stay within hailing distance of space science. Thus there
has been a remarkable thrust for codification and for explicit formu-
lation in this newest branch of law. The traditional mechanism of
bilateral and multilateral agreement fashioned through negotiation
and embodied in conventional form is ill-adapted to meet this demand
under existing circumstances. The demand has been able both to
make itself felt and to get itself satisfied to a certain extent, largely
because of the existence of the United Nations General Assembly as an
international forum. The most important action of the Assembly in
this connection has been the adoption of the well-known Resolution
1721 (XVI) which commended certain principles to states for their
guidance in the exploration and use of outer space. They were first_
that "International law_ including the Charter of the United Nations,
applies to outer space and celestial bodies"; and second_ that "Outer
space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all states
in conformity with international law and are not subject to national
appropriation."
These principles are of course very general. They were intended
to be so, and at this stage of space exploration it is appropriate that
they should be. They are obviously not self-executing. Their appli-
cation to specific space activities is already the subject of considerable
exegesis, both political and scholarly. They do however provide a
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basic and_ I think_ a sound legal framework for the conduct of space
activities at this stage.
There are certain things about the statement of guiding principles
that are noteworthy :
1. They were unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly_ al-
though this action was not forthcoming until agreement between the
United States and the USSR had been achieved.
2. They involve one very significant and quite specific substantive
innovation, the principle of nonappropriation. Them is no solid
customary basis for this rule_ and of course it directly contradicts the
bulk of prior human experience with exploration.
3. They look toward a freely developing pattern of activity in ex-
ploration and use of space_ limited only by relevant provisions of inter-
national law and the Charter.
In the legal subcommittee of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space work has gone forward on the articulation of additional
general principles. Discussions in the legal subcommittee have re-
vealed a wide area of consensus on such matters as liability for damage
caused by space vehicles_ obligation to assist and return space vehicles
and personnel in distress or landing by accident and mistake, the
principle that jurisdiction over a space vehicle and personnel in transit
shall be retained by the state or international organization which had
it before launch, and the obligation to conduct space activities in such
a way as to minimize the possibilities of contamination. There is
little doubt that agreement on these points could be reached were it
not for the insistence of the Soviet Union that a number of contro-
versial provisions also be included, on a package basis, in any agreed
statement of principles to emerge from the legal subcommittee.
The United States recognizes the principles announced in Resolu-
tion 1721 as stating existing law. And I believe it would so regard
any principles that came from the legal subcommittee and were unani-
mously approved by the Assembly. I will leave it to jurisprudes to
tell us what the source of law is in this case. I suppose it would have
been possible to argue for the principles a pr/or/, though that would
have been difficult in the case of nonappropriation. Moreover_ we
have here an explicit formulation that is exceedingly hard to reach
by a process of pure ratiocination. There is no formal international
agreement establishing consensual obligations. Of course the As-
sembly is not a legislature, so we can discard enactment as a source
of law. Perhaps the unanimous assent of the United Nations member-
ship to Resolution 1721 can be taken as denoting common acceptance
of the principles expressed, though here again the existence of a spe-
cific verbal formula is not wholly consistent with that notion.
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Whatever the source may be, the United States, as I have said, ac-
c_epts these principles as stating the law, and I suspect most other
states would also. We have witnessed in this field a significant and
novel kind of lawmaking activity that has established a sound and
useful base for more intensive legal development and that is attribut-
able in large part to the presence and action of international organi-
zation.
ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Familiar administrative processes also have their analogies in the
activities of international organizations in the field of space law.
The UN Secretary-General, pursuant to Resolution 1721, has estab-
lished a registry of space launches. The resolution calls upon states
launching objects into orbit to furnish information for the registra-
tion of such launchings. Although it does not really serve as a traffic
control it does tend to encourage a pattern of openness in space activ-
ity that is very much in the interests of the United States. The impact
of disclosure requirements as well as the various intricacies of this
administrative technique are of course well known to .us on the basis
of a wide range of domestic experience with it.
Even more comfortably familiar are the administrative develop-
ments in the field of space communications. In space, as on the earth,
the limits of the spectrum of radio frequencies are inexorable. Unless
an allocation of frequencies among users is accepted and respected,
the result will be that no one can use the facility at all. The Inter-
national Telecommunication Union, established in 1865, has of course
no compulsory jurisdiction in the allocation of frequencies. Its func-
tion is essentially coordination and its method is essentially recom-
mendation. Yet, the necessities of the case being what they are, the
member states have no choice but to accept the allocations made by
the ITU. In 1959, the Union assigned certain radio frequency bands
for research activities in outer space including tracking and communi-
cation. The ITU plans to convene an Extraordinary Administrative
Radio Conference in October 1963 for fundamental allocation of fre-
quencies for operating space communications.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The existence of the United Nations and associated international
organizations has had a manifold and a decisive influence on early
developments in the field of space law. I believe this influence will
continue. Nations engaging in the conduct of space activities will
wish to do so, in general, in accordance with standards that are ac-
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cepted internationally. This is so not only because of the interna-
tional political consequences of conduct in space. Space flight is
global. States conducting space programs need the cooperation of
other countries for tracking and like purposes. Even the Soviet bloc
is not autarchie in this respect. Existing international organizations
will continue to provide the major forum for arriving at and articu-
lating consensus on standards of national conduct in space.
But in space as in other environments, the decisive questions will
be associated with the control of the use of force. The United States
has frequently expressed its view that outer space should be devoted
to peaceful uses. And it has so conducted its own space programs.
The United States has no intention of placing nuclear weapons in
orbit. Disarmament negotiations continue for the actual elimination
of nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them as well as
for dealing with other types of armaments. But it is important to do
everything now that can be done to avoid an arms race in outer space.
It is clearly easier not to arm an environment that has never been
armed than to disarm one that has been armed. It is the earnest
hope of the United States that the Soviet Union will likewise refrain
from taking steps to extend the arms race into space.
More generally_ it is well to be precise about what is meant when
we talk of peaceful uses of outer space. It is perfectly clear that the
dividing line cannot be drawn on the basis that a particular space
activity has military applications or is carried out by military per-
sonnel. A navigational satellite can guide a naval vessel as well as
a merchant ship. A communications satellite can serve a military
establishment as well as civilian communities. Photographic observa-
tion from space may be used for mapping or for military planning.
The instruments which guide a space vehicle on a scientific quest may
also guide a space vehicle on a military mission. American and Russian
astronauts have been members of national armed forces_ but this has
afforded no reason to challenge their activities.
The dangers to peace which exist and which may exist in the future
stem from the threat or use of force in violation of international
legal obligations. The standards which must be used in determining
and controlling exertions of national power have not been altered by
the new world which outer-space activities have opened. This is
explicit in the United Nations General Assembly declaration that
"international law_ including the Charter of the United Nations_ ap-
plies to outer space and celestial bodies."
The standards of judgment remain those set forth in the Charter
of the United Nations. Article 2_ paragraph 4, imposes the obliga-
tion to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of the United Nations. Article 2,
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paragraph 3, imposes the obligation to settle international disputes
by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and secu-
rity, and justice, are not endangered. These principles laid clown in
the United Nations Charter bind nations in space as on earth. In
the celestial as in the terrestrial sphere, they represent the judgment
of the organized international community.
CONCLUSION
It is a commonplace to say that we are 0nly at the threshold of
space law. But, as with many commonplaces, this one is true. Never-
theless I think we have made an encouraging beginning. A promi-
nent feature of that beginning has been the part played in developing
standards and in administrative regulation by the ordinary machinery
of the international community_ that is to say the United Nations
and its associated bodies. The capacity these bodies have shown in
these directions is an important asset for the rapid development of
law to govern the conduct of man in outer space.
Comments
David F. Maxwell
I am delighted that Professor Chayes has referred to Resolution
1721 and the dedication of the United States to the principle that the
uses of outer space should be confined to peaceful purposes. But I
feel that we should read the expression "The freedom of outer space,"
which is set forth in Resolution 1721, in the context of the entire
Resolution, noting that the preamble states : "Recognizing the common
interest of mankind in furthering the peaceful uses of outer space, and
the urgent need to strengthen international cooperation in this im-
portant field .... "
The whole subject of freedom of outer space is thus tied in to the
peaceful uses of outer space. What is meant by "peaceful uses"?
Here I would like to illustrate the difference between the Russian and
United States views on this question, especially as this difference was
pointed up in the recent discussions of the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space of the United Nations. During this conference,
the Soviet delegate, expressing the official policy of his government,
declared that observation from space for the purpose of collecting
intelligence data is not to be construed as a peaceful purpose. In fact
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he held such use to be not only violative of international law but
also incompatible with the purposes of the United Nations charter.
The United States' official position is that any use of outer space
is "peaceful" if it is not intended for aggression. In short, the prob-
lem resolves itself into the determination of whether outer space may
b_ used for military purposes of a nonaggressive character.
The Russians' attitude toward this question is reflected by the condi-
tions which they impose upon the return of salvaged spacecraft. It
is interesting to note that the Soviets propo_ to return only such
spacecraft that may have landed within their borders, even through
inadvertence, as are not equipped with devices for the collection of
intelligence information. To quote the Soviet delegate: "The use of
artificial satellites for the collection of intelligence information in a
territory of foreign states is incompatible with the objectives of man-
kind in its conquest of outer space."
Contrast ,that with the United States' proposed resolution which
provides: "States shall return to the launching authority any space
vehicle or part that is landed by reason of accident, distress, or mis-
take. Upon request, the launching authority shall furnish indenti-
lying data prior to the return period."
I should like to comment also on the difference in attitude between
the United States and the Soviets with respect to free enterprise in
space. The Russians maintain that the use of outer space must be
restricted to the spacecraft of nations, thereby barring exploration
initiated by private enterprise. In effect the Soviets are attempting
to project into outer space the basic philosophy of their monolithic
form of government--individual rights must be submerged by the
rights of the state.
If this proposal is adopted, the cornerstone of international law as
now understood by the community of nations would crumble and a
new concept of the law of nations inspired by Communist concepts
would prevail. The Russians would thereby succeed in establishing
through the "back door" of outer space that which they have thus far
failed to achieve on Earth.
Not only would such a result be contrary to accepted principles of
international law but it would also constitute an indirect blow at those
voluntary international organizations which have contributed so much
to man's knowledge of outer space. As Mr. Chayes pointed out, these
international agencies have been involved in space activities since 1948.
An outstanding example is the wholly voluntary effort of the Inter-
national Council of Scientific Unions. If encouraged, such voluntary
organizations, composed of citizens of many nations, can contribute as
much as, if not more than, the United Nations.
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Finally, a word as to why the American delegation must exercise
such great care in the language used in any internationl agreement
involving the Soviets. The meaning of the word "peaceful" is clear
enough to us. It is definite, precise, and invariable. But the Rus-
sians' interpretation may vary to suit their purpose at the moment.
On the one hand, they condemn the United StaCks for its view that the
use of outer space for reconnaissance purposes is legitimate. Yet
would the same standard govern them in their own uses of outer
space ? Listen to Marshal S. S. Biryuzov boasting about the exploits
of the Russians in rocketry :
It has now become possible at command from earth to launch rockets from
satellites at any desirable time and at any point of the satelli_'s trajectory.
The successful development of Soviet weapons and their high quality, reliability,
and precision are demonstrated by the rockets used in the exploration of the
cosmos. It must also be said that the problem of destroying enemy rockets in
flight has been sucessfully solved in our country.
Thus, while the Soviets express disapproval of satellite reconnais-
sance in outer space, they would apparently not hesitate to project
into the cosmos the most destructive space satellites ever devised by
man.
Given _he Soviets' present unreliable and unpredictable disposition
toward the uses of outer space, it would seem wise for the United
States delegation at the United Nations to guard zealously our right
to use outer space for any purpose which our government deems neces-
sary for our national security.
Howard J. Taubenfeld
The only major point of issue I take with Professor McDougal is
that his magnificent system for description describes what is and how
it comes about_ and probably prognosticates the slow way that things
may develop, but it does not at all help me in discussing what would
be the best way to do things. It describes how things will probably
be done, but it does not describe for me the alternative ways in which
they might be done better.
This I think is_ in a different context, also a limitation, and a very
important bne, that inevitably predominates in the formal, prepared
addresses of government people and others who have vested interests
which they must defend. It has been said that politics is the art of
the possible. That might be reinterpreted to indicate that politics is
the art of the lowest common denominator, or often the art of the not
quite good enough in international relations.
As a consequence, I thought it might be .l_ossible to pursue an older
theme of mine, which turns not so much on the law as it is, but on the
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND SPACE---COMM_ENTS 6_
framework in which the law might be made--not existing framework
at all, but other frameworks, other rela.tionship% in which this prob-
lem as well as any number of other problems could be approached.
I once heard Professor Oliver, a very distinguished international
law professor, start a speech with something which I can't quote di-
rectly, but which I thought was entirely appropriate. Ite described
himself, in talking about the United Nations, as one who is paid by
society to comment on the passing scene, and to propose better ways
of doing things without being limited by any necessity of describing
exactly how they are to be done. It may well be quite enough at this
stage to comment only on the political framework, not "the law."
Prime among the problems tha.t have been discussed in this confer-
ence are those of avoiding confliot over the use of space and space
resources, avoiding conflict in space when it becomes possible to have
conflict there, and, on the other side of the coin, developing patterns
within which space resources could be used for the highest good of all.
I am going to suggest, as I have done elsewhere, a pattern of orga-
nizational framework within which these questions could be ap-
proached. This has nothing to do with "reality. '_ But these are
alternative ways in which these problems could be approached.
Of the solutions that I shall propose_ the one that would be most
likely to resolve all these problems is the least likely to be acceptable
politically; that is, the readiness with which my various proposals
would probably be accepted by states is in inverse proportion to their
intellectual fruitfulness with respect to resolving my three issues.
You can start, of course, if you are model building, with a model
of an all-embracing, democratically operating world government.
This would solve the problems of avoiding conflict in sl)ace_ avoiding
conflict over space resource% and using space resources for the highest
good of all mankind.
There is the small problem that there is no likelihood of having this
at present; that there is no consensus for it; that creating a democratic
world government would be an extraordinarily difficult problem.
But it would resolve these space-associated problems.
In fact, if such a government were to evolve in the reasonably near
future, it would oversolve some of the problems in _hat a democratic
world government with power to redistribute resources would be un-
likely to devote any vast amount of these resources to space explora-
tion. With two of the three billion people in the world in a state of
developmen.t, and many of them near starvation, a democratic world
government would be unlikely to devote very much to anything but
some of the near-in space resources---communications and meteorol-
ogy, perhaps. It would probably not allocate to the exploration of
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the moon the $4 or $5 billion we are now spending, plus the severaJ
billions perhaps being spent in Russia.
If you reject this unlikely alternative, and come down my scale,
you will find a proposal to solve the same problems by means of an
organization that would embrace every outer-space activity, near in
or far out. This organization would handle all launchings of objects,
including intercontinental missiles and the like. This suggestion, if
somewhat less unlikely politically than world government, is also an
unlikely possibility, particularly since it includes total control of inter-
continental missiles and other missiles, which are or are becoming tha
prime reliance of national states in their military postures.
In addition, such an organization, having space resources ultimately
available to it, would be an extremely powerful entity in the world.
It would be 'another government, if you like. The difficulties in form-
ing it--in getting political consensus--are probably as great as for
world government. Its results probably would not be as useful, so we
can pass on from it as well.
The next alternative is to leave to the states all of their own manu-
facturing possibilities, including intercontinental missiles for defense.
After all, there is only one definition that can be used today for outer-
space activities in dividing the military-aggressive from the peaceful.
That is the standard definition: theirs are military-aggressive; ours
are peaceful. And that, in effect, is the definition that the Soviet
Union and, I might say, we too have used. The missiles in Cuba
obviously are hostile to the United States, though the Cubans might
argue that they are not likely to attack us and, therefore, the missiles
are for defensive purposes only, to prevent us from attacking them.
The Soviet Union may argue that a satellite that passes over the
Soviet Union to find targets is clearly an aggressive weapon. We say
that since we are not going to attack, we need this information to
defend ourselves. This is about all there is to say, I think, about
definitions.
You can imagine, then, the next order of a partial outer space
regime. It is one which leaves to the national states their military
capacities, their ICBM's, and the like, but provides an international
entity to handle all other space activities--anything that is going into
space to orbit or to travel to the celestial bodies. This would pre-
sumably avoid conflict arising in space. It would avoid conflict over
space resources because the national states would be cut off from them
completely.
Whether it would lead to the highest utilization of all space re-
sources is hard to judge. We argue, for example, that private com-
panies in the space field are very useful; national states competing in
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outer-space activities may also prove very useful. This regime, too, is
unlikely to be acceptable, but, again, it would deal with the three chief
problems. It would not deal with keeping peace on earth or avoiding
the use of the space highway for ICBM's, since we have left to the
national states their missiles.
The next alternative, coming down the scale again, is to have no
general outer-space regime to make rules for the use of outer space,
but to encourage the higher development of international functional
organs.
It is conceivable to me that there could be an international telecom-
munications system, an operating system that might rent out channels
to national entities or to multinational entities. It is equally con-
ceivable, though it might not be the best thing to do, that there could
be an operating international meteorological organization making fore-
casts, doing research, trying to control weather, and so on. This
might be accomplished without any general overall regime.
If none of these solutions is accepted, you come down to what is,
I think, much the present situation--that is, no overall organization
for outer space and no international operating entities in outer space,
though of course the ITU already has a role in the field of space com-
munications. And there is the enunciation, whether we call it law in
this sense or not, of general, self-policed, self-denying ordinances such
as the United Nations resolution of December 1961, which has been
discussed here repeatedly. To the extent that man's capacity to use
space is limited, to the extent that space and the celestial bodies prove
ultimately to have no military value, and to the extent that the re-
sources are really sharable by the states, these may be satisfactory.
On the other hand, it can be demonstrated in history that no self-
denying, self-policed ordinance has ever succeeded in any area which
was in fact suffused with security or rich in resources. There are many
examples, often involving solemn treaties. Mandates are an obvious
example from the League of Nations period. Freedom of access was
guaranteed to all nations in the mandates arrangements. The national
state controlling the mandate had no sovereignty over it. What has
this meant with respect to the position of the Union of South Africa in
Southwest Africa, an example which still exists ? It is obviously en-
tirely possible to have exclusionary activities which are real and
rigorous, without any claim to sovereignty at all.
Thus, a self-policed, self-denying ordinance that a state will not
claim sovereignty does not necessarily indicate the shape of the future.
There are many historic examples of unilateral exclusive claims to use
areas without claims of sovereignty. Freedom of access is one ex-
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ample. Freedom to defend oneself anywhere without claiming
sovereignity in the area is another obvious example.
For outer space this type of-regime, a regime with a certain amount
of functional cooperation and with self-denying_ self-policed ordi-
nances_ is what we have and what we are likely to see. And it is
entirely possible that there will be no major conflicts in and over outer-
space uses. These other patterns of more general international control
may not be necessary. But as one who is paid by society to observe
all of the possibilities_ I do think that at least some attention should
be called to them as other ways in which mankind might rationally
proceed.
JohnA. Johnson
I would like to comment on a remark made by Mr. Beresford. That
was the reference to an upward limit on territorial sovereignty set
arbitrarily at a low altitude. I freely concede that the word "arbi-
trary" is a dangerous one to us% and that we would not expect nations
to act in complete disregard of all rational considerations. As I have
pointed out_ the only area with which I was concerned was the area
above the airspace that has actually been used up to the present time
by aircraft operating on aerodynamic principles and below the lowest
levels of orbital flight.
What I meant was_ simply_ that the only limit that would have any
practical utility would be one that was set quite arbitrarily in the lower
portion of that area. The area we are talking about is roughly be-
tween the altitudes of 25 and 90 miles. I would prefer, if a limit were
to be set by agreement_ that it be set near the lower rather than the
upper end of that area. And it would be determined in an arbitrary
way; that is_ it would not be derived from scientific or technological
considerations_ but would be agreed upon by the states concerned with
reference to their security interests and whatever other national in-
terests were to be served by it.
I would also like to say_ in connection with some of Mr. MaxwelFs
comments_ that there really is no prospect of any considerable amount
of support being gain_ed by the Soviet Union in the United Nations
for the principle that space activity should be conducted only by states.
In the general debate that occurred in June of 1962 at Geneva and
again in April 1963 at New York, I don_t believe that the Soviet Union
has picked up one shred of support for that principle outside of the
Soviet bloc itself. Recognizing that the committee is composed of 28
members---12 from the so-called Western bloc_ 8 from the Soviet bloc_
and 8 from the nonalined nations---what the nonalined nations say
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about this subject is, of course, most interesting. This is an area in
which no support has been gained for the Soviet position. I think the
same can be said for the proposal of the Soviet Union that outer space
may not be used for what they refer to as espionage or intelligence-
gathering purposes.
The very forthright statements that we have made concerning the
legality under international law of observation from outer space have
found, I think, a good reception among the members of the committee.
Here, too, it appears that the Soviet position is supported by only a
small minority.
This does not mean, however, that the Soviet Union is going to
yield easily on these points. They have taken a firm position, and they
have reiterated it constantly.
In 1962 at Geneva they firmly refused to permit any kind of a re-
port to go forward to the parent committee indicating the extent of
agreement that had been reached. The only kind of report they would
approve was one which said there had been a useful exchange of views
but that no agreement had been reached. Their position was, in effect,
that if the other nations would not buy the complete Soviet package,
dealing with those problems which they said were of the greatest
concern to the peoples of the world, they did not want to mislead
the world into thinking that any kind of useful progress had been
made on issues with which they were not primarily concerned and
which they regarded as trivial.
Whether this position will be repeated in the 1963 session remains
to be seen.
Myres S. McDougal
We have had a surprising degree of unanimity at this conference.
We should all be grateful to Professor Cohen for stirring up a little
trouble.
I do have a few comments to address to each of the commentators.
Let me begin with Professor Christol, my former student, a member
of the first class I ever taught international law. It is now painfully
apparent that I did not then know much about the law of espionage.
When Professor Christol suggested that it was questionable whether
espionage was unlawful under international law, I could not help but
think that it would be small comfort to the man who was caught, and
lawfully shot as a spy, to be told that espionage was lawful under
international law.
The difficulty is perhaps in the common use of the legalistic word
"espionage" to refer to all kinds of factual observation of others. It
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should be obvious, however, that observation from satellites can be
fully the equivalent of observation from planes or ships or photog-
raphy on earth and can gravely endanger the security interests of a
particular state. In such instances the target state may, as suggested
above, be accorded an occasional exclusive competence, comparable to
that in contiguous zones on the high seas, for its protection.
The details in application of such a competence will have to be
adapted to space conditions, but I should think it highly probable that
the peoples of the world will clarify a common interest in this kind of
competence. Official utterances from both the United States and
Russia would appear to support this view.
I was particularly grateful to Professor Christol for his insightful
elaboration of the concept of customary international law. To the
broad structure he presented should be added the remarks of Mr.
Chayes about resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.
The role of such resolutions in implementing the traditional require-
ments about customary law is reasonably clear.
The requirements of customary law, as we have seen, are that there
should be certain past uniformities of behavior accompanied by
certain subjectivities that these uniformities are required. We found
also that a very short period of time was necessary to the crystalliza-
tion of a customary consensus when there was no doubt about the ex-
pectations of future requirements. We found that the requirement
in uniformity was not that of universality, but of generality.
The new role that the United Nations plays is th}_t of providing, in
the General Assembly, a forum where these expectations of the
peoples of the world about what future decisions are required can
be ascertained easily and quickly and with relative certainty. Hence,
everything which Mr. Chayes said should be included within a real-
istic conception of customary international law. The only relevance
of the past is for its clarification of contemporary expectations about
the future; what the United Nations does is tremendously to improve
the efficiency of the historic process.
I would join with Mr. Beresford in his emphasis that the opposition
by the Soviet to customary international law--in fact, their whole use
of these doctrines of peaceful coexistence--is designed not simply to
undercut our inheritance, our contemporary expectations of the future,
but also to project certain very positive and retrogressive conceptions
of their own. This amendment I accept with great pleasure.
I would, however, differ with Mr. Beresford when he suggests that
it is not necessary to take the position that we already have a custom-
ary principle that access to outer space is free. As I recall, I believe
he said that the only thing necessary was simply the conclusion that
the free use of outer space was not prohibited.
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This suggestion raises _he ghosts of the arguments in the famous
Lotus case. You will remember that in this case a French vessel ran
down a Turkish steamer upon the high seas and killed several people
on board the Turkish steamer. The Turks claimed that they could
punish a French officer whom they caught in Turkey because they could
do _mything that was not expressly prohibited by international law.
This was comparable to the suggestion by Mr. Beresford. The
French claimed that the Turks could not punish their officer because
the Turks could do only what was expressly permitted under inter-
national law.
I submit that both arguments are fallacious. They both build
from the conception of law as a body of fixed, inherited rules. If
one thinks rather in terms of a continuous process--a process in
which law is continuously being prescribed and applied and is being
made and remade all the time by the collaborative behavior of
people--neither argument does justice to a very rich reality. There
are no necessary gaps in international prescription; courts and other
bodies create rules as they apply them.
I would, however, agree with Mr. Beresford in the importance
of application; no matter how carefully we formulate prescriptions
in opinions, resolutions, and otherwise, they almost always travel in
complementary form and in highly ambiguous language. They have
to be interpreted and adapted to concrete instances.
On the problem of boundaries, I would like to say a few words
in supplement to Mr. Johnson's remarks. I once took him to account
for the use of the word "arbitrary," but later bethought myself that
I was wrong and adopted the word from him. In my principal
remarks, I tried to indicate reasons for both "arbitrary" and "low."
I suggested that the generic problem with which the general com-
munity is here confronted is that of the accommodation, in specific
instances of application, of the inclusive claims of all states to freedom
of use and of the exclusive interests of all states in protecting the
healthy functioning, the security, the internal welfare, of their terri-
torial communities.
From the perspective of the inclusive interests of states in the
greatest possible productive use of space, any boundary agreed upon
would have to be the surface of the earth, the lowest possible. This is
the justification of "low."
From the perspective of the exclusive interests of states, no bound-
ary anywhere located can offer adequate protection. Immediate
threats may come, as observed above, from anywhere in space. If
every state began to try to extend its boundaries to the extent necessary
to protect its exclusive interests, we would have complete anarchy.
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What we meant by references to an "arbitrary" boundary was that
no boundary could serve the major purposes of common interest. The
only purposes a boundary could serve would be the relatively minor
administrative ones of keeping down the number of controversies
and of shifting the burden _of proof in instances where there were
controversies.
Another point by Mr. Beresford was that some of us had taken the
analogy of the oceans a little too seriously. I would agree that for
some of the problems the analogies of the ocean and airspace, and
the processes of customary development, are not entirely adequate.
The purpose, however, of the careful discrimination of ten different
types of problems which I attempted was to indicate upon which
problems the analogies might be relevant.
Thus, with respect to the problems of minimum order, the keeping
of the peace, the analogies may not be completely helpful. If we
can reach agreement with the Russians on arms control problems--if
we are ever able to project a series of arrangements for prevention,
deterrence, and so forth the measures taken with respect to space
activities might be very different from those previously taken with
respect to ocean activities. The threat from space conceivably could
be much greater than the threat from the oceans. Certainly for
purposes of observation_ the threat from space is greater.
With respect to the major problems of freedom of access, of non-
appropriation, and of an occasional exclusive competence for security
and self-defense, I would_ however, take a very strong position that
the best experience we have from the past is that from the oceans
and the airspace above the oceans. The only concession I would
make is that the conditions of space activity will make it much more
difficult than ever before to apply the experience of the past.
The next man on our list is Professor Cohen. The principal point
upon which I would differ with him is, again, the question of bound-
aries. In his fourth phase_ he found that we were again coming
back to boundaries because of the difficulties abo_t the problems of
pollution_ nuclear tests, and so on.
May I suggest again that no management of the problem of boun-
daries can cope with these problems. Until we get some general
arrangement_ until we can achieve a new and different clarification of
common interests_ the underlying state willy I think, claim the com-
petence to act unilaterally to protect itself. It would be most unfor-
tunate if this claim is made in the form of an attempted extension of
boundaries. It would be much more economic and effective to honor
the occasional exclusive competence of the contiguous zone--with the
requirement of contiguity removed--than to accept any territorial
claim.
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For Professor Cohen's brilliant lecture upon jurisprudence, and
especially upon the beauties of sociological jurisprudence, I have little
but applause. There are, nonetheless, certain points even here upon
which I would hope that he might achieve a little further clarification.
Those of us who recommend a policy-oriented approach to the study
of law certainly do not intend to minimize the importance of norms_
rules_ or principles. We do like to emphasize the importance of iden-
tifying and clarifying the policies that norms express and serve.
Hence, we would reject the notion that there is something unique,
autonomous--I forget the exact words used--that separates norms
from policies. The only meaning of norms with which we are con-
cerned is the empirical one of who uses them with respect to whom_
for what purposes, and with what outcomes_ under what conditions.
What is important are the value consequences of the prescription and
application of norms.
Beyond concern with norms, appropriately understood, I would ac-
cept the emphasis several commentators have offered_ that we should
also be concerned with improving institutions and procedures. I be-
lieve both Professor Cohen and Professor Taubenfeld made this point.
It is in no way incompatible with recognition of the importance of
customary law to demand invention of new institutions and new
procedures.
With great deference to Professor Cohen_ I believe that the intel-
lectual tasks required of the scholar and those required of the decision-
maker are much the same. The first task is to clarify the policies, the
overriding goals for which the individual is willing to take personal
responsibility as a citizen of the larger community of mankind,
speaking to other such citizens.
The next task is to assess the experience of the pasty to draw upon
the best wisdom of what we have called customary law. A third task
is to consider what are the factors which have affected this past be-
havior. Still another is to consider whether such factors will be op-
erative in the future. The final task is that of ascertaining and
recommending the alternatives which will best promote the clarified
policies we recommend.
In answer to Professor Taubenfeld_ let me say that I never intended
to neglect the broad goals he mentions. I would share his concern
for future improvement. Where I would differ would perhaps be on
certain modalities of emphasis.
I do not_ for the moment, put a very high premium upon the pro-
jection of grandiose plans of world government. It would appear
much more important to concentrate upon clarification of the common
interests of peoples on the very specific types of problems itemized
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earlier. There are many different institutional arrangements by
which such clarification could be implemented.
There remains the problem of persuading peoples to accept any
institutional modality. How is it that we can best appeal to the effec-
tive elites in Russia and in the other totalitarian countries, and per-
suade them that it is in their interest to put an end to his divided world
and to cooperate more fully on these many problems? Fortunately,
our new access to space will tremendously improve our facilities for
communicating with other peoples. It becomes the responsibility of
all of us who pretend to scholarship to use all of our knowledge about
the past regulation of the legal problems and all of our knowledge of
the behavioral sciences, including psychology and public relations, to
attempt to move a world which is in a very dangerous and precarious
condition toward a public order much more in conformity with the
values of human dignity.
Part II
COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES
AND THE LAW
Introduction to Part II
THE COMMUNICATIONSSATELLITEACT OF 1962 is a reminder that the
decisions that men make do count in the shaping of history. The
legislative creation hammered out in bitter controversy in the summer
of 1962 appears to have shaped for the forseeable future the course of
development for international communications in the Western World
and possibly for all men. In its final form the legislation is also a
reminder of both the vitality and the puzzling complexity of the
concept of a national interest realized through private decision
making. In this respect the act is a typically Yankee invention. In
a world not sharing in a like degree the American commitment to free
enterprise, its administration will present unique and absorbing
problems of law and diplomacy.
In an effort to shape the intellectual outlines of both the domestic
and international aspects of the new legislation, Northwestern Uni-
versity Law School presented on May 2, 1963, a symposium on Com-
munications Satellites and the Law as part of the Conference on the
Law of Space and of Satellite Communications. In the following
pages are the three principal papers prepared for and presented at
the symposium and the extensive comments upon these papers by a
group of distinguished lawyers. For convenient reference, the Com-
munications Satellite Act of 1962 is reprinted here as an appendix.
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Monopoly and
Antitrust Aspects of
Communications Satellite Operations
BennettBoskey
"Monopoly and Antitrust Aspects of Communications Satellite
Operations" is a subject with many lively ramifications. It marks
out an area which is a meeting place for the old and the new--an area
where the theoretical and the practical interact--an area virtually
certain to be the breeding ground of controversy as the communica-
tions satellite program moves forward.
Communications satellite activities constitute an integral part of
our space programs, which today are reaching far out beyond existing
frontiers of knowledge and technology. The process will be not only
challenging and difficult, but also exceptionally expensive. The
President's budget message gives some idea of the magnitude. It
estimates that during fiscal year 1964 the Federal Government will
spend on space research and technology (apart from the "national
defense" portions of the budget) a sum in excess of $4 billion--or
nearly 4 percent of the total Federal expenditures. 1
Communications satellites offer real opportunities for important
and relatively early practical applications of space technology. As
yet we do not have any very clear notion of the practical uses of land-
ing a man on the moon. But we can already see ahead to the massive
improvements achievable in global communications through commu-
nications satellites--achievable at least if there can be developed reli-
able communications satellites which will have sufficiently long oper-
ating lifetimes in orbit so that replacement costs will not make the
satellite system prohibitively expensive3
See the President's Budget Message, in H. Doc. No. 15, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963).
J The problem of satellite reliability has been described as the key technological
problem. See REIGER, NICHOLS, _ARLY & DEWS, COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES:
TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMICS, AND SYSTEM CHOICES, The Rand Corporation Memoran-
dum RM--3487-RC (Feb. 1963).
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Such considerations underscore the need for wisdom and ingenuity
in devising the best available combination of private and govern-
mental actions to assure effective development and results. This is
what the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 8----or at least its
sponsors and supporters---hoped to do. The act was designed to
serve as basic legislation. It provides, among other things, for the
establishment of a private corporation which, nevertheless, is endowed
with many quasi-public characteristics and functions--including
nomination of all the incorporators (and 3 of the 15 directors) by the
President of the United States subject to confirmation by the Senate."
Sharp differences emerged during the congressional consideration of
this legislation--so sharp that for the first time since 1927 the Senate
voted cloture2
Thus was established a United States legislative framework for the
conduct of communications satellite operations. Now we find our-
selves at the threshold of the experiment which the legislation
launched.
COMPLEXITIES
The monopoly and antitrust aspects of activities to be carried out
under this legislation have every potential for giving rise to major
controversy. For one thing, implicit in them are some of the difficul-
ties which were responsible for the diverging views when the legisla-
tion was pending in Congress. For another, they are inherently com-
plex matters, of legitimate concern to many people, and they involve a
rather delicate balancing of conflicting interests.
By way of illustration, the following considerations may be
mentioned •
(1) Problems as to allocation of proprietary and other rights, as
well as allocation of responsibilities between the Government and
private industry, particularly in the light of increasing evidence of
a strong need for extensive Government funds to support the research
and development effort.
(2) The fact that initial costs and size of investment loom so large,
and profits are so uncertain, that great initial encouragement may be
given to monopoly.
SPub. L. 87-624, enacted Aug. 31, 1962; 76 Stat. 419, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 701--44.
' In the confirmation debates a minority suggested that the Consti'tution does
not permit Senate confirmation of the officials of a private corporation who are
not public officers. The Senate rejected the point 75 to 15, voting that the consid-
eration and confirmation of the nominations was in accordance with the Consti-
tution. ,109 Co_o. REC. 6608-18, 6621-58, 6693-99 (Daily ed. April 24 & 25, 1963).
5 The legislative history of the act is summarized, and the act is extensively
analyzed, in Legislation Note, The Communications Satellite ol 1965, 76 HARV.
L. REv. 388 (1962).
• • $,
82 LAW" OF SPACE AND OF SATELLITE CO_VII_d_LrN_CATIOI_S
(3) Problems arising out of affiliation between communications
carriers and equipment manufacturers (most notably illustrated by
the structure of AT&T).
(4) Competing claims and interests of different communications
carriers--the largest and the not-so-large.
(5) Possible anticompetitive effects of creating a statutory joint
venture in which competitors work together.
(6) Practical problems of assuring a proper degree of participation
by "small business."
(7) Dangers of undue dominance accruing to those companies
which have made a headstart, which are represented on the board
of the new corporation, which have access to all the information, and
which in some instances may occupy what appears to be a most valu-
able "inside track" posit.ion.
(8) Longer-range problems as to whether, when communications
satellite systems have become established on a working and regular
basis_ there will be room for (or undue restraint upon) effective com-
petition between the new corporation and the communication-carrier
companies which own part of its stock and have a voice in its
management.
Problems such as these are by no means simple; and perhaps addi-
tional complexities arise by virtue of the fact that some of the large .
companies involved (or likely to be involved) in the communications
satellite program are not strangers to antitrust proceedings and
problems.
Congress of course was sensitive to the need for protecting the public
interest and tried to deal effectively with factors of this kind. Natur-
ally it wished to assure that opportunities to participate in the com-
munications satellite program would be established and maintained on
a broad basis. Indeed, it is fair to say that Congress wished to en-
courage competition wherever practicable and wholesome.
The act approaches such problems by three principal routes. First,
it creates a federal regulatory system in which competitive principles
are given strong express recognition. Second, it makes extensive use
of a system of checks and balances. And third, it leaves no doubt
that Congress intends to maintain watchful surveillance over this
aspect of the program.
REGULATORYSYSTEM
Experience has shown that regulated industries give rise to some-
what special type0, of monopoly and antitrust problems. Normally_
the regulated industry, having a status in the nature of that of a public
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utility, is subject to the jurisdiction of an agency deemed to have con-
siderable expertise in bringing the industry's problems into harmony
with the public interest. Through the operation of the "primary
jurisdiction" rule and in many other ways, the existence of such a
regulatory system has substantial impact upon the regulated industry's
antitrust phases. This tends to be so even in those situations where
the applicable statute makes clear that the agency's express regulatory
approval does not relieve the licensee from the operation of the anti-
trust laws in connection with the licensed activity: Such problems
are not novel; we have been dealing with them in fields such as ship-
ping, motor carriers, aviation, natural gas, and atomic energy. While
drawing on this experience, however, we must also recognize the
likelihood that communications satellite operations will present new
and substantial problems.
The regulatory system imposed by the Communications Satellite
Act does have rather distinct features, including a number of pro-
visions especially pertinent to monopoly and antitrust considerations.
These begin, appropriately enough, with the declaration of policy and
purpose in section 102 of the act. In the drafting of important legis-
lation, there has developed a modern tendency to include in legislative
declarations of purpose, generalizations which are commendable but
sometimes not wholly consistent leaving it to others to worry about
how all the stated objectives can be reconciled and achieved. Perhaps
this tendency is reflected, in part, in section 102 of the Communications
Satellite Act. Nevertheless, subsection (c) of section 102 does set
forth one of the major objectives which Congress felt it important
to declare:
In order to facilitate this development and to provide the widest possible par-
ticipation by private enterprise, United States participation in the global system
shall be in the form of a private corporation, subject to appropriate governmental
regulation. It is the intent of Congress that all authorized users shall have
nondiscriminatory access to the system; that maximum competition be main-
tained in the provision of equipment and services utilized by the system; that
the corporation created under this Act be so organized and operated as to
maintain and strengthen competition in the provision of communications services
to the public; and that the activities of the corporation created under this
Act and of the persons or con_panies participating in the ownership of the
corporation shall be consistent with the Federal antitrust laws.
e See gymposium on Antitrust ang the Regulated anvl E_empt Industries, 19
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 261--421 (1961). During recent terms the Supreme
Court has had occasion to decide a number of such issues : Pan American World
Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); California v. FPC, 369
U.S. 482 (1962) ; Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States,
362 U.S. 458 (1960) ; United States v. R.C.A., 358 U.S. 334 (1959) ; Federal Mari-
time Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
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This statement of purpose serves to furnish guidance to those who
must administer and interpret the act, as well as those who must live
under its provisions.
We turn next to section 201 (c) (1) and section 201 (c) (2), which give
specific content to the definition of certain of the responsibilities lodged
in the Federal Communications Commission. Here it is provided
that :
(c) the Federal Communications Commission, in its administration of the
provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and as supplemented
by this Act, shall-
(i) insure effective competition, including the use of competitive bidding
where appropriate, in the procurement by the corporation and communica-
tions common carriers of apparatus, equipment, and services required for
the establishment and operation of the communications satellite system
and satellite terminal stations ; and the Commission shall consult with the
Small Business Administration and solicit its recommendations on measures
and procedures which will insure that small business concerns are given
an equitable opportunity to share in the procurement program of the corpora-
tion for property and services, including but not limited to research, devel-
opment, construction, maintenance, and repair.
(2) ihsure that all present and future authorized carriers shall have
nondiscriminatory use of, and equitable access to, the communications sat-
ellite system and satellite terminal stations under just and reasonable
charges, classifications, practices, regulations, and other terms and con-
ditions and regulate the manner in which available facilities of the system
and stations are allocated among such users thereof ....
To these should be added the more general standard of the "public
interest, convenience, and necessity"--a standard which recurs in
other subsections as the measure of the FCC's responsibilities.
As to monopoly and antitrust matters, it will be seen that the act
leaves in some doubt the limits of the respective responsibilities of
the Federal Communications Commission, the Justice Department,
and (with respect to foreign negotiations and commitments) the State
Department. It would be easy to exaggerate the amount of confusion
thus engendered. In many ways the jurisdictional doubts and un-
certainties are comparable to those besetting other regulated industries;
certainly nothing here seems to be so acute or unusual as to give special
cause for alarm.
CHECKS AND BALANCES
In formulating the structure for the new Communications Satellite
Corporation, Congress imposed a system of checks and balances--
both with respect to the corporation's board, section 303 (a), and with
respect to the corporation's stock, section 304. The board is to have
three members--intended to represent the public interest--appointed
by the President of the United States subject to Senate confirmation;
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six members elected by those stockholders which are communications
common carriers; and six members elected by the other stockholders.
In addition, no single stockholder which is a communications common
carrier may vote, either directly or indirectly, for more than three
board members.
Fifty percent of the stock authorized for issuance at any time by
the corporation is to be reserved for purchase by communications
common carriers authorized by the FCC to make such purchases. At
no time may these carriers own or control, in the aggregate, more than
50 percent of the voting stock issued and outstanding. In addition,
the FCC is given power to compel a communications common carrier
to transfer some or all of its stock, for a fair and reasonable considera-
tion, to another communications carrier, to the extent that the FCC
determines that this "will advance the public interest and the pur-
poses" of the act, Congress having also specified that the FCC, "when-
ever consistent with the public interest, shall promote the widest
possible distribution of stock among the authorized carriers."
The statutory directions governing the corporation's structure have
by now been implemented through the adoption of articles of incorpo-
ration and bylaws. _ With respect to its stock, however, the corporation
has not yet arrived at even tentative and preliminary decisions con-
cerning the amount of stock to be issued, the timing and the terms of
the offering, or other aspects of stock distribution.
Section 403 of the act, containing provisions relating to sanctions, is
of particular interest in connection with monopoly and antitrust as-
pects. Subsection (a) of section 403 expressly confers on the At-
torney General a right to obtain such equitable relief as may be neces-
sary or appropriate to prevent or terminate conduct or threat of
conduct violating the act's provisions, policies, or purposes. Sub-
section (b) of section 403 goes on to provide that nothing con-
tained in the section "shall be construed as relieving any person
of any punishment, lia:bility or sanction which may be imposed
otherwise than under this Act." This provision, particularly in
conjunction with the language of section 102(c) already referred
to_ will give strong support to the position that the act is in no way
a pro tanto repeal or modification of the antitrust laws.
In addition, section 404(c) manifests the intention of Congress to
keep watch on these matters. It requires that, among the reports
which the FCC is to transmit to Congress "annually and at such
other times as it deems desirable," there shall be included "a report
The corporation's articles of incorporation (filed Feb. 1, 1963) and the bylaws
are both reproduced tn Hearings on Nominations ot Incorporators o] the Com-
munications Satellite Gorporation Before the Senate Committee an Aeronautical
and Space Sciences, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 43-63 (1963).
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of its activities and actions on anticompetitive practices as they apply
to the communications satellite programs."
Some of the monopoly and antitrust problems, as we have seen,
may be expected to arise by virtue of the communications carrier
affiliations through at least six members of the new corporation's
board of directors. Accordingly it is worth noting that, to help mini-
mize these problems, the articles of incorporation and bylaws in-
clude a set of provisions intended to prescribe certain rules for the
disqualification of directors, officers, and employees, to pass upon
specific transactions in which they may have some other interest, s
The ambiguities and uncertainties in the provisions of major legisla-
tion emerge quickly. The Communications Satellite Act is no ex-
ception. For example, as the act has been interpreted, the new corpo-
ration could not require its communications-carrier stockholders
actually to purchase 50 percent of the voting stock as a condition to
exercising their statutory right to elect all six of their group of
directors. This interpretation has been received with surprise and
dismay by some of the Senators who were strong supporters of the
legislation. But the suggestion has been made that before initiating
measures to amend the law in this respect, Congress might well wait
8 Section 8.07 of the articles of incorporation provides :
No director shall participate in the negotiation of any contract between the Corporation
and any firm, corporation, association, or other entity in which such director has a sub-
stantial financial Interest or of which he is a director, officer, trustee, or employee. If a
director knows that the Board of Directors of the Corporation or any committee of the
Board proposes, at a meeting at which such director will not be present, to act upon or
in reference to any such contract, it shall be his duty to advise the Board or committee,
at or before the meeting, of his interest in such contract. If a director is present at any
meeting at which the Board or any committee of the Board acts upon or in reference to
any such contract or any contract between the Corporation and such director himself, it
shall be his duty to advise the Board or committee of his interest, and to abstain from
participation in any discussion of or vote upon such contract. If any director knowingly
violates this Section in connection with any contract, and if such contract was unfair to
the Corporation at the time it was entered into, such director shall be liable to the Corpo-
ration for any damages resulting from such unfairness.
Section 5.17 of the bylaws provides :
Outside Interests o] Officers a_d Employees. The Boarc_ of Directors fron_ time to time
may adopt rules and regulations governing the conduct of officers or key employees with
respect to matters in which they have a financial interest adverse to the interests of the
Corporation. Such rules and regulations may forbid officers or key employees from partici-
pating personally and substantially in corporate action with respect to any contract, trans-
action or other matter in which, to the knowledge of any such officer or employee, he or
any member of his immediate family has a financial interest, unless (a) such officer or
employee makes full disclosure of the circumstances to the Board or its delegate and the
Board or its delegate determines th,at the interest is not so substantial as to affect the
integrity of the services of such officer or employee, or (b) on the basis of standards to be
established in such rules or regulations, the financial interest is too remote or too incon-
sequential to affect the integrity of such services. Such rules and regulations may also
prohibit, or establish appropriate limits upon, the ownership by such officer or employee,
or member of his immediate family, of securities of any communications common carrier
or any other firm or corporation doing a substantial volume of business with the Cor-
poration.
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to see whether the carriers nevertheless decide to buy the full 50 per-
cent available to them2
How important this and other ambiguities in the legislation may
prove to be in their practical effects is by no means clear. Certainly
it is still too early to tell whether the act is reasonably adequate for
the next few years, or whether it will require drastic amendment.
So _nuch for the general legislative _tructure which will furnish
guidelines for dealing with monopoly and antitrust problems in the
communications-satellite program. Obviously many such problems
may arise in connection with the practical conduct of the new corpora-
tion's affairs. Fortunately, not all of these are likely to arise either
immediately or simultaneously. Here it may be useful to explore,
briefly and in a preliminary way, three groups of the problems: (1)
procurement; (2) foreign negotiations; and (3) service and rates.
PROCUREMENT
As already indicated, procurement matters pose many difficulties.
Not all of them can be postponed ; indeed, some of them must be dealt
with virtually immediately. Moreover, the FCC is already consider-
ing what kind of procurement regulations it should issue in order
to fulfill its statutory responsibilities.
Decisions must be arrived at progessively, as the program moves
forward, which will make choices between different communications-
satellite systems and will establish orders of priority in development.
Often it can be expected that the merits will be highly debatable and
as we know from the current TFX controversy, such decisions are apt
to bear the imprint of the personal judgment of those responsible for
making them. Accordingly, it becomes especially important to safe-
guard against solidifying some preferred position which may accrue
to a company having both a headstart and an "inside track."
In the act, as we have seen, Congress proclaimed its adherence to
broad competitive principles. But this alone cannot assure that in
practice such competitive principles will be given the scope required
by the public interest; continuous planning and effort on the part
of both the regulators and the regulated is required. On the other
hand, it must be recogaaized that if, in order to facilitate open com-
petitive bidding, "equipment specifications are frozen too early, the
price may be high in terms of a resulting inefficiency or partial
inoperability of the communications satellite systems.
"See especially Hearings, supra note 7, at 96-106, which included interpretative
opinions rendered both by the Justice Department and by the corporation's special
counsel.
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To state these problems is not to solve them. Nor is this an area
where it will be easy for the Federal Communications Commission
to exercise its regulatory authority wisely and well. It is understood
that by now the FCC has circulated to other Government agencies and
to industry representatives a very tentative working draft of proposed
procurement regu|ations_ seeking to obtain their comments and sug-
gestions before any formal rule-making proceeding is initiated by
publication in the Federal Register.
Needless to say, many different approaches could be made to the
exercise of this important regulatory responsibility. At one extreme_
the FCC might embark upon a detailed system of transaction regu-
lation, requiring that specific advance approvals be obtained from the
FCC before any procurement of goods or services in excess_ for ex-
ample, of some minimum figure such as $10_000 or $15_000 or $20_000
could be entered into by prime contractors_ subcontractors_ and so on
down the lin% as long as the procurement comes within the scope of
the communications-satellite program. At the other end of the spec-
trum might be a regulation providing merely for a kind of postaudit_
under which the FCC would periodically examine, after the event_
certain types of procurement transactions to see whether competitive
principles appeared to have been followed. Numerous intermediate
approaches suggest themselves. One is to require advance FCC trans-
action approval only on certain critical or unusually important cate-
gories of procurement. Another would be to develop an extensive
list of exemptions for those categories of transactions which seemed
less likely to be a source of difficulty. Another possibility would be
to require companies engaging in procurement to submit to the FCC_
for advance approval, a proposed general procurement procedure_ and
then to provide that specific transaction approvals need be obtained
from the FCC only in instances where it was planned to depart from
the approved procedure in some material respect.
These and other variations doubtless will be canvassed by the FCC
before the procurement regulations are adopted in final form. The
FCC is an agency which, as compared with the Defense Department_
the Atomic Energy Commission_ and various other federal agencies_
has had very limited experience in the regulation and control of pro-
curement by private corporations. This lack of experience would
aggravate the normal difficulties of putting into effect a smoothly
functioning regulatory system if the FCC undertook too large an ad-
ministrative burden. Indeed, by being overzealous in the early stages
of the program, the FCC might succeed only in stifling development,
in introducing intolerable delays, and generally in frustrating the
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possibilities of working out reasonable procurement practices. It will
not be an easy task to achieve a proper balance.
FOREIGN NEGOTIATIONS
The application of the United States antitrust law_ to activities
abroad has long been a thorny and complex subject. 1° In the case of
communications-satellite activities, the complexities will be enhanced
by the close interrelationship--which obviously exists and which the
act tends to emphasize--between United States foreign policy and the
new corporation's foreign negotiations and foreign operations, n
Much diversity of opinion can be found concerning the role which
the corporation should play in foreign negotiations. Some think the
corporation should maximize its independent position; others, that
foreign negotiations constitute an area in which the corporation should
tend to follow rather than lead the Government.
In any event, the approach of foreign legal systems to matters such
as monopoly, allocation, and price control is often very different from
the approach of the United States antitrust laws. Possibilities of
collision accordingly exist when such matters arise in a context which
directly affects the commerce, foreign and domestic, of the United
States.
To what extent will the Communications Satellite Corporation, in its
negotiation of foreign commitments, be limited and inhibited by the
traditional scope of the United States antitrust laws as they have
been applied to other industries carrying on activities abroad ? To
what extent will special circumstances and the special regulatory
system cause any modification in the impact which the antitrust laws
might otherwise have on the making and the scope of the corporation's
foreign commitments ? The outcome of questions such as these will
surely be watched with interest as the communications satellite pro-
gram develops.
SERVICE AND RATES
The general expectation is that, initially, when a communications
satellite system can first be put into practical operation, there will
1, See, e.g., ALI, LAW GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS eh. V (1962) ;
BREW._TER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (1958) ; FUGATE, FOREIGN
COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (1958) ; I_ESTATEMENT, THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 18, 39, 40 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ;
References cited in Weston, Developments in Antitrust During the Past Year, 21
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 46, 97-98 (1962).
n See generally SCHWARTZ _ GOLDSEN, FOREION PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNICA-
TIONS SATELLITE SYSTEMS : IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE ACT
OF 1962, The Rand Corporation Memorandum RM-3484-RC (Feb. 1963).
728-323 O--64_7
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probably be an excess of capacity. This would mean that the system's
ability to meet the demand is not likely to be a problem at the begin-
ning. Nevertheless, the basic decisions made as to types of systems
and order of priority of development will have substantial implica-
tions for the nature of service furnished, the persons to whom such
service shall be available, and the kinds of rate structures which axe
practicable and just.
Inherent in these matters are many problems as to preferential
treatment, discrimination, and similar issues on which a great body of
experience has developed during the past half century of public-
utility regulation. It is a part of the challenge of our times to adapt
such experience to new situations as they emerge.
THE ROLE OF CONGRESS
However important may be the role of the FCC and other parts
of the Executive Branch in regulating the corporation and in ad-
ministering the policies of the Communications Satellite Act, careful
attention should also be given to the central position of Congress.
The controversy surrounding enactment of the statute, and the con-
tinuing importance of the subject matter with which it deals, assure
that congressional scrutiny will be intensive.
Here indeed is one of the great safeguards against preferential
treatment, monopolistic tendencies, and other anticompetitive prac-
tices. One reason for the effectiveness of this safeguard is that from
time to time particular transactions and activities in the communi-
cations satellite program will be the subject of thorough review by
Congress. Another is that, because Congress has made so plain its
high interest in the subject matter, those who participate in the pro-
gram are likely to be more careful and deliberate in their actions
and to try to be more sure that adequate justification exists for what
is done.
Congress is by no means limiting itself to a watchdog function in
connection with the communications satellite program. For example,
questions are now pending--and can be expected to be of a continuing
nature--concerning whether federal funds should be appropriated
for research and development efforts in which the Communications
Satellite Corporation is directly and immediately interested. The
public importance of such questions will help to assure that this
program stays in the limelight on Capitol Hill.
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Carl H. Fulda
With respect to the subject of competition in a regulated industry,
Mr. Boskey has pointed out that under the Communications Satellite
Act the FCC is given the duty to enforce certain antitrust principles,
and that this is, of course, not very new because the same mixture of
administrative enforcement of some competition, but not too much
competition, applies in many of the other regulated industries.
This arrangement raises, among other things, the psychological
question of the reaction of regulators to the phenomenon of competi-
tion, which by itself seems to be irreconcilable with regulation in the
sense that regulation is a command to do thus and so, rather than to
compete freely. The situation has produced in some agencies a
rather schizophrenic attitude in that some of the members seem to feel
the word "competition" is almost an obscene expression, while other
members think it is their duty to enforce competition to the maximum
extent.
Perhaps, among all the agencies, the only one that has taken this
command very seriously is the Civil Aeronautics Board. But that
agency is now being condemned for allowing too much competition.
Now, what is the point of all this ? The satellite corporation is a
monopoly, a legalized joint venture, in spite of the phrase in section
102 [47 U.S.C.A. § 701(d)] that indicates new systems might be per-
mitted. It will remain a monopoly for a considerable time to come.
Its immunity from competition is granted only on condition of effec-
tive regulation by the regulatory agency. That is the reason why
enforcement of the antitrust principles brilliantly described by Mr.
Boskey is one of the primary duties of the agency. Consequently, the
compartmentalization of this program into three acts, if I may call
them so---Act I, Antitrust; Act II, Administrative Aspects; and Act
III, International Aspects--is a device of convenience, but no more
than that. At least Acts I and II_ Antitrust and Administrative As-
pects, are in fact a_d in legal theory part and parcel of the same
general scheme: the administrative supervision must be directed to-
ward achieving these antitrust safeguards. And I think that past
experience certainly justifies the admonition that this should be em-
phasized as strongly as it possibly can be emphasized.
With respect to some of the specific problems, Mr. Boskey suggested
that competition in procurement of equipment is perhaps the most
crucial one. Indeed, the hearings before the various committees--
particularly the hearings before Senator Kefauver's Subcommittee on
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Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee and Sen-
ator Long's Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Select Commit-
tee on Small Business--are replete with very vigorous debates on this
question of procurement.
One provision of the act which_Mr. Boskey cited, but on which he
"did not comment further--which was, incidentally inserted into the
statute at the suggestion of the representatives of the FCC 1--includes
discretionary authority for the commission to prescribe competitive
bidding in procurement "where appropriate" [47 U.S.C.A. § 721(c)
(1)]. This differs from section 10 of the Clayton Act, which makes
competitive bidding mandatory for common carriers in surface trans-
portation whenever there are interlocking directors. Significantly,
the Interstate Commerce Commission has gone beyond what section
10 of the Clayton Act ordains by requiring competitive bidding in
practically all instances, including the flotation of bonds and equip-
ment trust certificates, without any inquiry as to whether there are
interlocking directors.
One question would therefore be, What are the intentions of the
Federal Communications Commission with respect to this all-impor-
tant discretionary authority and, particularly, how does the Commis-
sion propose to give concrete content to the mysterious words "where
appropriate."
It would be relevant to our discussion to find out whether the most
recent attempt at enforcing competition in procurement of communi-
cations equipment has any relevance for the future experience under
the 1962 statute. I am referring, of course, to the lawsuit by which
the Department of Justice attempted to compel AT&T to divest itself
of its control of its wholly-owned subsidiary, Western Electric.
The complaint filed in 1949 charged that AT&T and Western
Electric had been engaged in a continuing conspiracy to restrain and
monopolize the manufacture, distribution, and sale of telephones,
telephone apparatus, and telephone equipment in violation of sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The suit was settled in 1956 by the Gov-
ernment's giving up the demand for divestiture and also giving up
the alternative demand for the limitation of the role of Western as
an exclusive supplier of AT&T, and settling for provisions opening
up some patents for general licensing. 2
1 Hearings on Antitrust Problems of the Space Satellite Communications Sys-
tem Before the Bubeommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 286 (1962). (Hereafter cited as
Kefauver Hearings.)
s See Report of the Antitrust Subcommittee of House Judiciary Committee on
_o_eltt Decree Program of the Department ol Justice, ch. II : The A.T.&T. Con-
scott Decree, pp. 29 et seq. (86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1959). (Herea£ter cited as
Con_t Decree R_cport. ) .
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In the negotiations which preceded the entry of this consent decree,
the defendant urged that Western was selling equipment to AT&T
at prices considerably below those which independent suppliers could
afford to charge, and that divestiture or limitation of Western's role
would therefore be damaging to the public interest2
Now, here is question number 1 for the future experience under the
1962act. Will this argument be repeated ? What is there to it ? Can
it be substantiated ?
Moreover, in the Western Electric case--and this relates to another
aspect of administrative supervision as a substitute for competition
in the protection of the public interest--the defendant pressed the
argument that the FCC had jurisdiction over AT&T's interstate and
international rates and the state commissions over their intrastate
rates; and that even the prices which Western Electric charged to
AT&T were subject to scrutiny because they affected the rate base
of AT&T. Accordingly, so the argument went in the negotiations
preceding the consent decree, the application of Sherman Act prin-
ciples would not only make no sense, but it would actually be con-
trait to the public interest."
I believe it is unfortunate that these contentions were never tested
at a trial. But it would seem to me--and if I am wrong, I trust that
the gentleman who will speak for AT&T will prove this---that a sim-
ilar problem may arise again, because the hearings are replete with
the question as to how antitrust principles in procurement can be
effectuated when the most important company in the picture is being
supplied by a wholly owned subsidiary2 And apparently the same
subsidiary relationship does exist in some other companies2
At this point, perhaps it is important to mention two pending bills--
one in the Senate 7 and one in the House 8--which would direct the
chairman of the Federal Communications Commission and the Admin-
istrator of the Small Business Administration to "cooperatively de-
velop a small business contracting program to be applicable to the
contracting and procurement activities" of the corporation. This im-
plies, so it would seem, that the authors of these bills do not have great
faith that the commandment of the statute--there shall be competi-
tion-will be enough. They seem to feel that the FCC, in view of its
lack of experience in procurement regulations, cannot entirely be left
to its own devices; in ether words, the apprehension is that without
g C_e_t Decree Report, p. 77. Kefauver Hea_ngs, p. 228.
' Consent Decree Report, p. 96.
E See Kefauver Hearings, pp. 78, 79, 80, 130, 151, 324, 326, 335, 345, 357, 359.
6 Id., p. 78. (Reference to General Telephone.)
7 S. 223, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
' H.R. 3619, 88th Cong., 1st Sesa (1963}.
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a further affirmative push, the competitive policy in this area will not
get off the ground and, obviously, anything which cannot get off the
ground has no place in the satellite system.
The formal and technical questions which Mr. Boskey mentioned
with respect to the continued validity of the antitrust law in this
area presents another problem. Perhaps Mr. Boskey has been a
little too sanguine in predicting there would be no difficulties. Under
section 201(c) [47 U.S.C.A. _ 721(c)(1)] the Commission shall "in-
sure effective competition." This would seem to indicate that the
Commission may prosecute a complaint. However, the legislative
history is replete with assertions that the Commission is not expert
in enforcing competition, and presumably for that reason section
403(a) [47 U.S.C.A. §743(a)] provides that the Attorney General
shall file a complaint in equity against the corporation if it violates
any provisio.ns of the act. On the other hand, section 403(b) states
that 408(a) is not to be construed as relieving any person of any
liability under any other law. Although the antitrust laws are not
specifically mentioned, they are presumably included in the general
clause of section 403(b). Consequently, it would seem that the At-
torney General may have the choice of proceeding under the Com-
munications Satellite Act or under the antitrust laws, or possibly
under both at the same time, and that treble damage actions are also
available.
The real point of all this will be raised by a defendant in an
antitrust suit brought by the Attorney General, who may invoke the
provision that the Commission shall insure effective competition. He
is likely to say: "This means at least something in the nature of pri-
mary jurisdiction, or prior resort. And you, Mr. Plaintiff, must first
go to the Commission and see whether the Commission will give
you satisfaction. This may take quite some time, but in any event,
until the Commission has decided this, nothing further can be done
about it."
Now, as to rate regulation, it is of course obvious that effective rate
control is a quid pro quo for monopoly status. But only effective
rate control can secure the consumer protection which normally comes
about through competition. Thus, here again, antitrust and adminis-
trative aspects are indivisible.
In this connection it is significant that the Commission in 1961
persuaded Western Electric to reduce its prices to the Bell System.
The fact was brought out in the later stages of Senator Kefauver's
Hearings2 But the people who believe very strongly in the policy
• Ee]o_,ver Hearings, pp. 283, 284.
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of competition, even though gratified by this contrast with previous
inactivity on the part of the Commission, nevertheless raised the
question whether an adversary rate proceeding may not have had
greater effect than a private negotiation. 1° In the international field,
there is the further difficulty of dividing the rates between the Ameri-
can and foreign carriers. The administrative part of the program
may enlighten us further on these matters.
The next point, which in any discussion of monopoly is an un-
avoidable one, is the problem of technological improvement. The
hearings devoted a great deal of time to this; it was charged that the
incentive to always keep ahead, to do the best possible, to use the
most recent and the most modern devices and inventions--that this
incentive could be weakened by the monopoly status which is accorded
to this corporation.
Two specific examples from the Hearings are pertinent to this
question. One is a quotation from Judge Loevinger's testimony
before Senator Long's Committee. And again, of course, I do not
know whether there is merit to these charges. I merely bring them
out here because it seems to me this is a problem which ought to be
discussed. Said Judge Loevinger:
We understand, for example, that evidence developed in the trial of the
GE lamp case indicated that fluorescent lamps were developed in the 1939's.
However, there was some apprehension by GE that the introduction of fluorescent
lamps might have disturbed GE's activities in the incandescent lamp field ....
AT&T started development of a mobile hand set to meet Army and Navy
demands, and actually produced some hand sets in 1907. However, no effort
was made to intro_luce the hand set for public use until 1937.
There is also some evidence that it failed to in'troduee automatic switching
equipment as rapidly as it was available because it was waiting for the
obsolescence of equipment it had then on hand. n
The other quotation is from Congressman Ryan of New York,
who told the Kefauver Committee:
AT&T, which laid one undersea cable in 1956, contemplates another in 1963.
If the satellite system goes up quickly, and is used to capacity, these cables
will become obsolete.
Moreover, it is very likely that the first system to be in operation will be
low orbit, which . . . should be superseded by the high orbit system which will
be far more economical .... Once a private corporation invests hundreds of
thousands of dollars in a low orbit system its investors and directors will
10 Senator Long in Kelauver Hearings, pp. 359, 360; Dr. D. W. Smythe, _. p.
195; Congressman Celler (id. p. 131) charged that the Commission has never
established "fundamental principles or standards by which to judge the reason-
ableness of Bell System's interstate telephone rates."
n gpave Sate_Zite Communications, Hearings Belorv Subcommittee on Monop-
oly ol Senate Select Committee o_ Small Business, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 52, 53
(1961).
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not be inclined to proceed expeditiously with research and development
which will make equipment purchased by those hundreds of millions obsolete._
Perhaps one answer tothisisthatthe Government willinsisthat
always the newest equipment be used. Chairman Minow referred
to section214(d) of the Communications Act, which authorizesthe
Commission to requireany carrierto provide itselfwith adequate
facilitiesfor the expeditiousand efficientperformanceof itsservices
asa common carrier.Is
It would be interestingtohave some furtherelaboration,from the
gentlemen who representthe Federal Communications Commission,
as to the feasibilityof thissuggestion,where the stumbling block
againmay bewhat ismeant by adequate.
In regardto preventionof dominationand guaranteeof equaluse,
Mr. Boskey mentionsthelimitationto50 percentof thecarrier-owned
shares.This leavesopen thequestionofhow thatoverallshareisto
be apportionedamong the carriers.The provisionthatonlynonvot-
ing securitieshallbe eligiblefor inclusionin the ratebase seems
to be designedto encouragecarrierinvestmentwithoutsimultaneous
carriercontrol. Whether itwillwork out thatway, of course,re-
mains tobe seen.
As to the bylaws,I have some questionabout the provision(sec-
tion2.06)which fixesone-thirdof the outstandingvotingsharesas
a quorum. I am wondering whether thatisenough to implement the
statutoryobjectiveof not permittingdomination by one firmor one
group.
It seems,however--and again,thisis a matter for discussion--
thatthequestionof ownershipand controlislessimportantthan that
of equalaccessforeverybody [§201(c)(2),47 U.S.C.A.§721(c)(2)].
It isconceivablethatownership and controlin a few hands might,
nevertheless,under the gentleprodding of the Commission, be man-
agedinsuchaway astoassureequalaccesstoall.
Therefore,the guaranteeof equaland nondiscriminatoryaccessto
a facilityof such earth-shakingimportanceisthe most crucialpre-
requisiteof reconcilingthis corporationwith our general legal
traditions.
W. A. Schlotterbeck
It is a very challenging assignment for a nonspace expert to com-
ment on two papers which seem to me to deal with completely dif-
ferent subjects. But I am going to try to do it anyhow.
_KeFaurer Hearings, p. 179. (For similar charges see id., pp. 133, 151.)
18 Kv_a4tver Hearings, p. 304.
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Mr. Boskey's analysis of the regulatory and competitive problems
presented by the Communications Satellite Act seems to me to be
thoughtful, practical, and comprehensive. The pr(_blems that he de-
scribes have been recognized by everyone who is interested in the legis-
lation--everyone who is interested in getting a space satellite system.
They are not new. The statute was designed to provide a number
of ways to solve them.
I do, however, differ a little with Mr. Boskey and more particularly
with Professor Fulda with respect to whether there are "antitrust"
issues. Terms like "monopoly" and "antitrust" can be very useful
tools of analysis and debate. They are, however, very controversial
symbols. If misapplied, these tools can create images that obstruct
analysis.
It seems to me that, as applied to the particular situation we are
discussingtoday, "anVltrust" is a somewhat misleading term. I would
prefer to substitute (what I believe Mr. Boskey also substituted dur-
ing his talk) the idea that we are dealing with a regulated, reregulated,
and perhaps overregulated enterprise. Regulation has been substi-
tuted for antitrust as has been done in other situations.
It seems to me the essence of "antitrust" is encompassed in the
federal antitrust statutes--principally the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
Under these laws the business venturer retains the initiative to decide
what objectives he will try to reach and how he will get there. In
seeking to reach these goals_ he is prohibited from rising certain tech-
niques. Whether his objectives and techniques for attaining them
are lawful is resolved in accordance with our regular judicial proc-
esses. This has very little in common with our regulatory processes.
The Communications Satellite Act is not an exemption from anti-
trust or an immunity from competition, but an imposition (for well-
understood and well-considered reasons) of the restraints of
regulations.
We all know that things are not always what they seem. Not in-
frequently things can be the converse of what they seem. Some com-
ment on the Communications Satellite Act assumes that it creates
a "monopoly." It seems to me that the law we are discussing,
rather than being an example of the creation of a monopoly, is designed
to prevent monopoly, if we can use that term to apply to this particu-
lar potential medium of communication.
What the statute does is recognize an economic and technological
fact which was described by Mr. Boskey; namely, that in the near
future there isn't the money and interest to put up more than one
system. The act does not legislate that as a law. It is a background
fact that the act takes into account.
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Therefore, this one system for the time being is not a creature of
the law. The act prevents monopoly by insuring access to the com-
munications satellite system on nondiscriminatory terms, with public
participation in the ownership, with rate regulation, and with the
federal antitrust laws thrown in.
Professor Fulda's paper deals with a wide range of different sub-
jects. It was very provocative and_ so far as I was concerned, provok-
ing. I realize that he assumed the role of the picador. The picador
is well protected, as is his horse. This looks like a bull ring_ and I
feel like a bull. I can see what is intended for the bull. But it is
in his nature to charge_ nevertheless.
With respect to the question of insuring competitive procurement
of equipment for the satellite system (a question which everyone has
recognized will present problems, as it frequently does in govern-
ment contract procurement), Professor Fulda takes a detour into
the Western Electric case. This was a lawsuit brought under the
antitrust laws and has nothing to do with the subject of a regulated
communications satellite system.
He asks whether or not the same kind of problem--that is_ the dan-
ger of "insider" influence and self-dealing--will arise in this case.
Here we have a statute that answers the question. The Communica-
tions Satellite Act empowers and obligates the Federal Communica-
tions Commission to "insure effective competition" in the procurement
of equipment and services by the satellite corporation. Comprehensive
regulations are being drafted.
Professor Fulda also identifies Mr. Cook and myself as representa-
tives of two industrial concerns. I do not know about Mr. Cook, but
I can make more than a pro forw_ disclaimer. I am not here in any
representative capacity other than representing myself.
Professor Fulda repeats certain charges which Judge Loevinger
is said to have made. I sometimes think there must be a Bartlett's
Familiar Quotations of Charges, particularly for antitrust specialists,
because certain quotable gems crop up all the time.
Now, Judge Loevinger is reported to have said, with respect to elec-
tric light bulbs (I don't know whether there will be any on the satel-
lites)_ that while the fluorescent lamp was developed in the 1930's,
it did not in fact come on the market until after the Government suc-
cessfully concluded an antitrust case against General Electric Com-
pany.
I will have to take on the role--which was thrust upon me---of
being the lawyer for my client. I spent four years as a counsel for
the people in the Lamp Division of General Electric in Cleveland.
There were two government antitrust cases against the Lamp Divi-
sion, one involving incandescent lamps and one involving fluorescent
MONOPOLY AND ANTITRUST ASPECTS---COMMENTS 99
lampsl The trial of the incandescent lamp case was completed and
the judge_s opinion rendered in 1949. Adecree was entered by consent
in the fluorescent case in 1954.
Quick research into some of the government figures has unearthed
the following facts--which are not hard to get. It is true that
fluorescent lamps were developed in the 1930_s. They also were in-
troduced commercially in that decade and sold to the World's Fairs
at New York and San Francisco.
The statistics which are at hand only go through 1947. Therefore_
I cannot state precisely how many fluorescent lamps were sold prior
to the termination of the government antitrust case, which is either
1949 or 1954_ depending on how you want to look at it. But the
industry had sold, by the end of 1947, over 300 million fluorescent
lamps.
Professor Fulda asks what is industry's answer to these charges of
technological suppression. My answer is that the charges are inac-
curate and, under the circumstances, somewhat reckless. On top of
that, and much more important to our discussion of communications
satellites, they are irrelevant. The very concerns about which Pro-
lessor Fulda raises questions with regard to technological suppression
are the ones that want to go ahead with this particular technological
improvement in communications, as Professor Fulda himself points
out.
I think that this kind of argument demonstrates that the policy
question which Congress has decided does not sit well with many
people. It is going to be debated for a long time.
My personal hope is that we accept President Kennedy's charac-
terization of the Communications Satellite Act as a national program
to get the space satellite system up and operating, and that those who
can and want to do the job--whoever they are--be allowed to get on
with it. I don't see any critical antitrust issues at this time, nor has
Professor Fulda pointed one out. We have fully adequate statutory
provisions for addressing any future problems in procurement or
competitive relationships. Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach has
made it very clear that the Department of Justice is entirely satisfied
that this corporation is the best answer we can devise to a realistic
cooperation of private industry and the Government in a program of
national and international significance.
The real issue is whether we can get the system up, get some leader-
ship for the United States with respect to the very difficult foreign
negotiations that will take place. This goal requires the recognition
that there is a common national interest to be served here rather than
the denial that government and business can have such a common in-
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terest. The policy issue, it seems to me, should be accepted as settled
in favor of a unique regulated private enterprise.
Under these circumstances, I would like to see the academic world,
people in industry, and government work on the development of means
of going forward with what is going to be a very complex political
and foreign relations problem.
George V. Cook*
I shall endeavor to emphasize certain matters which have not been
developed by the other speakers but which deserve consideration
before any meaningful appraisal can be made of the "Monopoly and
Antitrust Aspects of Comlaunications Satellite Operations."
I am torn between my basic obligation to comment on Mr. Boskey's
very reflective paper and fine contribution to the learning on this
subject, on the one hand, and the desire to accept Professor Fulda's
invitation, on the other hand, to comment on certain statements he
lms made in which he attempts to draw parallels which I think
1Kr. Schlotterbeck has already demonstrated do not exist, and which
I think overlook the very language and purpose of the statute we
are discussing. 1 In fairness I should note that Professor Fulda fur-
thered the principles of the free exchange of ideas by sending me a
copy of his comments which I received as I was running for a plane.
Consequently, I have had some opportunity to reflect briefly on his
paper prior to this meeting.
In his prepared paper, Professor Fulda included some statements
which he did not repeat in his oral presentation but which serve to
fortify my views. I was somewhat surprised, in this connection, at the
references that were made to the statements of the distinguished chair-
man of the House Judiciary Committee, Mr. Celler, which apparently
Professor Fulda (if I understood him correctly) though cast doubt on
*I have taken the liberty of extending my comments to include a discussion
of the case law relating to joint ventures which time did n_t permit to be coy.
ered in my oral presentation, and otherwise to annotate or amplify my remarks
for the benefit of the reader--G. V. C.
1See Pub. L. 8T-624, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), 76 Stat. 419, §} 102(c) and
201(c) (1). Ct. the testimony of Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach before
the Senate Commerce Committee, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., April 26, 1962, at 347:
Senator Kefauver, as I understood him, seemed to feel that in s_m¢ way the antitrust
laws were suspended by the creation of this corporation. That ia certainly not the view
of the Department of Justice. They aren't in any sense suspended. The antitrust laws
apply to what is done in this corporation, to any conspiracies which are created with an
intent to dominate or to lesse_ competition. Indeed, the whole thrust of the Department
of Justice participation in this bill has been to make the communications system more
competitive and to use this as a device for insuring that no single carrier would get
monopoly control over this great new satellite system. And that has been our thrust. We
believe that this bill, as drafted, accomplishes that purpose insofar as it is possible to
accomplish it.
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the wisdom of the Communications Satellite Act. I found these ref-
erences rather misplaced, however, in that Representative Celler was
recorded among the multitude who cast their votes affirmatively for the
Satellite Act. 2 It seems to me, therefore, that the matters raised by
Professor Fulda are either based on a misconception of what this act is
all about, and what Congress was attempting to do, or they are simply
not pertinent to the general discussion of the law of space and satellite
communications.
My remarks will focus primarily on Mr. Boskey's paper, especially
those phases of it which are peculiarly within my competence, namely
those which relate to the communications aspects of this subject. I
will return to Professor Fulda's specific questions to the extent time
permits.
It is obvious that antitrust is just one interesting aspect of the Com-
munications Satellite Act--one of many of its public-interest features.
The act is, as )Cir. Boskey has said, permeated with overlapping safe-
guards which certainly must be taken into account in appraising the
antitrust posture of this legislation. 8
The act contains so much to spark the imagination and excite
wonderment that I really hardly know where to begin. So I will
begin with a few simple scientific facts which I believe are indispensa-
ble to an understanding of this subject.
1. Despite the glamour and excitement created by Telstar, tech-
nologically speaking communication via satellite is but another means
o] relaying, point-to-point, long-distance communications. We do
this today. We do it with cables. We do it with high-frequency
radio, troposcatter radio, and other facilities. Every telephone in the
United States today, for example, is a part of a worldwide communica-
tion network connecting such far-off lands as the United Kingdom,
Liechtenstein, Italy, Iceland, Monaco, Russia, Bulgaria, France, Ger-
many, San Marino, Argentina, E1 Salvador, Brazil, Kuwait, Ethiopia,
Malagasy, Iran, and Singapore. Recently the telephone systems of
Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Sarawak, Burundi, French Somaliland,
Reunion, Swaziland, and New Hebrides were added to those accessible
from the telephones of the United States.
Satellites will help us to provide better service. They will provide
another high-capacity facility to help us meet the ever-growing de-
mands for more and more circuits. But in terms of service to the
The vote i_ the House was 372 to 10, including Rep. Celler's vote in the affir-
mative, 108 CoNe. REC. 16615 (August 27, 1962, daily ed.), and 66 to 11 in the
Senate, 108 CONG. REC. 15874 (August 17, 1962, daily eel.).
s For a detailed exposition of these safeguards, see also the statement of
Senate Majority Leader Mansfield, 108 ConG. l_c. 15828--29 (Daily ed. August
17, 1962).
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customer there is nothing that a satellite system can do that we cannot
do in communications today, or that we will not be able to do with
conventional facilities when the system comes into being.
The use of Telstar for intercontinental television has apparently led
some people to think that communications satellites will provide a
complete communications service. This is not so. Satellites will not
be used to broadcast directly tohome receivers, certainly not in the
foreseeable future, but rather will operate on a point-to-point basis
between existing common-carrier networks. 4 In short, and this is
crucial in evaluating the antitrust posture of communications satellites,
they will not constitute a communications system in themselves. They
will simply serve as a bridge, an intermediate link, in a system that
provides complete communications service, much like high-frequency
radio and modern submarine cables.
Stated another way, any commercial satellite communications sys-
tem must perforce become a part of existing worldwide communica-
tions. Its efficient use will depend on its proper integration into the
vast terrestrial networks of the international and domestic communica-
tions carriers. And without those networks, as Dr. Dryden of NASA
has noted, communications satellites will be relatively useless2 This
leads me to my next postulate.
2. In the foreseeable future, there can be but one commercial com-
munications satellite system. This is a basic economic fact. I could
not agree more in this respect with Mr. Schlotterbeck's observations;
and I think Mr. Boskey also developed this quite adequately in his
remarks. The Communications Satellite Act did not create this con-
dition. On the contrary, that act was a direct outgrowth of this
condition. This is primarily a matter of the high initial cost of
a satellite system, low initial demand, and very large circuit capacities
of the microwave radio amplifiers to be used in the satellites.
See Draft Proposals ol U.E.A. for the Extraordinary Administrative Radio
Conference for Bpaee Radiocommunication (Geneva, 1968), Oct. 22, 1962, at 4:
Recent experimental programs have demonstrated the techn4cal feasibility of relaying
aural and television broadcast program material via communication satellite stations.
However, these demonstrations consisted of transmissions to special receiving stations on
the earth's surface from which the program material was 4istributed over conventiomtl
terrestrial communication systems to the broadc&sting stations which serve the general
public .... Studies indicate that there is little likelihood: of the general public receiving
direct broadcasts from satellites in the near future. _rhe proposals of the U.S.A. 40 not
include provision for a broadcasting satellite service.
For an appraisal of the practical uses of communications satellites, see L L.
Johnson, The Commercial Uses of Communications Eatellites, V CALIF. MGMT.
P_V. 55 (Spring 1963), and Jaffee & Smith, The Impact of Communications
EatelNte# on the Less Developed Areas, a p_per submitted at the UN Confer-
ence on the Application of Science and Technology for Benefit of the Less De-
veloped Areas (Geneva, Jan. 1963).
5 Testimony of Dr. H. L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator of NASA, before the
Senate Space Committee, 87th Cong., 2d Seas., at 19 (Feb. 27, 1962).
MONOPOLY AND ANTITRUST ASPECTS---C01VIMENTS 103
It is this situation--where there can be but one system in which a
number of carriers desire to participate in ownership and use--which
required resolution so as to assure the use of the system on equitable
and nondiscriminatory terms, and so as to prevent any unfair ad-
vantage or preference to any one carrier or supplier.
This is precisely what the Satellite Act is all about. And this is
exactly what it does. There is nothing novel in it in this sense at all.
It involves no exemption from the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act,
Professor Fulda to the contrary notwithstanding. This is evidenced by
the fact that the courts on many occasions have held similar ventures--
in railroad terminals, involving the Pullman Company, involving
newspaper distributorships, and the like--not to constitute an un-
reasonable restraint of trade or a violation of the antimerger law.
Even without the Communications Satellite Act, the provision of
a communications satellite system by means of a joint venture author-
ized by the Federal Communications Commission would not of itself
violate the antitrust laws. This was recognized by the Department
of Justice during the debates on the Satellite Act e and is implicit in
the four criteria which Mr. Loevinger advanced and which were
quoted by Professor Fulda.
The mere fact that there would be a combination of parties is not
a violation. There must be conduct "significantly and unreasonably
anticompetitive in character or effect." _ The test to be applied has
been succinctly stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Board of Trade of
the City o/Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) :
• . . Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.
To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence• The true test of legality is whether
the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual
or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason
for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained,
are all relevant facts ....
The legal test to be applied in determining the validity of a joint
venture of existing carriers to provide themselves with joint facilities
See the testimony of Assistant Attorney General Loevinger before the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sesa, at 153
(July 26, 1961) and Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co. v. F.C.C., 97 F. 2d 641,
644 (D.C. Cir. 1938). See also Kohhneier, President May Order Message Satel-
lite Operation iF Congress Fwils to Pass Bill, Wall Street Journal, .at 7 (August
3, 1962).
' Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws, at 11 (1955).
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so long as the facilities are available to all who use them was set forth
in United States v. Terminal Rai_oad Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
Here, the Supreme Court held that the existence of one railroad termi-
nal, which was owned by 14 of the 24 railroads doing business in the
St. Louis area, did not constitute an illegal restraint or unlawful
monopoly provided access to the facilities was made available on an
impartial basis to each interested carrier. Accordingly, it held that
all existing and future railroads should be given an opportunity to
participate in ownership and that those not electing to participate in
ownership be authorized to use the facilities upon just and reasonable
terms.
Similar arrangements by which parties otherwise competitive could
jointly operate a necessary common facility have been universally held
to be permissible under the antitrust laws. In United States v. Pull-
man Go., 64 F. Supp. 108 (1946), aft'd, 330 U.S. 806 (1947)_ the court
authorized the acquisition of the Pullman sleeping car service by a
group of competing railroads doing more than 95 percent of the pas-
senger carrying business in the United States. In United States v.
Yellow Gab Go., 332 U.S. 218, 228 (1947) and in Parmelee Transpor-
tation Co. v. Keechin, 186 F. Supp. 533, 542-43 (N.D. Ill. 1960), aft'd,
292 F. 2d 794 (7th Cir. 1961), the validity of joint selection by all
railroads whose facilities terminated in Chicago of a transfer agent
to exclusively provide transfer facilities between various railroad sta-
tions was upheld. In Interboro News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
225 F. 2d 289 (2d Cir. 1955)_ the court upheld the joint utilization by
competing magazine publishers of the same local wholesaler even
though other distributors were available, where the facts showed that
no one publisher had sufficient business to support its own wholesaler.
Litigation has frequently occurred on the legality of joint ventures
of existing competitors to provide common service in foreign countries.
In this series of cases as well_ the courts have recognized that the mere
existence of the joint venture does not itself violate the antitrust laws
in the absence of agreements to fix price or unduly restrain competition.
See, for example_ United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 100
F. Supp. 504, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) ; United States v. E. I. duPont de
Neraours Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), a/f'd 351 U.S. 377 (1956),
and Cutter Laboratories v. Lyophile-Cryochera Corp., 179 F. Supp. 80
(9th Cir. 1949).
Joint ventures have been condemned only where the venture unfairly
impeded the competitive market place. Thus such joint arrangements
have been held illegal where competitors have been unfairly hampered
thereby: United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383
(1912) ; Associated Press v. United States_ 326 U.S. 1 (1944) ; and
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Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit and Produce Building, 194 F. 2d
484 (1st Cir. 1952). The joint use of common facilities by com-
petitors would also violate the antitrust laws if such use were pur-
suant to agreement which restrained competition between the parties
or reduced the services and facilities available to the public. See
Norfolk Soutl_ern Bus Corp. v. Virginia Dare Transit Co., 159 F.
2d 306 (4th Cir. 1947), and Eastern States Retail Lumber Corp. v.
United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
Moreover, only recently, the court in United States v. Penn-Olin
Ckem_ca/Co., 1963 Trade Cases, para. 70, 762 (D. Del. May 1, 1963),
rejected the theory that any joint venture between companies having
the capacity to go into a line of business by themselves is illegal per
se under section 7 of the Clayton Act.
From these cases the following legal criteria can be developed:
(a) Where natural economic or technical considerations present
situations in which all parties desirous of obtaining a given
facility or service are unable to obtain independent facilities or
services, a joint venture of such parties, limited to this situa-
tion, is not, without more, a violation of the antitrust laws;
(b) Such joint ventures may consist of parties who are otherwise
competitors in cases where the shared arrangement is one which
is not provided directly to the public, but is one which the
sharers themselves use in their own service; and
(c) The antitrust laws are violated only where outside competitors
or suppliers are unduly restrained or the public is deprived of
service.
This brings me to my third postulate which is also a very im-
portant one to understand in placing this legislation in its proper
perspective:
3. It is clear that U.S. interests alone cannot construct and operate
a comn_tnications satellite system. Many people, it seems to me,
have ignored this basic political fact and have assumed that we in the
United States could go it alone. But this will just not be done. This
country is at only one end of each international communications
message which originates or terminates within it boundaries. Much
of the satellite traffic, moreover, will be between other countries and
will not involve the continental United States at all.
Experience in international communications, which goes back more
than a hundred years, has shown over and over again that the major
nations of the world, and many of the smaller ones as well, will
wish to participate as equals in this system through their own com-
munications administrations, agencies, and companies. They will
want to own a part interest in the satellites and they will want to
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provide their own ground terminal facilities, just as they do in the
case of conventional facilities?
The system will not be a United States monopoly. Thus, I think
what Mr. Boskey has said about procurement problems--and he had,
I think, some very reflective remarks to make, in this connection--has
to to be placed in the further context of active foreign participation
in the construction and establishment of this system. In short, foreign
interests will want to provide equipment as well, just as they have
done with the cable systems that now circle the globe.
I also should add in answer to Mr. Boskey that I do not see that
the negotiations with foreign communications interests should pose
any serious antitrust problems. The very nature of international
communications requires their participation, and the long and suc-
cessful history of past negotiations between American carriers and
these interests without antitrust difficulties provides a strong precedent
for future use.
Against the background of these three postulates, what is it that the
Communications Satellite Act charges the new Satellite Corporation to
do _. Well, the act says it is going to do two basic things :
First, it is to cooperate with the foreign interests in planning,
constructing, maintaining, and operating a worldwide system of com-
munications satellites?
Second, it is to lease communications capacity, or channels in the
satel|ites, to United States communications common carriers who are
authorized by the FCC to provide service to the public via satellites,
and to other authorized entities, foreig,n and domestic. 1° This means
in essence that the corporation will not serve the public directly but,
rather, is to operate as" a carriers' carrier" in providing communica-
tions capacity in the satellites to the carriers who, in turn, will derive
the circuits over which they will provide service to the public.
*See Moult, on, _om.e Legal Aspects of International Coraraunications, an ad-
dress at the Southeastern Regional Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law, February 2, 1963, to be published in the North Carolina Law
Review.
0 Section 305(a) (1).
lo Section 305(a) (2). In addition, of course, the Corporation is authorized by
§ 305(a) (3) to own and operate satellite terminal stations when licensed by the
FCC pursuant to §201(c)(7). Under § 201, Congress authorized the FCC to
Hcense the Corporation and/or carriers, jointly or severally, to construct and
operate ground stations. Congress obviously had antitrust considerations in
mind when it rejected a proposal that the Corporation own and operate all do-
mestic ground stations. Thus, the Senate Space Committee stated in its report,
S. REP. No. 1319, 87th Cong., 2d Sees., at 5 (1962) :
Another important consideration is that, while as a practical matter there probably can
be only one system of commercial satellites, there can be a number of ground stations all
served by the sa,me satellite system. Thus, competition might well be fostered if the
carriers establish and operate their own ground stations.
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Thus, the corporation will depend upon the carriers for revenues,
and the carriers will depend upon the corporation for satellite capac-
ity, to assist them in supplementing their alternative means of pro_
riding communications service to the public. This, I should note
in answer to Professor Fulda, is a situation which has no parallel.
in domestic or in other international communications situations.
In this way--through the corporation acting as a carriers' carrier,
through the corporation's structure, through FCC regulation, and
through the elaborate system of checks and balances which Mr. Boskey
developed all carriers will be assured nondiscriminatory use of the
system and all suppliers given an opportunity to compete for its
business.
Let me repeat, there is no antitrust exemption or immunity granted
in the act. It embodies all the criteria which the Department of
Justice said over and over again must be taken into account, and
then some.
I think Mr. Schlotterbeck's concluding observations deserve
reemphasis at this point. If we are to keep our national lead in
this field--which I am proud to say Telstar has contributed to, which
NASA's Relay satellite ha_ contributed to, and which I hope Tel-
star II will further contribute to--then I think it is time we apply
ourselves in a constructive way to make this venture a success. The
President has said this is the best way to do it and the Congress has
agreed overwhelmingly with him. The time has come to go forward
and this will not be done by reliving the past.
l_ow, let me turn to some of the specific points raised by Professor
Fulda.
He speaks of the Western Electric price reduction in 1961 as being
_n isolated and unusual case. The fact is that since 1948 Western
has reduced its prices materially on seven separate occasions, to a
point where the aggregate level of its prices today is about 20 percent
lower than the 1948 level. 11 This, mind you, was during a period
in which Western's material and labor costs climbed substantially
and when, according to the Government's BLS data, the prices on
electrical machinery and equipment rose by more than 50 percent.
Western's prices and profits, moreover, have been under review in
n See Report of I_ARUC-FCC Telephone Stall Subcommittee on Manufactur-
ing and Service A_liates to the Stall Committee on Communications Problems,
Transmitting Wester_ Electric Data for 1965, at 3-4.
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literally hundreds of state eases apart from FCC regulation and
consistently have passed muster. 12
Professor Fulda also asked for industry's answer to the charge
that there is an inherent temptation here to retard technological
advances. I think again Mr. Schlotterbeck has exploded that myth.
I am hardly qualified to speak for industry, but it seems to me that
Professor Fulda could not have chosen a poorer illustration to make
his point. Anyone familiar with the operations of the Bell Tele-
phone Laboratories, which developed the Telstar satellites in the
first place, I submit, could not seriously accuse the Bell System of
such activity28
Any entity which has produced four Nobel prize winners in physics
can hardly be accused of "sleeping at the throttle." _ And it is of
some interest that during the current year Bell is spending at the
rate of $165 million on basic research and development which in a
very real sense is designed to render obsolete its entire plant.
I think the converse observation is the one I hear more frequently:
that the Bell System moves too aggressively and too rapidly and that
others find it hard to keep up with it.
It should be emphasized in this connection that, both before and after the
Consent Decree referred to by Professor Fulda, Western Electric had no exclu-
sive rights to supply the Bell System. Thus to state that a limitation of West-
ern's status "as exclusive supplier of AT&T" was an alternative to divestiture is
misleading. But when Bell operating companies do in fact purchase from
Western they have the burden, under the doctrine of Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel.
Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930), of showing the reasonableness of the prices they have
paid. See City of Columbus v. P.U.C., 154 OHIO ST. 107, 93 N.E. 2d 693, 698
(1950).
Professor Fulda quoted from a statement made by Mr. Loevinger that it had
been alleged that AT&T delayed the introductions of the so-called handset and
failed to introduce certain switching equipment as rapidly as it was available.
These allegations, which were made more than a quarter of a century ago, have
long since been refuted. (See Comments Submitted to the FCC by AT_T on
Commission Exhibits 293 and _096G, Telephone Investigation 1935-1937.) They
were in fact based on unsupported assertions made during the so-called Walker
investigation in the 1930's in which no opportunity was afforded for cross-
examination. The individual who advanced these allegations was subsequently
discredited after cross-examination in the first major rate case in which he ap-
peared after making these allegations. See Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. P.S.C.,
287 N.W. 122, 157 (1939) :
While we cannot adopt the view of the trial court with respect to the testimony given
by the witness Hill in its entirety, a reading of the record convinces us that it is so unfair
and biased as to be unreliable.
In contrast to these allegations compared The Annual Report, N.Y.P.S.C., at
54--57 (1953).
1_ Clinton J. Davisson, John Bardeen, Walter H. Brattain, and William Shock-
ley. See Bello, The World's Greatest Industrial Laboratory, Fortune, (Nov.
1958).
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To be specific, Professor Fulda quotes from a statement by Repre-
sentative Ryan that the communications carriers will seek primarily
to protect their cable investments. This overlooks the fact that the
foreigners, who will have a strong say in the establishment of a
satellite system regardless of the structure of American participation,
have much more substantial cable investments than any of the Ameri-
can companies. It further fails to note that the Bell system has
been working on communications satellites since 1954, and has spent
in the last 2 years alone $50 million on the Telstar program. 15
So, suddenly, the charge changes. Now, the Bell System's interests,
it is asserted, are in establishing and maintaining a preferential posi-
tion for a low- or medium-orbit system. This overlooks the fact that
Dr. John Pierce of the Bell Laboratories, in the first detailed analysis
of the potential of communications satellites in 1954, pointed out
certain advantages that the so-called synchronous system will have
when it becomes available, is Mind you, John Pierce's comments were
made 3 years prior to the time that Sputnik I was launched. More-
over, Mr. J. E. Dingman, an Executive Vice President of AT&T, has
testified that "if a high altitude system became available at approxi-
mately the same time, and the other carriers or the overseas countries
wanted the high altitude system, and there are advantages and dis-
advantages to each, AT&T would put its money in a high altitude
system also." _T
I find these allegations rather startling, and maybe Professor Fulda
does too, for he has stated that AT&T is expected to put up most of
the money to make the satellite corporation go. Here we have a very
anomalous situation: AT&T under this novel theory is expected to
put up most of the money to support a system which it must know
will make obsolete its equipment, while others argue that AT&T's
development of new high-capacity cables will create problems in
establishing a satellite system. 18 I find this all very confusing indeed.
Letter of Mr. J. E. Dingman to Senator W. G. Magnuson, dated April 19,
1962, contained in Hearings on Communications Satellite Legislation before Sen-
ate Commerce Committee, 87th Cong., 2d Seas. 207-08 (1962).
a, Orbital Radio Relays, a technical paper written in November 1954 and pub-
lished in the April 1955 issue of Jet Propulsion, at 153--57.
Z_Hearings Before the Senate Space Committee, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 321
(March 6, 1962).
xs See the statement of Senator Gruening, 109 Cor_o. REC. 9207-09 (Daily ed.
May 28, 1963).
110 LAW OF SPACE AND OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
In short, AT&T is chastised if it does, and criticized if it doesn't--
all without regard to the overriding necessity of providing the circuits,
by satellite and cable, for the continued growth in overseas com-
munications requirements.
I would like to conclude, and I can assure you that there was no
intent on my part to overlap with some of Mr. Schlotterbeck's re-
marks, by referring to another part of the statement made by Deputy
Attorney General Katzenbach"
Another and somewhat similar attack on this legislation is the charge that
it will create a monopoly. It is true that, at least for a number of years, only
one commercial communications satellite system will probably be feasible.
Therefore, under any system of organization, including Government ownership,
there will be only a single system for some time, and in that sense a monopoly.
However, the proposed corporation under the pending bill will certainly not
be a monopoly in the accepted and invidious sense of an enterprise which enables
its owners to dominate and exploit the market. The important objective with
respect to the communications Satellite system is to make sure, as the pending
bill does, that the system will not be controlled by a favored few but rather
will reflect broadly the interests of all those who are concerned with the system,
whether as communications carriers, manufacturers, suppliers, investors, citi-
zens, and taxpayers. 19
Letter to Senator M. J. Mansfield, 108 ConG. REc. 13919-20 (Daily ed. July
27, 1962).
Regulation in Orbit:
Administrative Aspects of the
Communications Satellite Act of 1962
Victor G. Rosenblurn
FOCUSING THE ROLE OF FREE MEN in what he termed "an ever-renew-
ing society," Carnegie Corporation President John W. Gardner
recently observed :
[M]any of the qualities crucial to a society's continued vitality are qualities
of youth, vigor, flexibility, enthusiasm, readiness to learn .... Every society
must mature, but a society whose maturing consists simply of acquiring more
firmly established ways of doing things is headed for the graveyard. In the
ever-renewing society what matures is a system or framework within which
continuous innovation, renewal and rebirth can occur?
The Communications Satellite Act 2 viewed in the context of the
Carnegie president's observations is a significant innovation. Alter-
native methods of organizing and administering a satellite system, in
greater consonance with our "established ways" than the resulting
statute, could certainly have been developed. But would greater con-
fortuity to those established ways have produced a better statute ._
Let us examine the potential alternatives.
Either of two major courses could have been adopted. One was the
FCC's original proposal embodied in its First Report of May 24, 1961,
dealing with administrative and regulatory problems of communica-
tions satellite systems. 8 That report proposed consideration and ex-
ploration of a joint venture composed of international common
Gardner, Free Men in an Ever-Renewing Society, Chicago Daily News, April
13, 1963 (Panorama section), p. 6.
2Pub. L. No. 87-624, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 31, 1962), 76 Stat. 419, 47
U.S.C.A. §§ 701-44 (1962) [hereinafter cited to sections of the act]. An excel-
lent analysis of the statute is Legislation Note, The Cammunieatioas 8atel_ite
Act of 196_, 76 HARe. L. REV. 388 (1962).
s FCC Doc. No. 14024, In the Matter oI an Inquiry Into the Administrative and
Regulatory Problems Relating to the Authorization ot Commercially Operable
Space Communications Systems, First Report, May 24, 1961.
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carriers, subject to the FCC's regulatory jurisdiction, as an effective
means of promoting the orderly development and effectuation of such
a system. New enabling legislation was not deemed necessary. It
was urged that the FCC could handle the matter administratively.
The second alternative would have been to establish a Communica-
tions Satellite Authority as an agency of the United States to acquire,
own, and operate the United States portion of the satellite system2
By what criteria might either of these alternatives have been pref-
erable to the bill finally adopted? If the FCC's plan had been
followed, a handful of international communications companies would
have controlled our satellite system, accountable only to an agency
whose record of regulation of common carriers over the years has been
bleak2 The Department of Justice's statement of May 5, 1961, re-
minding the FCC of the Antitrust Division's responsibility for en-
forcement of the antitrust laws and cautioning the Commission that
"a project so important to the national interest should not be owned
or controlled by a single private organization irrespective of the extent
to which such a system will be subject to governmental regulation,"
was a necessary reassertion of national policy in opposition to monopo-
listic controls2 The Justice Department set out four conditions that
any plan for the development and operation of a satellite communi-
cations system must meet in order to be consistent with the antitrust
laws. These included the opportunity for all interested communica-
tion common carriers and all interested producers and sellers of
communications equipment to participate in ownership, for all in-
terested common carriers to have unrestricted use of the system on
nondiscriminatory terms, and for all interested producers and sellers
• This was the essence of bills like S. 2890, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), and of
the amendment to S. 2814, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), proposed by Senator
Kefauver for himself and Senators Morse, Yarborough, Gore, Gruening, Burdick
and Neuberger. The minority views of Senators Yarborough and Bartlett to
S. REp. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) (Senate Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce) and of Senators Morse, Long, and Gore to S. REP. No.
1873, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations),
summarize the position of proponents of government ownership of the satellite
system, 14 U.S. CODE CON0. & AD. NEWS 2531-42, 2545-51 (1962).
In their "Organization and Management Survey of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission" in March 1962, the Management Consulting firm of Booz,
Allen and Hamilton noted that the responsibility of the Common Carrier Bureau
of the FCC is "of an order of magnitude and significance which exceeds the
Bureau's resources. Neither the physical facilities, the staff, nor the budget
provided the Bureau properly reflects a recognition of the Bureau's statutory
obligations." Minority Views, pt. 1, S. REP. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 n. 1
(1962).
Statement of Department of Justice, FCC Doo. No. 14024, May 5, 1961, in
Hearing8 on Establishment, Ownership, Operation and Regulation of a Com-
mercial Communications Satellite System Before the House Committee o_ Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 132, 134 {1961).
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of communications equipment to furnish such equipment to the system.
President Kennedy's statement on communications satellite policy
of July 24, 1961, 7 made clear that more was at stake in the establish-
ment of a satellite system than what the FCC alone could handle. The
President stated his preference for private ownership and operation
of the United States satellite system provided such ownership and
operation could meet eight policy requirements, such as expanded
international communications services at the earliest possible date,
global coverage including service to unprofitable areas, opportunities
for foreign participation in the satellite system, nondiscriminatory
use of and equitable access to the system by present and future
authorized communications carriers, maximum possible competition in
the acquisition of equipment and of ownership or control of the sys-
tem, full compliance with governmental regulatory controls and anti-
trust legislation, and development of an economical system to be
reflected in beneficial rates. Since these requirements could not be met
by FCC action alone, congressional action embodying a comprehensive
regulatory plan was proposed, s
The other alternative to the President's proposal was Government
ownership and operation of the satellite system. Government owner-
ship would not have eliminated but would merely have reduced the
visibility of problems like securing the technical knowledge and ex-
pertise indispensable to the success of a satellite system. Deputy
Attorney General Katzenbach's views on the subject in a letter to
the Senate Majority Leader on July 27, 1962, emphasized that it was
with the communications common carriers and their related corporate
subsidiaries, rather than with Government personnel, "that the bulk
of experience, knowledge, and expertise rests."
Either they will dominate the system through ownership, as the communications
industries initially proposed to the FCC, or under a government-owned system
they will dominate it through contract. We cannot avoid the simple fact that
the Government does not have, and would have great difficulty in acquiring
the personnel needed to operate this system under Government ownership and
would, in my judgment, be forced to contract actual operation to the communi-
cations industries.*
Surely our experience with Government contracts has not been so
economical, pleasant, or nonpolitical as to warrant a preference for
In Hearings on Antitrust Problem# of the Space Communications Satellite
System Be]ore the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 271-72 (1962).
s On February 7, 1962, S. 2814, a bill transmitted by the President, was intro-
duced in the Senate by Senators Kerr and Magnuson. For the legislative history,
see S. REp. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. {1962}.
° Letter from Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach to Senate Majority Leader
Mansfield, July 27, 1962, in Hearings on H.R. 110_0 Be]ore the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, 87th Cong., 2d Sees. 30, 33 (1962).
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domination by contract over shared responsibility through broadly
based ownership. From World War I to the recent dispute over
the TFX lo we have been confronted by manifold problems involving
procurement, profits, and politics in contracting. 11 One cannot be
critical of the effort to devise a mechanism for ownership and control
of the satellite system that would maximize responsibility for and
commitment to its success and minimize costly inefficiencies in procure-
ment and administration that might have been inevitable byproducts
of the plan for exclusive Government ownership.
The Satellite Communications Act embodies the effort to establish
the broadest possible base of ownership, control, and commitment; to
render a vital service to people throughout the world;and to show
that the American enterprise system, requiring neither subservience
of private business to the Government nor dominance of Government
by private business, can thrive on a bona fide partnership of interests.
Is the statute's effort successful ? It is, of course, too early to know
the precise answer to that; but there are major uncertainties in its
language and potential pitfalls in its administration that call for
careful consideration.
Examination of the Communications Satellite Act from administra-
tive perspectives suggests three broad problem areas for analysis.
The first relates to clarity of draftsmanship and demands a detailed
exploration of the ambiguities, intentional and otherwise, that cloud
the act. The second focuses on the role of the Executive, who is given
unprecedented power in a peacetime measure. The third centers on
the conflicts that may arise among the various agencies and depart-
ments that have a role, however loosely defined, to play in the admin-
istration of the act.
10 For an examination of the measures of decision making by the Defense De-
partment in the case of the TFX contract, see Smith, The $7-Billion Contract
That Changeel the Rules (2 pts.), Fortune, March 1963, p. 96; April 1963, p. 110.
n A typical day's reading of the Congressional Record--for example, remarks
of Rep. Pillion of New York on April 9, 1963---reveals charges such as the fol-
lowing redolent prose.
Mr. Speaker, the Comptroller General of the United States, in his reports to the Congress,
has disclosed innumerable Instances where bu,siness firms, in concert with, or Independent
of, government procurement officials, have extorted countless millions of dollars out of
United States taxpayers. Our government procurement programs are riddled with flagrant
violations of law. There exists a combination of utter incompetency, negligence and civil
and criminal con_plracy.
The Congressman then proceeded to quote the Comptroller General's charges
that Hazeltine Corporation had been unjustly enriched by $428,000 under a sub-
contract with Grumman Aircraft, that alleged Air Force negligence in a Boeing-
Westinghouse contract for the production of interceptor missiles produced $404,-
500 in unwarranted profits for the contractors, and that the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers incurred unnecessary costs of $1,200,000 in the procurement of high
cost portable fire extinguishers.
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STATUTORY AMBIGUITIES: INTENTIONAL AND OTHERWISE
Apparently Congress does not take its cues on prescribing specificity
of administrative standards from the corps of observers and critics of
the administrative process. Despite numerous scholarly condemna-
tions of the vagaries of existing statutory guides to administrators, 1_
Congress goes right on functioning as a political body seeking to by-
pass storm centers of controversy through deliberate utilization of
vagueness. The avoidance of overt conflict through vagueness, espe-
cially where strong policy arguments and strong political pulls may be
exerted from both sides, can speed adoption of statutes even though
it delays our understanding of them. 18
While we may recognize the salutary effect of the practice of impre-
cision on full employment for the legal profession, the trouble with
such practice is that it applies a "mafiana" approach to key problems
that cry out for resolution today. To take an example from another
regulatory area, Congress employed deliberate vagueness at best and
inherently contradictory language at worst in section 15(a) (3) of the
Transportation Act of 1958 14in order to avoid conflict between truck-
ers and railroads that might have made adoption of the statue impos-
sible. The buck was passed from the legislature to the Interstate
Commerce Commission and then to the courts. Five years of uncer-
tainty and confusion preceded an interpretation by the Supreme Court
of just what Congress had in mind when the legislature instructed
Judge Henry Frlendly's 1962 Holmes Lectures pursue this theme comprehen-
sively and eloquently. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES : THE
NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS (1962). Noteworthy predecessors of
the judge in perceiving the evils of statutory ambivalence and amorphousness
include former CAB member Louis Hector [see Hector, Problems oI the CAB
and the Independent Regulatory Commissiona, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960)], Mr.
Justice Jackson [see his dissent in FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 480, 486
(1952) ], and Professor Louis Jaffe [see Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Leg-
i#lative Power, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1947)].
Earl Latham suggests that "every statute tends to represent compromise,"
since the process of accommodating conflicts of group interest is one of delibera-
tion and consent. LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS 35-36 (1952). A sim-
ilar point is made by Bertram Gross in GRoss, THE LEGISLAT_E STRUGGLE (1953),
when he comments that many issues which are determined by judges in accord-
once with the intent of Congress "were in the first instance deliberately left un-
solved because any effort to resolve them in Congress would have made too many
people unhappy." Id. at 106. See also Frank Newman's discussion of The Art
of Deliberate Ambiguity, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW (Paulsen
eel 1960).
1'72 Stat. 572, 49 U.S.C. § 15(a) (3) (1958), provides:
In a proceeding involving competition between carriers of different modes of transpor-
tation subject to . . . [this act], the Commission, in determining whether a rate is lower
than a reasonable minimum rate, shall consider the facts and circumstances attending
the movement of the traffic by the carrier or carriers to which the rate is applicable.
Rates of a carrier shall not be held up to a particular level to protect the traffic of any
other mode of transportation, giving due consideration to the objectives of the national
transportation policy declared in . . . [this act].
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the ICC not to hold up rates of one mode of transportation because of
their competitive effect on other modess but, at the same times instructed
the ICC to proceed consistently with the national transportation policy
which had been regularly interpreted to require holding up rates of
one mode because of their competitive effects on other modes. 15 There
is a similar proclivity toward vagueness in the basic controversy in the
Satellite Communications Act over the construction and operation of
terminal or ground stations. As if the FCC did not have enough other
problems under the statute, it must decide, for each of potentially
dozens of ground stations_ whether to award it to the Satellite Cor-
poration, to an authorized carrier like AT&T or RCAs or to the Cor-
poration and one or more carriers jointly. The applicable section of
the statute, 201 (c) (7), requires the FCC to
grant appropriate authorizations for the construction and operation of each
satellite terminal station, either to the corporation or to one or more authorized
carriers or to the corporation and one or more such carriers jointly, as will best
serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity. In determining the public
interest, convenience, and necessity the Commission shall authorize the construc-
tion and operation of such stations by communications common carriers or the
corporation, without preference to either[.]
The fact that the second sentence omits reference to joint construc-
tion and operation is only a minor defect. The major problem is to
determine what instructions the FCC has in fact been given. Does
this section contemplate the horror of comparative proceedings as in
the case of TV channel awards, in which the award of each authoriza-
tion for a terminal station could require months or years of hearings
and deliberations ? This could be disastrous since the satellite system
cannot operate without terminal stations capable of transmitting tele-
communications to and receiving them from a communications satellite.
If the FCC were to handle the buck passed to it by Congress as gin-
gerly as the ICC did in section 15(a) (3) of the Transportation Act,
we could look forward to a state of uncertainty until a test case reaches
the Supreme Court some time around 1968.
Congress did, of courses try to cope with the problem on its own at
first. The original draft of the statutes embodied in S. 2814 and H.R.
10115, as introduced on February 7, 1962s at the request of President
Kennedy, proposed that the Satellite Corporation "acquire the physical
facilities and hardware necessary to its operationss including com-
The Supreme Court's decision of April 22 in ICC v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R.,
372 U.S. 744 (1963), albeit unanimous, did not resolve definitely the meaning of
} 15(a) (3). The Court reversed and remanded an ICC order rejecting proposed
railroad rate decreases but explicitly declared it "inappropriate to approve of
other aspects" of the comprehensive District Court opinion, Sea-Land Serv. v.
New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 199 F. Supp. 635 (D. Conn. 1961), construing
§ 15(a) (3).
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munications satellites, earth stations, and associated ground equipment,
whether by construction, purchase or gift" and that the Corporation
"develop plans for the number and location of earth stations and for
the technical specification of all elements of the communications satel-
lite system." 16
There was vehement opposition by carriers to ownership of ground
_tations by the Corporation, however. The remarks of James E.
Dingman, Executive Vice President of AT&T, before the House
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee were typical:
I have said that we believe the ground stations should be owned and oper-
ated by the carriers. I think you can now see that the ground stations will
be the key to the proper coordination of the communications satellite channels
into the domestic network. As such, we look upon them as an i_tegral part
of that network.
We therefore believe ground stations should be owned and operated by the
carriers who are responsible for the operation of these networks. . . . [A]ny
other arrangements providing for divided responsibility for operation of these
facilities will prove impractical and will degrade service to the public. 1T
The provisions of the statute regarding acquisition and control of
the earth or ground or terminal stations were substantially altered in
subsequent drafts. In H.R. 11040, introduced by Chairman Harris
of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee on April 2,
1962, the Satellite Corporation's authorization in section 305(b)(2)
to acquire physical facilities and hardware necessary to its opera-
tions no longer included "earth stations." The Corporation's origi-
nally proposed authority to "develop plans for the number and
16 Section 305 of the original draft of S. 2814 and H.R. 10115 provided :
(a) In order to achieve the objectives and to carry out the purposes of this Act, the
corporation is organized to--
(l) _lan, initiate, construct, own, manage, and operate itself or in conjunction with
foreign governments or business entities a commercial communications satellite system.
(2) f_rnish for hire, channels of communication to United States communications
comm_)n carriers and to other authorize& entities, foreign and domestic.
(b) Included in the activities authorized to the corporation for accomplishment of the
purposes indicated in subsection (a) of this section, are among others not specifically
named-
(l) conduct or contract for research and development related to its ndselon ;
(2) acquire the physical facilities and hardware necessary to its operations, including
communications satellites, earth stations, and associated ground equipment, whether by
construction, pro:chase, or gift ;
(3), purchase satellite launching and related services from the United States
Government ;
(4) contract with authorized users, including the United States Government, for the
services of the communications satellite system ;
(5) develop plans for the number and location o_ earth stations, and for the technical
specifications of all elements of the communication6 satellite system.
_THearings on H.R. 10115 and H.R. 10138 BeFore the House Committee on
Interstate arid Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sesa, pt. 2, at 521 (1962).
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location of earth stations" was also deleted from section 305 (b) (5).1s
Added to the FCC's duties in section 201(c)(7) was the responsi-
bility to "grant a license for the construction and operation of each
satellite terminal station, either to the Corporation or to one or more
authorized carriers, or to the Corporation and one or more such car-
riers jointly as will best serve the public interest, convenience and
necessity." The original draft of section 201(c)(7) in H.R. 11040
instructed the FCC that in determining the public interest, conven-
ience and necessity, it "shall encourage the construction and operation
of such stations by communications common carriers wherever, in
the judgment of the Commission, such construction and operation are
not inconsistent with the policies of the Act." 19
Some federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, ob-
jected discreetly to the requirement that the FCC "encourage"
common carrier operation of the terminal stations. The defense
Department maintained that:
[A] unified satellite system, in which the ground stations are an integral
part of the overall system, would better achieve operational and technical
compatibility within the system, would provide the desirable single authority
for negoti,ation with foreign participants in the system, and would be better
accommodated to the needs of a major communications customer like the
Department of Defense. _
The text of § 305 in the original draft of H.R. ]]040 was as follows :
(a) In order to achieve the objectives and to carry out the purposes of thts Act, the
corporation is authorized to
(1) plan, initiate, construct, own, manage, and operate, itself or in conjunction with
foreign governments or business entities, commercial communications satellite systems;
(2) furnish, for hire channels of communication to United States communications
common carriers and to other entities, foreign and domestic; and
(3) construct and operate satellite terminal stations when licensed by the Commis-
sion under section 201 (c) (7).
(b) Included in the activities authorized to the corporation for accomplishment of the
purposes indicated in subsection (a) of this section, are, among others not specifically
named :
(I} to conduct or contract for research and development related to tts mission ;
(2) to acquire the physical facilities and hardware necessary to its operations, includ-
ing communications satellites and associated equipment and facilities, whether by con-
struction, purchase, or gift ;
(8) to purchase satellite launching and related services from the United States
Government ;
(4) to contract with users, including the United States Government, for the services
of the communications satellite system ; and
(5) to develop plans for the technical specifications of all elements of the communica-
tions satellite system.
The text of § 201 (c)(7) in the original draft of H.R. 11040 authorized the
FCC to:
grant a license for the construction and operation of each satellite terminal station,
either to the corporation or to one or more authorized carriers or to the corporation and
one or more such carriers jointly, as will best serve the public interest, convenience, and
necessity. In determining the public interest, convenience, and necessity the Commission
shall encourage the construction and operation of such stations by communications com-
mon carriers wherever, in the judgment of the Commission, such construction and opera-
tion are not inconsistent with the policies of this Act. The Commission shall insure
that each authorized carrier shall have equitable access to, and nondtscrin_tnatory use of,
such stations on Just and reasonable terms.
2o Letter from Cyrus R. Vance, General Counsel, Dep't of Defense, to Sen.
Warren Magnuson, Chairman, Senate Committee on Commerce, May 10, 1962, in
S. RF2. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2(I Sess. 37, 38--39 (1962).
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The Department of Justice had urged in stronger language that the
ground stations be operated by the Corporation. Deputy Attorney
General Katzenbach warned:
There is a real danger that ground stations if separately owned by the car-
riers may, because of their high cost, represent an obstacle to technical growth
so as prematurely to freeze the type of system .... Having the corporation
own and operate its own grouud stations also could mean grater reliability,
guaranteeing continuity of service in emergencies, such as failure at one ground
station, by the ability quickly to reroute traffic through other ground s_tions
under its own management. _
The final form of the statute--after first assigning responsibility
for ground stations to the Corporation, then changing this and order-
ing the FCC to encourage operation by the common carriers--requires
the FCC to allocate ground stations according t_ the public interest
but without preference for either the Satellite Corporation or the
common carriers. 22 The Senate Commerce Committee, which pro-
posed the language adopted in the final draft, assured the Senate in
its report :
Your Committee is confident that the FCC will take into account all relevant
technological, economic, operating, and policy factors . . . which are related
to the public interest as they are presented in each case making its determi-
nation as to whom it will authorize to operate the ground stations, m
The reasons for creating the organizational framework for our
satellite communications system before the technical details of the
system became final were stated vehemently by the Department of
Justice in July 1962. Deputy Attorney General Katzenbech pointed
out:
[F]urther delay in enacting such legislation could only serve to impair the
organization and impetus of the overall effort, to create uncertainties among
Minority Views, pt. 1, _. at 56-57.
The final draft of § 201 (c) (7) instructs the FCC to:
grant appropriate auth_rizations for the construction and operation of each satellite ter-
minal station, either to the corporation or to one or more authorized carriers or to the
corporation and one or more such carriers jointly, as will best serve the public interest,
convenience, and necessity. In determining the public interest, convenience, and necessity
the Commission shall authorize the construction and operation of such stations by com-
munications common carriers or the co:potation, without preference to either.
S. REP. NO. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 12--13 (1962). At a later stage in its
Report, the Senate Committee repeated its intent that there be "no legislative
prejudgment as to who shall establish a ground terminal station," but in reciting
the factors the FCC was to consider, the Commi'ttee this time specified "all
relevant technological, economic, and operating factors" but neglected to include
the factor of "policy." Id. at 18. Reference should be made also to the
absence of the word "ownership" from the FCC's licensing powers under § 201
(c) (7). The FCC has power only to license "construction and operation."
The Corporation under § 305(a) (3) has power to "own and operate" terminal
stations when licensed by the FCC under § 201 (c) (7), hut the FCC is not given
a role in the allocation of "ownership." The Committee Reports do not deal
with this discrepancy.
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other nations now interested in cooperating with us, and to weaken our own
sense of national commitment to this program, especially on the part of those
enterprises, agencies, and individuals who must plan now if there is to be
prompt availability and utilization of talents and energies, productive resources,
and facilities and capital funds, a
In passing the bill, however, it seems that Congress made only half a
decision.
It would be horrendous but not beyond the realm of possibility to
envisage dozens of communications satellites dancing resplendently
above us in their random, polar, and synchronous orbits while current
equivalents of the Messrs. Whiteside, Katzentine, Palmer, Mack, and
Schwartz (part of the cast of characters in the FCC nightmare from
another drawn out era of comparative proceedings) are battling end-
lessly over who properly should be given the ground stations so that
we can communicate with and through our satellites.
There are, of course, other vagaries in the statute. The problem of
stock allocation strikes one as another potential nightmare for an
agency that has had difficulty enough with the technical and alloca-
tive aspects of the communications spectrum. To have to decide who
gets how much of the pie without instruction from Congress under
section 304(f) could be debilitating. That section provides:
Upon application to the Commission by any authorized carrier and after notice'
and hearing, the Commission may compel any other authorized carrier which
owns shares of stock in the corporation to transfer to the applicant, for a fair
and reasonable consideration, a number of such shares as the Commission de-
termines will advance the public interest and the purposes of this Act. In its
determination with respect to ownership of shares of stock in the corporation,
the Commission, whenever consistent with the public interest, shall promote the
widest possible distribution of stock among the authorized carriers. _
An earlier draft of the stock transfer provision had called upon the
FCC to order the transfer of the number of shares that. would be
reasonable "in the light of the estimated proportionate use of the
corporation's facilities by the applicant. ''26 Fearing that this might
enable a carrier using a large portion of the Corporation's facilities
to increase its stock ownership and thereby gain a dominant position
in the Corporation, the Senate Commerce Committee removed the
specific standard and ordered the FCC to promote the widest possible
24Let:ter From Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach to Senate Majority Leader
Mansfield, July 27, 1962, in Hearings on H.R. 110_0 Before the Senate Committee
on Foreig_ Relations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, 32 (1962).
This is the only section of the statute explicitly requiring notice and hearing
and makes one wonder whether the inclusion of the requirement here impliedly
excludes it from all other areas of Agency power conferred by the statute.
_The "estimated proportionate use" standard was embodied in § 304(h) of
H.R. 10110 and in § 304(f) of subsequent drafts of S. 2814 and H.R. 11040, until
the Senate Commerce Committee deleted it.
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distribution of stock among the authorized carriers whenever consis-
tent with the public interest. 27
The FCC's discretion was nominally enlarged, but a peculiar phrase-
elegy may plague the agency in the future. The stock transfer the
FCC is empowered to compel is from "any other authorized carrier."
The plural is not used. This suggests that a new carrier applicant
for stock can receive his share only from another single carrier rather
than from a plurality or pool of carriers' stock. On gloomier days,
one foresees once again arduous, prolonged hearings over who gets
what stock from whom.
One of the most perplexing ambiguities of the statute is the mean-
ing of "other authorized entities" and "users" under sections 305(a)
(2) and 305(b)(4). Section 305(a)(2) authorizes the Corporation
to "furnish, for hire, channels of communication to United States com-
munications common carriers and to otker autlwrized entities, foreign
and domestic." (Emphasis added.) Section 305(b)(4) allows the
Corporation "to contract with authorized users, including the United
States Government, for the services of the communications satellite
system." (Emphasis added.) The Chairman of the FCC noted his
own confusion over the meaning of the terms in testimony before
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in March
1962Y s Chairman Minow said that insofar as the bill provides that
the Corporation is to furnish facilities not only to communications
common carriers but also to authorized users, "We think that the bill
is somewhat ambiguous .... " He pointed out that "The bill can be
construed to permit entities, such as the Government, who otherwise
would be customers of the carriers, to directly lease channel facilities
from the Satellite Corporation." The FCC Chairman objected to such
a construction of the statute because it "could result in the Satellite
Corporation competing directly with the common carriers, and pos-
sibly deprive those carriers of essential revenues, thereby leading to
financial difficulties for the carriers. We think that this matter should
be clarified. ''29 The amorphous language was not altered or clarified
in the final draft, and we have yet to learn precisely who besides the
carriers and the United States Government might be an "authorized
entity" or an "authorized user" entitled to hire facilities directly
from the Satellite Corporation.
S. RE_. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1962).
"-_Hearings on H.R. 10115 and H.R. 10138 BeFore the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 39(3-440 (1962).
Id. at 408.
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THE OVERRIDING ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVEBRANCH
The assignment of ultimate responsibilities and sanctions under the
statute has not been included under vagueness. One might in this
instance prefer vagueness to the massive grant of decision-making
power conferred on the President by the statute. While the FCC's
regulatory powers are broad, they are neither exclusive nor final under
the statute. In several respects the FCC may become no more than
"water boy" to the Attorney General and the President.
Recent testimony by the FCC's General Counsel, Max Paglin, cer-
tainly expresses no fear that the statute has downgraded his Agency's
position. In the course of an appearance before the Subcommittee
on Communications of the Committee on Commerce, Mr. Paglin re-
ferred to the FCC's comprehensive regulatory role and to its obliga-
tion to report extensively to Congres under section 404(c) of the
statute. He stated that "section 404c contemplates that the Commis-
sion.., report to the Congress, among other things, on an evaluation
of the activities within the scope of its authority, with a view to
recommending such additional legislation which the Commission may
consider necessary in the public interest." so
But section 404 may not be as broad in its allocation of functions
to the Commission as one might wish. The meaning of "such" may
be significant here. It is the President who, under section 404(a),
is to transmit to Congress each year a report
which shall include a comprehensive description of the activities and accom-
plishments during the preceding calendar year under the national program
referred to in section 201(a),(1), together with an evaluation of such activities
and accomplishments in terms of the objectives of this Act and any recommenda-
tions for additional legislative or other action which the President may consider
necessary or desirable of the attainment of such objectives. [Emphasis added.]
The FCC, under section 404(c), is to transmit to Congress "a report
of its activities and actions on anticompetitive practices as they apply
to the communications satellite programs" and "an evaluation of such
activities and actions taken by it within the scope of its authority with
a view to recommending such additional legislation which the Com-
mission may consider necessary in the public interest." (Emphasis
added.) The "such" of section 404(c) may well refer only to activ-
ities and actions on anticompetitive practices. This restricted view is
given support by the next clause that specifically calls upon the
Commission to evaluate the capital structure of the Corporation, a
function that would not need specification if the preceding clause
were as broad as Mr. Paglin construed it. The President, in his
aOHearings on Satellite Communications Before the Subcommittee on Com-
munications of the ,Senate Committee on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sees., ser. 3,
at 11 (1963).
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initial report to Congress under section 404, reported on all phases
of the FCC's actions under the statute as well as those of NASA and
the State Department, al as though the chain of reporting is now frovh
the FCC to the President-to Congress rather than from the FCC to
Congress directly. This point could be classified as a professor's cavil
if it were not part of a pattern running through the statute that
enlarges to unprecedented proportions the powers of the Chief
Executive.
That a provision of an earlier draft, which would have facilitated
further intrusion of the executive branch into areas beyond its tra-
ditional domain, was subsequently stricken is indicative of partial
recognition of the problem but not of partial solution. The draft
of H.R. 10115 contained an eighth paragraph in section 201 (a) author-
izing the President to
designate an official or officials of the Government to assist in the accomplish-
ment of the purposes of this Act who shall have access to all books, records,
papers, correspondence and files of the corporation, shall have the right to
attend any and all meetings of the board of directors or of stockholders of the
corporation and shall make certain that what is being done and what needs
to be done, both by the corporation and by departments and agencies of govern-
ment, are known at all times to the President and that recommendations are
made to him, whenever necessary, to attain full compliance with the national
policy regarding international communications through space satellites.
Criticized along with other regulatory provisions by representatives
of the common carriers as a deprivation of the Satellite Corporation
management's responsibilities and prerogatives, the "overseer" clause
was deleted from H.R. 11040. It could be argued that the provi-
sion was superfluous at best since the President appoints the incorpo-
rators and three of the fifteen directors. His power over the three
directors is not made explicit. With regard to removal, for exam-
ple, the statute provides, in section 303(a), only that the three mem-
bers of the board appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate shall serve "for terms of three years or until
their successors have been appointed and qualified .... " (Emphasis
added.) Whether or not this language be construed to authorize
presidential removal, 32 it may be expected that the presidentially
appointed directors will perform the functions originally prescribed
in the deleted section 201(a)(8). Although the Attorney General
has expressed the opinion that the incorporators and directors ap-
pointed by the President "will occupy private posts and not be ofli-
Report by the President of the United States on Activities and Accomplish-
ments Under the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Jan. 31, 1963.
= The original draft of this paper suggested the probability that the President
had the power of removal. Subsequent comments by others should be read with
this in mind.
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cers of the United States." s8 it would be the height of political
naivete to assume that directors appointed by the President would
not owe their primary allegiance to him.
Let us proceed to examine the specific powers conferred on the
President by the statute, especially in section 201(a). He is, in sec-
tion 201(a)(1), empowered to "aid" in planning and development
and to "foster" execution of a national program for establishment
and operation of a communications satellite system. Section 201
(a) (2) directs him to "provide for review" of "all phases" of the
development and operation of the system, "including the activities" of
the Satellite Corporation.
Pursuant to section 201 (a) (3) the President must "coordinate" the
activities of the Government agencies with responsibilities in tele-
communication "so as to insure that there is full and effective
compliance at all times with the policies set forth in this Act."
(Emphasis added.) The President in short is named guardian of the
policies of the act and is to coordinate the activities not only of the
executive branch but of "governmental agencies." I believe this
means that the FCC is now subject directly to the President's centre]
insofar as it deals with the substance and policies of the statute.
Section 201(a)(4) requires the President to "exercise such super-
vision" (earlier drafts limited him to "general supervision") over the
Corporation's relationships with foreign governments and interna-
tional bodies as will assure that "such relationships shall be consist-
ent with the national interest and foreign policy of the United States."
The President has traditionally, of course, been responsible for our
foreign policy, but he is now also made guardian over the "national
interest."
While section 402, dealing with foreign business negotiations, re-
quires the Satellite Corporation only "to notify" the State Depart-
ment of its business negotiations with other countries and to keep
the Department informed with respect to relevant foreign policy con-
siderations, it would appear that section 201(a)(4) overrides sec-
tion 402 on this point. The Report of the Senate Commerce
Committee supports this interpretation, asserting that section 402
should be read with section 201(a)(4) which "recognizes the Presi-
dent's authority to take whatever steps he deems appropriate to assure
that the relationships of the Corporation with foreign governments,
Letter From Attorney General Robert Kennedy to President John F. Kennedy,
Oct. 25, 1962, in Hearings on Nomination o_ Incorporators of the Communications
gatellitv Corporation Before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 107, 110 (1963).
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entities, or international agencies are consistent with the foreign policy
of the United States. TM
Paragraphs (5) and (6) of section 201(a) again instruct the
President "to insure" the taking of specific actions, paragraph (5)
admonishing that timely arrangements be made for foreign partici-
pation in the establishment and use of the satellite system. Such
insurance implies the statute's approval of presidential action at both
the foreign level in negotiating participation and at the domestic level
in prescribing the policies of the Corporation and the regulatory agen-
cies to facilitate such use. Paragraph (6) calls upon the President "to
insure" the availability and utilization of the system for general
governmental purposes, except where a separate system is required
"to meet unique governmental needs, or is otherwise required in the
national interest." Is the President to be judge of when such a
separate system is required ? Apparently so, since section 201(a) (4)
makes the President guardian of the "national interest."
Opponents of the bill, such as Senators Yarborough and Bartlett,
viewed section 201(a)(6) as requiring the President to see that all
Government communications are channeled through the commercial
system, thereby providing a continuing subsidy to the private Cor-
poration2 _ The broad scope of the President's discretion dispels the
likelihood of that interpretation. Of greater interest and concern,
however, is the view of agencies such as the Departmen_ of Defense
that this section reserves to the President power to assign priority
to governmental traffic over commercial traffic2 e Thus section
201 (a)(6), according to this view, gives the President broad powers
to allocate the communication system's facilities.
While paragraph (7) of section 201(a) replaces the "insure"
phraseology with "help attain," it nonetheless facilitates a role for
the President in an area belonging to the FCC. Attaining "coordi-
nated and efficient use of the electromagnetic spectrum and the techni-
cal compatibility of the system with existing communications facili-
ties" has hardly been the historic domain of the Chief Executive.
If this view is correct, the great give-away of the statute is not so
much any grant of power or influence to private corporations as it
is the give-away of conceptions of private enterprise and of inde-
pendent regulatory commission to the ultimate control of the ex-
ecutive branch.
S. REP. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1962). (Emphasis added.)
Mir_ority Views, pt. 1, ig. at 51.
Letter From Cyrus R. Vance, General Counsel, Dep't of Defense, to Sen.
Warren Magnuson, Chairman, Senate Committee on Commerce, May 10, 1962, in
S. REP. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 37-39 {1962).
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More detailed examination of the meaning and implications of sec-
tion 201(a)(3) is desirable, for this paragraph, most of all, seems
the equivalent of a conventional-appearing missile that carries a con-
cealed hydrogen warhead. The President is to insure full and effec-
tive compliance with the policies of the act by coordinating the
activities of governmental agencies with responsibilities in telecom-
munications. The statute enumerates at least five agencies with such
responsibilities: the FCC, 3' NASA, 8sJustice, _ State, _°and, to a lesser
extent than the others, Small Business. '1 In addition, the SEC has
stated tha_ securities issued by the Corporation are subject to the
registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the qualifica-
tion provisions of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 and that the
Corporation itself is subject to the SEC's reporting requirements as
detailed in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. '2 Ordinarily, policy
objectives of a statute, like the Preamble to the Constitution, do
not constitute a grant of power to anyone. But here, through the
device of tying the statute's policy objectives in section 102 to the
President's coordinating power in section 201 (a) (3), executive power
of devastating potential is created.
The President can "coordinate" agency activities in telecommunica-
tions for any or all of these reasons: To serve the communications
needs of the United States, to contribute to world peace and under-
standing, to provide telecommunications services to economically un-
derdeveloped countries, to make expanded telecommunications services
available as promptly as possible, to provide efficient and economical
use of the electromagnetic spectrum, to maintain and strengthen com-
petition in the provision of communications services to the public, and
to maintain consistency with the antitrust laws. Since the power to
coordinate includes the power to allocate priorities, it would appear
that any action contemplated or taken by any regulatory body under
the statute could be nullified by the President's invocation of section
201(a)(3) along with any appropriate subsection of section 102.
Even the FCC's powers under the Communications Act of 1934 may
have been made subordinate to the President's powers, for while section
403 (b) preserves the sanctions under the Communications Act, section
401 declares that whenever application of the provisions of the Com-
Sections 201(c) & 304(b).
= Section 201 (b).
R Section 403 (a).
,0 Sections 201 (c) (_) & 402.
_ Section 201 (c) (1).
a Memorandum of the SEC to the Senate Committee on Commerce, May 14,
1962, in S. REP. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1962).
REGULATION IN ORBIT 127
munications Satellite Statute shall be inconsistent with the application
of the provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, the provisions of
the Satellite Act shall govern.
That at least some legislators were aware of the scope of power con-
ferred on the President by the use of "to insure" is shown in the Senate
Commerce Committee Report's statement that "to help attain" was
substituted for "to insure" in section 201 (a) (7) in order to show that
the statute conferred no new powers on the President under paragraph
(7). 43 The converse of that statement would be, of course r that
wherever "to insure" was retained, new powers were being conferred
on the President.
The Chief Executive may thus control the application of sanctions
as well as the interpretation of policies. Pursuant to section 403 of
the Satellite Act, it is "the PresidenFs lawyer," not the FCC, who is
in charge of enforcement. _ The Attorney General can seek equitable
relief in the United States district courts not only for violations of
explicit provisions of the act, but for "any action, practices, or policies"
of the Corporation which are "inconsistent with the policy and pur-
poses declared in section 102 of this Act." Relief may be sought
against anyone subject to the act for both active or affirmative viola-
tions, such as obstruction or interference with any activities authorized
by it, and passive or negative conduct such as refusal, failure, or neglect
to discharge duties and responsibilities under the act. Pursuant to
this provision, the Chief Executive conceivably can determine priorities
of action for private management by charging a firm with "neglect"
of any of the myriad of vague statutory duties.
One can appreciate the dilemma faced in the typical industry board
meeting when the question arose whether or not to endorse the Satellite
Act. The alternatives were probably presented as "either this bill
or a Space Age TVA," and the specter of the latter must have induced
such trauma in the public utilities that they neglected to look for the
booby traps in the former. The zeal with which the first Senate cloture
vote since 1927 was sought and greeted might more appropriately have
been channeled into joint political action by industry 45 to delimit
domination of management and the regulatory agencies by the Chief
Executive.
S. REP. No. 1584, 87t11 Cong.° 2d Sess. 15 (1962).
_ Section 403 (a).
On the legality of such action, see Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE AGENCIES AND
DEPARTMENTS
There are so many uncertainties in the statute that the act may be-
come technologically outmoded before we know authoritatively its
legal meaning. Not the least of these uncertainties concern the regula-
tory roles of the agencies vis-a-vis one another, a matter made specially
confusing by the tendency of the statute to play +'musical chairs" with
agencies' traditional responsibilities: For example, whereas we think
traditionally of the Federal Trade Commission and the antitrust divi-
sion of the Justice Department as guardians of our antitrust policy,
broad responsibility for insuring effective competition is now con-
ferrecl on the FCC under sections 201 (c) (1) and 404 (c). Whether the
FCC's authority is sufficiently broad and paramount to meet the ++per-
vasive regulatory scheme" test of U_ted States v. RCA _6 is not at all
clear however, and the hearings on the bill reveal little more than coy-
ness on the part of Department of Justice officials insofar as the effect
of the statute on the applicability of the RCA case doctrine is
concerned. 47
As another illustration, consider NASA's role vis-a-vis the FCC in
approving technical characteristics of the system. While one associ-
ates the FCC traditionally with matters affecting regulation of tech-
nical characteristics of communications, one also associates NASA
with matters concerning outer space. Small wonder that confusion
should accompany the regulation of space communications. Under
section 201(b)(1), NASA is to "advise" the FCC on technical char-
acteristics of the communications satellite system. NASA is also to
+'consult" with the Satellite Corporation with respect to the technical
characteristics of the communications satellite system under section
201(b) (4). The FCC, however, is to '+approve" the technical char-
acteristics of the operational communications satellite system and of
the satellite terminal stations pursuant to section 201(c)(6) and to
++insure" that facilities of the satellite system and satellite terminal
stations are +'technically compatible" and interconnected operationally
with each other and with existing communications facilities pursuant
to section 201(c) (4). Who has the power of decision over technical
characteristics, NASA or the FCC? Specifically, the FCC "ap-
proves" while NASA only +'advises." But can the FCC approve
without NASA's advice ? Could the FCC be successfully challenged
"358 u.s. 334 (1959).
+_See, e.g., Testimony of Assistant Attorney General Lee Loevinger, Hearings
on the Establishment, Ownership, Operation and Regulation o[ a Commercial
Communications Satellite System Be[ore the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 131-67 (1962), especially the
dialogue wi_h Rep. Dingell at 157-60.
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if it approved technical characteristics contrary to NASA's advice ?
Could the FCC be successfully challenged if it refused _o approve
technical characteristics adopted by the Corporation after the Cor-
poration's consultations with NASA under section 201(b)(4) and
receipt of NASA's advice under section 201(b)(1) supporting the
Corporation ._ In short, is the FCC's approval a ministerial act or
an act calling for the exercise of its own discretion ?
This uncertainty is compounded when the Secretary of State joins
the fray. Section 201(c) (3) calls upon the FCC to "institute forth-
with" proceedings to require establishment of communication by
means of the satellite system to a particular foreign point "in
any case where the Secretary of State after obtaining the advice of
the Administration [NASA] as to technical feasibility, has advised
that [such] communication . . . should be established in the national
interest." Here the advice of the Secretary of State would appear
to be binding on the FCC; the FCC's function seems ministerial.
But can the FCC refuse to follow the Secretary's advice if the Secre-
tary has failed to follow NASA's advice ? Would it be an adequate
defense to an action brought by the Attorney General against the
Corporation pursuant to sections 403(a) and 403(c), alleging the
Corporation's neglect in fulfilling the purposes of the act by failing
to provide telecommunication services to underdeveloped countries
under section 102 (b), for the Corporation to show that the Secretary
of State had not yet advised the FCC that such commercial communi-
cation should be established in the national interest or that the FCC
had not yet instituted a proceeding under section 214(d) of the Com-
munications Act of 1934 pursuant to the Secretary's advice._ One
could continue with unresolved questions like these ad infinitum. The
uncertainties stemming from overlapping jurisdiction suggest that,
short of resolution of interagency conflicts by the President acting
under section 201(a), a single agency is made the recipient or cus-
todian of "primary jurisdiction" under the statute as a whole.
It could be argued that the FCC does have primary jurisdiction
over the rate-making segment of the statute. Whereas other ager_cies
share regulatory power with the Commission in matters such as anti-
trust and technical standards, the FCC alone is assigned the rate-
making functions. 48 It thus appears that the FCC's greatest power
under the Satellite Act is the power it has administered with the
least success in the past.
Congressman Celler's testimony before the House Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee was not all political puffing when he
charged that the FCC had never yet established fundamental prin-
ciples or standards by which to judge the reasonableness of the Bell
Sections 201(c) (2), 201(c) (5), 304(c).
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System's interstate rates. '9 Even Chairman Minow's defense of the
Agency's rate-making functions acknowledged that "additional funds
would enable us to improve our performance and afford a greater
degree of protection to the public interest." 50
More depressing than critiques of the FCC's capacities by Congress,
presidential advisers, management consultants, or bar groups, were
the words of then Chairman Minow before the National Association
of Broadcasters in April 1963. Mr. Minow stated •
I must confess that I have found the FCC, too, a prisoner of its own procedures.
The Commission is a vast and sometimes dark forest where we seven FCC
hunters are often required to spend weeks of our time shooting down mosquitoes
with elephant guns. In the interest of our governmental processes, and of
American communications, that forest must be thinned out and wider, better
marked roads have to be cut through the jungles of red tape. Though we have
made substantial improvements in recent years, the administrative process is
a never-neve.r land which we call quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial. The
results are often quasi-solutions. _
If Mr. Minow's statement is an accurate reflection of the Commission's
present capacities, administration of the Satellite Act may turn out
to be even more confusing and dilatory than is feared.
The possibility of censorship under the Communications Satellite
Act is a final poin_ for examination here. On the one hand, repre-
sentatives of the FCC and the USIA stressed during the hearings that
there could and would be no censorship of what is transmitted through
the satellite system22
,9 Hearings on H.R. 10115 and H.R. 10138 Before the House Committee on In-
terstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 595--606 (1962).
Letter From Newton Minow, FCC Chairman, to Senate Majority Leader
Mansfield, July 26, 1962, in Hearings on H.R. 11040 Before the Senate Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, 29 (1962).
Address by Newton Minow Before the Annual Convention of the National
Association of Broadcasters, Chicago, April 2, 1963.
u In testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in August
1962, for example, Mr. Minow emphasized that "broadcasting 1_ this country
has developed on the whole premise that there will be no censorship. It is a
free medium of expression, and that is true of international broadcasting as
well. I would assume that this will continue." Hearings on H.R. 11040 Before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1962).
To the same end, USIA Director Murrow stated, "I do not believe that the U.S.
Government or any agency or division thereof should exercise control over the
content of programs sent abroad, whether they be television programs, books,
or any other method of communicatiom" Id. at 132. Mr. Murrow at the same
time, however, pointed out the need for attention to the content of what is sent
over the satellite system.
A communication system is totally neutral. It will transmit both pap and inspiration
with equal facility .... [T]he satellite will neither solve our dilemmas nor salve our
consciences .... We now confront the age old problem fundamental to all communications :
what are we to say, and how are we to say it?
Id. at 130.
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Section 201 (a) (3) invoked in conjunction with section 102(a) con-
ceivably could, however, provide an opening wedge for the censorship
of program content in the name of contributing to world peace and
understanding.
Similarly the President could seek under section 201 (a) (3) to "co-
ordinate" the FCC's policy so as to make section 201 (c) (2) a vehicle
for censorship by the agency. That provision requires the FCC to
insure nondiscriminatory use of and equitable access to the communi-
cations satellite system by all authorized carriers "under just and
reasonable charges, classifications, practices, regulations, and other
terms and conditions and regulate the manner in which available
facilities of the system and stations are allocated among such users
thereof." The interactions of considerations of national interest and
foreign policy under section 201(a) (4) with the provisions for con-
trol over access to the system and over the "other terms and condi-
tions" of section 201 (c) (2) could plunge us, however unwillingly, into
the censorship of ideas and beliefs.
CONCLUSION
Many of the vagaries and pitfalls of the Satellite Act have been
raked and bemoaned in the preceding pages. Nonetheless, without
adopting Pollyanna or Pangloss as a patron saint we should recog-
nize that creative innovation cannot be achieved without some equiv-
alent risk. As complex and unwieldy as the Communications Satel-
lite Act may appear to be, its potentiality for success is greater than
either of the alternative proposals that might have been adopted. If
it is not panacea or deus ex machina, neither is it a work of Caliban.
Administered with a sense of practicality and restraint, this strange
new vehicle might just soar into orbit.
Comments
Max D. Paglin
If I were asked about Professor Rosenblum's paper, "What did
he say?" I would answer, "He says we have problems." I agree
with him on that. And I also agree with him that the approach
taken in the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 was a novel one.
It is, as you have been told, a unique blend of private enterprise,
governmental regulation, and participation which has never before
been tried.
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I also agree with Professor Rosenblum--or at least I think I agree
with him--that this approach is one well worth trying. Finally, I
agree that it is too soon to tell whether it will be labeled success or
-failure, or perhaps some in-between verdict.
But I am afraid that is the end of my agreement with Professor
Rosenblum. He sets forth some three problem areas: in his words,
statutory ambiguities, the overriding role of the executive branch,
and administrative relationship among the agencies. I should start
fresh by saying I disagree with most of what he has to say in each of
these areas.
Let me make clear, first, that I do -not regard this act. as a perfect
piece of legislation. It deals with a novel problem, and it proposes
novel solutions. It was forged under tremendous pressures. Indeed,
I think it is fair to say that, because of the possibility of further fili-
buster, one of the usual legislative steps was omitted--that of a
conference between the two Houses to iron out details.
In these circumstances, passed as it was, the act will inevitably
have bugs. As a matter of fact, the Communications Act of 1934
itself has required considerable revision over the years, in order to
meet new and originally unforeseen problems.
But I am afraid that Professor Rosenblum is a poor entomologist.
He sees bugs where I see buds !
My comments will touch only on the highlights of each of his
three problem areas. First, with regard to statutory ambiguities,
Professor Rosenblum deplores the fact that Congress adopted a
"mafiana" approach to key problems which, in his view, cry out for
resolution today. He cites as the prime example the issue of con-
struction, ownership, and operation of the ground stations. Shall
the corporation alone, or the carriers and the corporation, construct,
own, and operate these stations? he asks.
I think the professor is quite right in saying this is a question of
great importance. _At one point the Congress did, in practical effect,
resolve the question. It told the Federal Communications Commis-
sion to authorize ground stations in the public interest, but in doing
so, to encourage the construction and operation of the stations by
carriers, whenever it would not be inconsistent with the Act and
its policies.
The various agencies that were interested in this legislation pro-
tested that this weighted the scales of the Commission's judgment
in favor of carrier ownership of the ground stations. And, inciden-
tally, it was the FCC that strongly urged deletion of this preferential
provision, and Congress did delete it. It specified that there was
no legislative prejudgment; that the Commission was to decide the
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issue on the basis of its evaluation of all the relevant public-interest
considerations.
Professor Rosenblum protests that this is not decision, but post-
ponement. Of course it is. But he is wrong when he says this issue
cries out for resolution today.
If it is resolved today, or if it had been in 1962, it would have been
resolved in almost total ignorance. We do not know today what the
system will be. We do not know what kind of ground stations will
be called for, how many will be required for optimum service, what
parts of the frequency spectrum will be used, with what other radio
services the bands will be shared, or what kind of protection against
interference with these sharing services will be required; nor do we
even know, at this time, which arrangement will be most economi-
cally beneficial from the standpoint of the users of the telecommuni-
cations services.
Remember_ when these things were put into the statute, the corpo-
ration was not yet even in being. In short, we do not know how
many ground stations are technically or economically feasible. How
can we possibly decide an important policy question without knowing
the critical policy considerations?
I think that Congress clearly did the right thing when it delegated
the decision without fetters to the Commission_ to act upon the basis
of the facts when those facts are available.
Let me digress for a moment by saying that I am a firm believer
in broad legislative standards like _'in the public interest." The Com-
mission would have been in an impossible position if it had been
operating over the last quarter of a century under a narrow_ con-
fining statute which purported to make the critical policy decisions
on the basis of the state of the radio industry as it existed in 1927
¢r even 1934.
Professor Rosenblum then raises the specter of lengthy comparative
hearings in this field_ and, of course, he refers to some of the blacker
days in our history. But I say there is no reason or basis for assuming
the worst.
The Commission has the power--not only by this statute, but the
basic power--to implement the statute with regulations. We could,
for example, adopt a rule permitting only the corporation to have
ground stations, or assigning ground stations to specific locations and
specifying which locations could be applied for by the corporation and
which by the carriers, or specifying some other plan. We might make
a detailed policy determination as to ground stations. We might call
in all the carriers at that time, and we might secure informal agree-
ment on a plan to implement that policy.
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But one thing I can assure you: we would never delay the United
States' effort in this field by awaiting the outcome of a lengthy com-
parative hearing before authorizing ground stations. Before allow-
ing that, we could employ, and we would employ, our authority to
make conditional grants, because the public interest imperatively
required such action. We do have that authority, and it has been
confirmed by the courts.
We have a host of procedures available to us, and the act does not
bind us to any one procedure or solution.
As to the role of the Executive, Professor Rosenblum finds the
Executive has been given an overriding role in the Satellite Act, and
one which, he claims, ends the independence of the FCC in the regula-
tion of space communications.
Of course the President has been given wide powers. Space com-
munications, by its very nature, necessarily involves negotiations with
other countries. And the President is just as necessarily the logical
one to be in charge of all these negotiations and the critical foreign-
affairs aspects of the satellite system.
It should be obvious that someone has to coordinate the activities
of the agencies and the government as a whole. Someone has to be
continually reviewing the program. Who should it be--the Com-
mission, coordinating and reviewing the President? The Commis-
sion overseeing the foreign-affairs aspects?
Clearly, in our form of government, it has to be the President. This
is not, in fact, a novel thing. An Executive Order of the President
under date of February 16, 1962 (E.O. 10995) assigns the President's
telecommunications management functions to the Director of Tele-
communications Management. He is the one who is delegated the
authority by the President to coordinate the activities and policies of
the government, as a whole, in the field of communications.
Congress was obviously aware of this, as the order was issued in
February of 1962, before the Satellite Act was passed. In the follow-
ing extracts from E.O. 10995 note the close similarity to the type
of language in the Satellite Act to which Professor Rosenblum has
referred.
Among the provisions in section 6 is this: "The Director of Tele-
communications Management shall _nsider the following objectives:
Implementation of the national policy of development and effective
use of space satellites for international telecommunications services."
In section 8 : "The Director of Telecommunications Management shall
assist and give policy, advice to the Department of State in the dis-
charge of its functions in the field of international telecommunica-
tions policies, positions, and negotiations." Similarly, in section 2 : "to
coordinate telecommunications activities of the executive branch of
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government and be responsible for formulation, after consultation
with responsible agencies, of over-all policies and standards therefor."
And the significant provision of this executive order is in section 7,
which says: "Nothing contained in this order shall be deemed to im-
pair any existing authority or jurisdiction of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission."
Nor do I think there is any impropriety whatsoever in specifying
that the President shall aid in the planning and development, and
foster the execution, of a national program of space satellite
communications. At one point during the legislative process, the
statutory language included the term "supervise." This was deleted be-
cause it was realized that the President could not supervise the Com-
mission's activities, but I cannot understand why it is wrong to say
that he should "aid" in the planning or the development, or that
he should "foster" the establishment and operation, of the system.
There is not a single substantive activity of the Commission, under
either the Communications Act or the Satellite Act, that the President
can control or direct. He cannot say to us, "Fix the rates at that
figure," or "Approve that system," or "Authorize ground stations to
so-and-so," or "Issue the following competitive bidding regulations."
Of course, he can review what we have done, and he can suggest
legislative reforms. But he can do that now with any function of the
Commission or, for that matter, any other regulatory body. Think
for a moment of his far-reaching proposals now before the Congress
affecting the ICC, and the entire transportation field. That is the
type of thing that he can do, and he can do it now.
Professor Rosenblum says that, under section 404, only the President
can make general recommendations to the Congress on legislative re-
forms to the Satellite Act. And here we get that typographical error
to which Professor Rosenblum refers--that the Commission is re-
stricted to making recommendations only in the field of anticompetitive
practices.
I have grave doubts as to Professor Rosenblum's construction of
the section. I leave to your reading the plain language of the section
in its entirety. The point is, it does not really matter. Because under
section 4(k) of the Communications Act, the Commission is not only
given the authority, but given the mandate, by the Congress to make
an annual report containing specific recommendations as to additional
legislation which we think desirable in the entire field of our complex
of authority, including all legislative proposals which we have sent,
in the normal course, to the Bureau of the Budget.
Even if Professor Rosenblum is correct in his interpretation, it
could well be that the reason is simply that it would have been super-
fluous to require the Commission to do something general, already
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required in section 4(k) of the Communications Act. Congress did
want, however, to be specific in the anticompetitive field, in order to
emphasize the Commission's responsibility in this area, because we
were being given new and added responsibilities here.
The professor also finds fault with the provisions of section 201(a)
(7) which calls upon the President to help attain coordinated and
efficient use of the spectrum. He says that it facilitates a role for the
President in an area belonging to the FCC. You need only read sec-
tion 305 of the Communications Act to perceive the error of this posi-
tion. The President, from the very beginning, has had an extremely
important role in the use of the spectrum.
The Communications Act has a dual kind of setup---there is dual
authority over the entire area of the spectrum, the President having,
in effect, complete authority in the spectrum insofar as use by Gov-
ernment stations is concerned, and the FCC likewise having authority
over the complete spectrum, insofar as non-Government use of the
radio spectrum is concerned.
Today, as for many years past, the President is the one who al-
locates the spectrum to Government users, just as the Commission
allocates it to non-Government users. Of course, to make such an
arrangement work, there has to be coordination and cooperation be-
tween the President's delegates and the FCC. In fact, such coordi-
nation-cooperation has been going on since 1922, long before the
Federal Radio Commission.
To conserve the spectrum and see to its efficient utilization, there
has to be the same effort on both sides. Here again, the Executive Or-
der setting up the so-called DTM, the Director of Telecommunications
Management, meant to centralize the authority given, on the Govern-
ment's side, with respect to the Government's use of the spectrum.
And this is how we have been working it out.
Professor Rosenblum again finds it amiss that under section 403 it
is the Attorney General, and not the Commission, who is in charge of
enforcement. He says we will become merely the "water boy" for
the Attorney General. Again, you have to read the Communications
Act; this fact is true with respect to the entire Communications Act
of 1934. Under section 401, it is the Attorney General, and not the
Commission, who is in charge of enforcement of the Communications
Act. Yet no one, I think, has suggested that the Commission has
ceased to be an independent agency because of the Congressional recog-
nition that enforcement of laws of the United States is within the
province of the Attorney General of the United States.
Finally, the professor finds that there are great uncertainties con-
cerning the regulatory roles of the agencies vis-a-vis one another.
Again, I find his supporting examples unpersuasive. He says broad
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responsibility for insuring effective competition is now conferred on
the Federal Communications Commission, in addition to the Federal
Trade Commission and Department of Justice. But we have always
had this responsibility, under cases such as McLean Trucking and RCA
Communications v. FCC. The public-interest standard necessarily
subsumes consideration of the policies underlying the antitrust laws.
And for many years, in our day-to-day operations, we have had liaison
with the Justice Department because of this joint concern.
Professor Rosenblum thinks that the roles of NASA and the Com-
mission are unclear as to the approval of the technical system. In my
view, nothing could be clearer. The Commission and the Commission
alone, according to this act, is charged with making that determination.
An ambiguity which existed in an earlier draft of section 101(b)(5)
was removed in order to be explicit on this point.
What the professor seems to be objecting to is that the Commission,
in making its decision, will receive advice from NASA. We would
be completely irresponsible if we did not seek such advice, whether
or not NASA was required to give it. NASA has spent many mil-
lions in this field, and it has an expert staff. Would it have made any
sense for us to ignore this expertise ? The statute simply recognizes
the obvious.
A parallel has been in existence since 1934, in our act with respect to
the recognition of air navigation hazards. The Commission is given
the authority, in section 303, to determine whether or not an antenna
tower constitutes an air navigation hazard. The expert judgment, of
course, is that of the Federal Aviation Agency. But we have the duty
under the law to make the final determination. And the same thing is
present here.
Further, I do not understand Professor Rosenblum's objection with
regard to section 201(c). There the statute requires the Commission
to initiate, upon the advice of the Secretary of State, a so-called section
214(d) proceeding to determine whether the corporation or a carrier
shall be required, at least, to give service to a particular point. The
Commission has to institute the proceeding. But the decision in the
proceeding is one for the Commission alone, on the basis of the hear-
ing record. As a quasi-judicial agency_ we would be bound to be held
to account by a court of review for our decision. I think the roles
of the agencies are clearly defined, in rather appropriate circumstances.
On this point of agency functions, I do not mean to indicate there
would be no problems. It would be surprising, under the circum-
stances, if none arose. But I do not regard the act as in any way
seriously defective. Rather, it seems to me to define the agency roles
fairly well.
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Now, as counsel for the defense, I would like to reply to the charge
of "a rather barren and bleak record" of the Commission as a regula-
tory agency. I would hope, in the interest of fairness and objectivity,
that Professor Rosenblum would make his own appraisal of the facts
before adopting these criticisms as proof of their own validity. In
fact, in the course of the legislative hearings, in the days leading to the
enactment of the Satellite Act, the Commission's regulatory practices
were inquired into in depth. We made a full presentation of all the
facts. And as recently as February 28 of 1963 the Communications
Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee devoted a full hear-
ing to all the facets of our regulatory program. We are confident that
the printed hearings will show that we have answered all questions to
the satisfaction of the Committee. In this regard, Senator Pastore,
Chairman of The Senate Subcommittee, spoke as follows:
I want to congratulate you, Mr. Minow, and all your colleagues and members
of your staff, for the fine statement. I hope that we accomplished something here
this morning. I do seriously hope that the matter we suggested be reviewed
and see if something could not be worked out..
I merely want to make this concluding statement: that I hope this will serve
to quiet the suspicions and the doubts of any of those who have been questioning
Just what the department does in supervising the rates on behalf of the people
of the United States of America.
My personal reaction to it is that you did about as competent a Job as can be
done under the circumstances.
I could go on for some time with my rebuttal, but I am afraid I
would be reminding you of the famous filibuster that was connected
with this subject.
Let me say again that we do not know whether this approach will
work or not. I think time will give us an answer to this and to a lot
of other questions.
Mr. Bernard Strassburg, head of the Commission's Office of Satel-
lite Communications, and I are both optimistic. Of course, they say
that if you see good in everything, you may be an optimist. Then,
again, you may be nuts !
We prefer, under the circumstances, to be optimists. I think, on
the whole, it will work out well. My final word to the critics in the
academic world and elsewhere is" I think you have to give the Satel-
lite Act a good and fair chance. Then you can criticize all you want,
but you will be criticizing on facts, and not on conjecture !
John A. Johnson
I want to line myself up with the optimists. I think this bird can
fly and will fly. Perhaps it is just coincidence, but it seems as though
most of the optimists are in the Government these days.
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We are indebted to Professor Rosenblum for his analysis of the
statute and for pointing out to us the kinds of legal problems that
are going to result in the administration of this act.
But I don't suppose there has ever been an act that has dealt with a
complex problem that did not raise comparable legal questions. We
can go all the way back to the Constitution of the United States and
put ourselves in the position of someone analyzing that document
before the Federal Government began to function. I am sure that
volumes could have been written on its ambiguities and, perhaps, on
some deliberate vagueness it contains.
I think that a good deal of Professor Rosenblum's thesis is that,
somehow, the act should have been more detailed, more specific; that
many more things should have been settled in the legislative process
than were settled, and should not have been left for the discretion of
regulatory and administrative agencies in the Government. This is
a thesis to which I would make a fundamental objection. If anything,
I think that some of the difficulties presented by the statute are the
result of being too specific, of overelaborating many things that could
have been left out entirely.
As Mr. Paglin said, it probably would not have been necessary to
spell out the relationship between NASA and the FCC. The ordi-
nary processes of reasonably intelligent and efficient administration in
the Government would have taken care of most of these things if they
had not been spelled out. I don't think it is a very serious problem
that they may have been spelled out with some vagueness.
I prefer the approach of Mr. Boskey, who recognized that while
there may be a number of difficulties, and many questions can be asked,
none of the problems is insuperable, given reasonably intelligent ad-
ministration. I think that will turn out to be the ease, although I
am not minimizing the fact that this is a very significant legislative
innovation.
While recognizing some of the defects in draftsmanship, we should
not overlook the fact that the statute is the expression of a very im-
portant decision by both the executive and legislative branches of the
government. The act ought to be evaluated, I think, primarily in
terms of how well the government made that basic decision and how
well the act expresses the conclusions that are connected with it.
The problem that faced the Government, when the commercial
prospects of satellite communications became clear, was that of decid-
ing what should be the chosen instrument of the United States for
the ownership and operation of the United States' portion of a global
communications satellite system. Given the fact that this is a truly
natural monopoly, the chosen-instrument problem was inescapable.
One of the alte1_atives, of course, was that a single existing corpo-
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ration would become the chosen instrument by virtue of its dominant
position and its aggressive entry into this field.
The other extreme was that, as Professor Rosenblum said, we could
have had a sort of space-age TVA.
In between these two extremes, there was the possibility of some
kind of new entity being created; and that was the decision that was
made. The problem was, What should be the structure of that new
entity ? A proposal was made to the FCC (which was, to some extent,
reflected in the first bill that was introduced--the Kerr Bill) that this
be a new corporate entity put together solely by the international car-
riers that would be utilizing the services of this system. But that
alternative was rejected and we finally came out with the corporate
structure that is described in this act.
That represents, I think, a considerable amount of progress in deal-
ing in advance with a problem that wasn't exactly knocking at every-
body's door. This was a far-reaching effort by the executive and
legislative branches to anticipate a problem, albeit an unavoidable one,
and to deal with it intelligently in advance.
I think that in that respect it is almost unique; it is an unprece-
dented piece of legislation. So when we criticize the detail, we should
not lose sight of the really tremendous amount of creative thinking
and energy in the executive branch and the Congress that went into the
concept and the execution of this piece of legislation.
Now, so much for philosophy. Mr. Paglin made a number of com-
ments which I had thought of making. I will not repeat them, but I
will summarize a few of them. I don't think that the particular pro-
vision concerning ground stations, which occupied a good deal of
Professor Rosenblum's attention, is an example of deliberate vague-
ness. I think it is an example of a very clear-cut expression of a legis-
lative decision. I think the meaning of it is absolutely clear and
unambiguous.
It does represent a deliberate and well-defined delegation of author-
ity to the Federal Communications Commission. The fact that it does
not set up a lot of standards under which this authority shall be exer-
cised is not at all unusual. I think it would have been a great mistake
for the Congress, with its limited knowledge of this technical sub-
ject, to have done anything else.
The history of this is well expressed by Professor Rosenblum. You
can see the kind of dilemma that the congressional committees were
in. To prescribe deliberately that this shall be decided by the FCC
at the appropriate time was, I think, the wisest decision. Whether
that is true or not, I don't think it is a decision that can be criticized
on the grounds of deliberate vagueness. I think it is a carefully artic-
ulated decision, although some may disa_ee with its wisdom.
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Now, another point that he raised has to do with the power of
the President over the three directors appointed by the President.
Professor Rosenb|um suggested that the President's power over the
three directors apparently extends to removing them. In support of
that conclusion, he cited the statutory ]anguage which provides that
the directors shall serve "for terms of three years or until their
successors have been appointed and qualified."
Bearing in mind some of the constitutional cases on the removal
of omcers_ ranging from postmasters to members of the Federal Trade
Commission_ and the considerations that entered into those decisions,
I doubt that this is a defensible conclusion. I should think this
language simply means that if the successor has not been appointed
and qualified before the end of the 3-year term, the one in ot_ce will
continue.
I do not think that such an extensive degree of control over the
directors as would result from the power of removal should be
implied simply from those words. But I must confess I have not
done any research on this point. I simply want to put a question
mark on Professor Rosenhlum_s suggestion.
On the question of the relationship of NASA to the FCC, I agree
with Mr. Paglin entirely." I do not think there is any ambiguity
in this section. I think it is quite clear that the Federal Communica-
tions Commission has the sole and final power of decision. It is
true that the Commission is obligated by statute to receive the advice
of NASA, and NASA is obligated to give it. But I do not think
they are obligated to follow it.
On the other hand, this becomes somewhat acade_c, considering
the way government agencies actually operate. It is not very likely
that the Federal Communications Commission is going to disregard
the kind of advice they will get from NASA on these subjects. Where
else would they turn for advice on which to base the decisions they
will make ?
So far as the relationships between the Secretary of State and
NASA and the FCC are concerned_ I must say I am not quite so
clear as to whether the advice of the Secretary of State does or does
not impose a mandatory duty upon the FCC. But since NASA's only
responsibility is to render advice to the Secretary of State, I would
not think that the decision of the Secretary of State in choosing to
follow that advice or to disregard it would affect the jurisdictional
competence of the FCC.
My final remarks concern another example of the kind of problem
that can be picked out of statutory language if one reads it very
closely.
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Mr. Boskey has borne down rather heavily on section 201(e)(1).
He said that one of the most urgent actions required would be the
implementation of this section by the Federal Communications Com-
mission through issuance of appropriate regulations, because some of
the very first acts of the corporation are going to be in the procurement
field. This is true. However, for some time to come_ the corpora-
tion's major contracting activities will be for research and develop-
ment. This presents a problem insofar as the statutory language
is concerned.
Referring back to section 201(b) (3) we see that NASA shall
assist the corporation in the conduct of its research and development pro-
gram by furnishing to the corporation, when requested, on a reimbursable
basis, such satellite launching and associated services as the Administration
deems necessary for the most expeditious and economical development of the
communications satellite system.
The statute, at that point, does not impose a mandatory duty upon
NASA. It is left to NASA's discretion.
On the other hand, section 201(b)(5) imposes a mandatory duty
upon NASA to "furnish to the corporation, on request and on a
reimbursable basis, satellite launching and associated services required
for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of the communi-
cations satellite system." The words %stablishment, operation, and
maintenance" of the system were carefully chosen to make a clear-cut
distinction between that phase of the corporation's activities and the
conduct of its research and development program. You can see the
importance of that because in one case NASA has no discretion, while
in the other case it has unbounded discretion.
Now, when we proceed to section 201(c)(1), we find that the
only words that are included in the first clause are "establishment and
operation of the . . . system." No mention is made of the "research
and development program" of the corporation until the second clause
of 201 (c) (1), in which "research" and "development" are specifically
mentioned. So I think there is a serious question as to whether the
FCC has the same authority under 201(c)(1) in relation to the
contracting process involved in the corporation's research and develop-
ment program that it has in relation to procurement of equipment
for the "establishment and operation" of the system.
Furthermore, there are some very serious differences in practice
between procurement in connection with research and development
programs and procurement for an operating system. In the Armed
Services Procurement Act, under which the Army, Navy, Air Force_
and NASA all operate, the requirement for procurement by formal
advertising is qualified by a provision which permits the agencies
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to exempt research and development contracting from that
requirement.
Incidentally, the term "competitive bidding" is a very.poor term to
employ in the statute. The term that has a well-established usage is
"procurement by formal advertising." I suppose that is what is
meant by the reference to competitive bidding. But procurement by
formal advertising is rarely appropriate for research and develop-
ment contracting.
I think the kind of question I am raising is one that the Congress
simply did not focus on. But it is the kind of problem that arises
when the words of the statute are read very carefully. And some-
one will have to come to a decision on the point.
Stanley Plesent
Although I was a member of the interagency team which met for
hours and days to put together a proposed draft of legislation for
the Congress_ and although I participated with my bo_ Ed Murrow_
for many_ many hearings_ it has been some months since I have been
connected with the workings of the Communications Satellite Act as
finally passed. So this has been a valuable review for me in going
back to the ton of material that accumulated in my files on this subject.
In doing s% frankly, I was amazed at just how much effort had
gone into all of this. And I can only say congratulations to Professor
Rosenblum_ whose paper--with which I disagree in many respects--
reflects a tremendous amount of research into the work that went
into this act. The hearings were endless_ as those who participated
know. However_ the result_ I think_ must be read against the pur-
poses_ as Mr. Johnson has just iterated_ to which everyone addressed
himself from the beginning.
Both Mr. Paglin and Mr. Johnson have focused on some specifics
in the professor's paper. I will do that very infrequently and will_
rather_ offer some general comments_ part of which may be in the
nature of special pleading for the agency I represent here today, the
United States Information Agency.
Our concern with this particular piece of legislation is basically
twofold: first_ the impact abroad of what this nation does--this is_
after all_ our mission--and second_ the potential utility of an operable
or an operating system to the Information Agency as a mode of
communication.
The impact abroad of what this nation does in this field has a very
special significance. This is true since there must be foreign partici-
pation_ or else the system is of no value whatever. It is a matter of
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definition s since it takes two or more to communicate. And in the
field of information it is not enough to speak the truth unless there
is another to hear it. There will have to be foreign participation_
deep and constant. Hence_ the way this legislation operates with
respect to the ability of foreign entities to come into a system is of
paramount importance.
That is part of the background that I want to make very clear here.
I don_t believe anybody has_ so far_ read a few of the words from the
Declaration of Policy and Purpose of this statute. Though this bill
went through many phases and many drafts and many changes, and
though there was tremendous pressure from a portion of the private
sector as well as pressure from certain government agencies_ there
seemed little effort at any time to deviate in any meaningful way
from what the President had set down in July of 1961 as the purpose
of the statute: that this be an important demonstration of the peace-
ful applications of space.
The statute had said from the very outset:
The Congress hereby declares that it ts the policy of the United States to
establish, in conjunction and in cooperation with other countries, as ex-
peditiously as practicable a commercial communications satellite system, as
part of an improved global communications network, which will be responsive
to public needs and national objectives . . . which will contribute to world
peace and understanding.
The next part of the declaration goes into the subject of making
service available--if I might quote Ed Murrow--"to serve the lean as
well as the lucrative." At the heart of all this was the notion in
the administration that this was not--and here I take issue with
George Cook--this was not just another system_ just a natural exten-
sion of one communication device to a new communication device.
That would be the same as saying that jet air travel is but an extension
of the covered wagon_ or that atomic energy is but an extension of
steam.
There are qualitative differences between the world of space com-
munication and the world of terrestrial or more traditional com-
munication. One of the private entities throughout the debate was
making the point that this was_ as Mr. Cook said_ nothing to be
excited about. Some have been of the opinion that we should just
stick with the old because it worked. AT&T negotiated with the
British and negotiated with the French. What is the State Depart-
ment so concerned about ? We have done it before.
Well, they are right_ and they have great experience in this field;
except that those negotiations took place with the British Post Office
and with the French Post and Telegraph Authority. They were
working business relationships. The fact is that the foreign min-
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istries, the space authorities, and the information ministries of all
these countries are in this field as much as, and indeed more than,
the traditional communicating authorities of those countries.
The point I make here is that we are dealing with a matter that
goes to the heart of this nation, as an effort in the space field. It
goes deeply into the realm of foreign policy and relationships with
foreign governments. At the very outset, the pragmatic approach
that was taken had as its backdrop the desire to advance the national
interest.
With respect to Telstar, so brilliantly conceived, launched, and op-
erated with AT&T and NASA doing the job, our agency did in the
normal course of its business gather foreign reaction to it. The re-
sults were interesting because AT&T's role in this, which was para-
mount, had had tremendous publicity. The foreign reaction through-
out--and I will furnish a few quotes to make the point--was that
this whole effort was a national effort. This is not an AT&T effort
or a GE effort; this is a national effort. And we have got to bring
together the very best minds, the very best administrators, the very
best scientists from all sectors of our economy to make this work.
From Italy came the line, "Telstar is the symbol of the new space
frontier desired by Kennedy." Sweden referred to it as a "brilliant
American overture." Tunisia called it "the gigantic American break-
through" and from Ghana came the words "The Americans deserve
every congratulation."
I could go on through many, many more. Telstar was a victory
for the United States as an entity.
The point I want to make here is that there is deep involvement
of the various agencies of the Government. And them is deep involve-
ment of the Chief Executive, probably with the continuing advice of
the Director of Telecommunications Management, to make this thing
go.
Professor Rosenblum started with a quote from Dr. Gardner which
was a plug for innovation--for trying new ways. But I am afraid
Professor Rosenblum's acceptance of that proposition in justifying
not legislating a space-age TVA on the one hand, or leaving the field
solely to international communications carriers on the other, stopped
short at the frontier, either the space frontier or the new frontier.
We innovated with respect to interagency relationships. An effort
was made here to use the expertise that exists in the Government
and to coordinate it.
Now, who can coordinate ? The statute might have said the Bureau
of the Budget. That is a traditional coordinating organization.
But the Bureau of the Budget is part of the White House. The
recognition was made early that there would have to be somebody to
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pull these strings together because this was a national effort, because
it involved space, launching, and so forth, as well as communications,
and because it was deeply involved in foreign policy. The choice was
the President. For those of us who drafted the statute, this was a
natural choice. As Mr. Paglin and, I think, Mr. Johnson also
stressed, there is nothing very new about this.
With respect to the potential use by our agency of this system, our
business as you know is an overseas business. Many people don't
know much about us, because we are not in the business of publicizing
in this country. Our business is to publicize this country's efforts
around the world, starting at the water's edge. We use every known
means of communication, from the word of mouth of our officers in
220 posts in 107 countries around the world, through films, television,
books and magazines, exhibits, and even wandering minstrels in
certain areas of Southeast Asia.
To the extent that there is an advance in the art of communica-
tion, this agency must be prepared to use it. Space communication
is such an advance. We are interested.
We testified at length, before many committees, that the way the
system is currently constructed, certain arithmetical calculations from
existing phone rates and testimony of the executive vice president
of AT&T convinced us that our agency would be priced out of the
market.
The history on this controversy, I think, you will find fascinating;
a very interesting interchange took place between us and Senator
Symington during the hearings before _he Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
We felt that something had to be said at those hearings about a
couple of shortcomings in the bill. We tried to present our criticisms
within the confines of all-out support for the bill. This was a tough
road to walk. We think we did. As a matter of fact there was one
change at least. Senator Frank Church introduced what is now
known as the Church Amendment, which I think was just clarifying
language. But it was a plus from our point of view, because it made
clear that when the Government_---the President, in Professor Rosen-
blum's analysis--felt that the national interest required another sys-
tem, or there were unique governmental needs for another system,
there could be another system. This was a last-minute improvement
in the situation. It gives us one additional way in which we can
look to potential communicating devices for ourselves, c
As for having this massive grant of authority to the President--
and this is one of the examples givenmI should remind Professor
Rosenblum of the Appropriations Committee. Any decision by the
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Executive to set up an additional system would grind its way through
the process of getting the funds to do it. There will be plenty of
chance for the Congress to speak at this point.
I just want to cite one or two examples on this rate issue. Right
now, the Government does not enjoy any preferred rate. This was
not always the case. Until 1947, the Government, in connection
with telegraphy, did enjoy preferred rates.
This went on from about 1867, I believe, to 1947--a long period
of time. The issue was constantly raised, "Why should the Govern-
ment be in a preferred position_." There was a set of hearings, and
one of the conclusions was that the company's business--at that time
of vast proportions--was fostered in its infancy by the Federal Gov-
ernment. It was concluded that the difference, if any, between the
cost of handling Government business and the amount paid by the
Government for such service should be regarded as consideration to
the Government for the rights and privileges granted by the act of
1866, and the preferential rate was continued.
I submit that the investment of the national weal in this system,
as of today--and for a long time to come--is phenomenal. I forget
the exact figures from the hearings, but the estimate goes up to $500
million already spent by the Government in research on space
communications.
The national investment has been great. Some recognition of that
fact should be made. Our forum for this effort, of course, will ulti-
mately be the FCC. We will n_ake the best case we can before that
body to acquire special rates that we can afford.
Interestingly, the question of ground-station ownership adverted to
by various speakers is involved in this, too. In our judgment it would
have been better if the ground stations were vested in the corporation,
as they were in the original Administration-drafted bill.
This is so for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that if
we want to negotiate for special rates, it is better to negotiate with the
corporation directly than to have to go through a ground station owned
by a common carrier. History in the field is such that we don't think
we would do too well taking that route. We are not protected from
that possibility right now, since the FCC may put the ground stations
into non-satellite-corporation hands.
George Cook commented that everyone is going to have to go through
a common-carrier-owned ground station. That is just not so--at least
not yet. There has been no determination of that yet, and we hope it
will be possible to do some direct negotiating.
With respect to the question of censorship, which Professor Rosen-
blum raised, I would like only to point out that this is not a new prob-
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lem. Our agency is flooded with mail, most of which comes to my desk
from the Hill, passing along such questions from constituents as "Why
don't we do something about stopping certain American motion pic-
tures from being shown in foreign countries._" or "Why are we per-
mitting certain television series to be _ent abroad _."
Our answer has been, and is, that we are not in the business of censor-
ship and it would be wrong for our agency to engage in it. We have
no authority to do it.
But the fact is that Mr. Murrow, respected as he is in the industry,
is doing what he can as a fellow communicator in forums in Hollywood
and in New York, to urge the film and television industry to pay a
little more attention to the impact their product may have abroad. I
believe it is a legitimate activity of the Government to urge voluntary
efforts to do a better job with our product. So I think that though
Professor Rosenblum_s concern is legitimate, taken against the back-
drop of history it need not be quite such a concern.
Nathaniel L. Nathanson
This is not exactly a question, but as the other half of the administra-
tive law faculty in this institution, I want partly to associate myself
with, and partly to disassociate myself from, my colleague.
In the first place, I notice that at least one of the commentators
jumped on Professor Rosenblum because of his suggestion that the
President probably had discretionary authority to remove the direc-
tors that he appointed. And, of course, Professor Rosenblum sug-
gested one particular clause of the statute _hich he thought tended to
go in that direction.
And Mr. Johnson said he didn't think that had that significance.
But leaving aside the particular argument Professor Rosenblum
made in support of his conclusion, I would be surprised if Mr. Johnson
were to take the position that the President did not have authority to
remove one of the directors that he appointed--discretionary author-
ity-in the light of the characteristics of this corporation. As far as
I know, it is different from the quasi-judicial bodies where the excep-
tion from the President's appointing authority has been made.
Before Mr. Johnson answers, I want to complete my disassociation.
Professor Rosenblum is apparently concerned that the President may
have such authority. I am glad if he has that authority. In general,
that is the point where I would disagree with Professor Rosenblum's
thesis that maybe the President has too much authority.
If anything, I might be a little concerned that the President does
not have enough authority in this statute. That is why I would be
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anxious to preserve at least this measure of his control with respect to
the corporation. I think it is a rather small item of control, as a
matter of fact.
John A. Johnson
I don't really know the answer to this question, quite obviously. I
gathered that the conclusion Mr. Rosenblum expressed was from that
statutory language. I think all one can say is that this will be an
interesting constitutional question:
You don't have a legislative quasi-judicial agency. It isn't the
Federal Communications Commission. We know about that case.
It isn't the Post Office Department. It isn't a purely executive
agency. In fact, it isn't any agency at all.
So I suppose, as lawyers, we can all be arguing what we think is
more or less persuasive analogy.
BernardStrassburg
For the last 20 years I have been associated with common-carrier
regulation in the Federal Communications Commission. The Com-
mon Carrier Bureau is charged with administering for the Commis-
sion the common-carrier provisions of Title II of the Communications
Act. I am associate chief of that Bureau and also chief of its Office
of Satellite Communications which the Commission established fol-
lowing the enactment of the Communications Satellite Act.
In view of my 20 years of common-carrier regulation at the FCC,
I can't help but feel that good, bad, or indifferent, I am sort of a
personification of the Commission's regulatory record. I don't want
to belabor the point; it has already been treated by Mr. Paglin. But
I would like to say just a few words with regard to our "bleak and
barren record." Believe me, it is not bleak and barren. Perhaps
it is not always as fertile as some people think it might be or could be.
On the whole_ judging by results, we do not have a bleak and barren
record at the Commission. The essential public interests have been
protected. You can look at the results in the domestic field of com-
munications. We have something that we are quite satisfied with:
over the years, during the period of inflation, we have brought down
interstate telephone rates considerably in the United States. We have
done it without fanfare and formal hearing; that is true. We have
negotiated a great number of rate reductions since our inception in
1934--rates have been reduced 19 percent since 1941. And every re-
duction has been initiated by the Commission rather than by the
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company--as a result of the alertness and diligence of the Commission.
There has been some criticism that our procedural mechanisms are
too involved, too cumbersome, full of delay, and so forth. This is
the very thing that the Commission has avoided in the common-
carrier regulatory field. That fact has provoked accusations of a
bleak and barren record. We avoided prolonged drawn-out public
hearings wherever possible. That has been the basis for criticism.
But the fact remains that it is because we have designed procedures
which are better suited to what we consider to be the regulatory
mission that we have accomplished what we have.
My office has been actively engaged in the last few months in draft-
ing rules and regulations to implement the provisions of section 201-
(c) (1), relative to effective competition. In this connection, we have
made rather wide distribution of a staff effort that has come forth in
the form of rules and regulations which, at some stage, will be
presented to the Commission with the recommendation that the Com-
mission institute proposed rule-making under the Administrative Pro-
cedures Act.
With what we have been learning from the exchanges we have had
with various members of industry and government, who have con-
siderable expertis_ and experience in the field of procurement, and
with what I have learned at this conference, I feel that we are well
ahead of the game.
Some of Mr. Boskey's thoughts, I would say, were novel so far as
my own thinking was concerned, or the thinking of my staff. This
is the kind of input that is required in a field which is as novel as
this field is--a field in which the FCC quite admittedly has to develop
an expertise. There were a few specific questions regarding the in-
terpretation and possible applications of section 201(c), and the pro-
vision dealing with competitive bidding in particular. I don't think
I will be able to give definitive replies to some of the questions that
have been raised.
Regarding Mr. John's observations as to the lack of clarity in the
statute, as to whether it really applies or was intended to apply to
research and development, 1 agree that the statute leaves some doubt
on that subject. I don't recall that Congress focused very sharply
on that particular aspect. But I would think that any research and
development program could be fostered consistent with maintaining
maximum competition, but maximum competition compatible with the
realities of research and development.
This does not mean that competitive bidding, as distinguished from
some other forms of negotiations, would be required or indicated
under those circumstances. This is something that will need very care-
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ful thought and study. It is very much before us now at the office,
and we hope to come up with a constructive recommendation.
I would like to emphasize that our rules_ whatever rules are adopted_
will be adopted by seven commissioners after the public has been
given an opportunity to comment on the proposed rules through the
process of rule-making that is required by the Administrative Pro-
cedures Act. Even in advance of undertaking that process, we have
been canvassing the industry and government so that we can do the
job as realistically and effectively as possible.
Professor Fulda asked just what we meant by competitive bidding
and how we intended to apply competitive bidding in light of the
qualifying language of the statute, which states that the Commission
shall employ competitive bidding where appropriate.
Well, our major mission is to assure competition. It may be that
competitive bidding in the context of the research and development
program may not be suitable. But there are other devices and tech-
niques which may be equally appropriate to fostering a competitive
environment.
Professor Fulda raised a question about adequate facilities, in the
context of the choice that carriers will have as to whether they are
going to utilize the modem new satellite channel or favor and pro-
tect their own "obsolete" facilities. For one thing_ I don't think there
will be very many obsolete facilities in the overseas communications
field. We have relatively few obsolete facilities today, compared
with the. total channel capacity that we have in overseas facilities.
The telephone and the modern-day telephone cables are by no means
Obsolete facilities, and will not be obsolete, technically or economically,
for a long time to come. They have all of the capability--with the ex-
ception, perhaps, of transmission of television--that we need. Also,
the telegraph carriers who need additional facilities are getting them
from the modem telephone cables that have been available since 1956.
I think there is going to be a plac9, in the overall complex of things
for high-capacity cable and satellite facilities. High-capacity cables
cannot be readily brushed aside as being obsolete or inferior to satel-
lite communications. We will want both from the standpoint of
redundancy and reliability in communications.
As far as the Commission's authority in the matter is concerned, the
Commission has control over any new facilities that are to be installed,
whether they be satellite facilities, conventional cable, or the high-
frequency radio facilities.
In the field of overseas radio circuits, the commission has the
power--every 3 years, I believe--to review outstanding authoriza-
tions to determine whether there is a public need for renewing them.
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If there are any obsolete radio facilities that are not serving a useful
purpose, the Commission has the control over them by that device.
The Commission also has control over the extension of cable facilities_
simply because to lay any new cables requires an authorization under
the Cable Landing License Act.
Thus, the Commision does have control over these matters. I don_t
think the problem of obsolescence is any real cause for concern.
SpencerM. Beresford
I feel obliged to say some things in reply to Professor Rosenblum,
because I had a personal concern with the Communications Satellite
Act, and no longer have. I think that in the conjunction of those two
conditions I am unique among those in this conference.
Mr. Paglin_s predicament_ following--not pursuing but following--
Professor Rosenblum_s tour de force reminded me of an incident that
I understand took place in the 18th century. Frederick the Great was
in the habit of inviting scholarly or at least vociferous men to attend
conferences such as this one, and then would set them against each
other in a kind of bullbaiting sport. On one occasion, he was sup-
posed to have invited Diderot, the French encyclopedist, who was
widely regarded as an atheist, and the German mathematician, Euler,
who was a believer in the Deity. Following the procedure of these
events, Euler was, first of all, to present a thesis. Then, after a suit-
able interval, Diderot would have his chance for rebuttal and the
presentation of a contrary thesis.
Euler said only, "Two plus two equals four; therefore, God exists."
And when the time came for Diderot's rebuttal_ it was found that
he had departed by stage for Paris.
I don't tell this story merely to praise Mr. Paglin_s courage in stand-
ing by his guns and making his reply to Professor Rosenblum, rather
than running out. I tell it also because I think that Mr. Paglin could
do, and to some extent has done, what Diderot should have done; that
is_ point out that the conclusion did not follow from the premise.
Professor Rosenblum has pointed out--I think correctly in some
instances, at least--that this act does contain many gaps, overlaps,
and areas of vagueness. But I think it would be premature, at least,
to conclude that for those reasons the act will not work.
I think the act certainly deserves a chance. It was a great institu-
tional and legislative innovation. It may perhaps be compared to a
research and development contract. In an ordinary supply contract
for standard items, there are usually rather detailed specifications.
This is not true of research and development contracts, in which there
.Jr
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are_ characteristically, no specifications. The contract necessarily
leaves gaps_ and contains overlaps and areas of vagueness.
So it is_ I think, with this act. Congress did not know enough--
nobody knew enough at that time_ and I doubt if anybody knows
enough yet--to specify correctly all the details of operation and
administration of a communications satellite system.
Professor Rosenblum, as was his job--the job he set for himself as
a devil's advocate--put the worst possible interpretation on various
provisions of the act. But we should remember that the administra-
tive agencies of the Government will try to find interpretations that
will make sense and will made the act work. The possibility of ad-
ministrative interpretation can make all the difference, as it often does,
between workable and unworkable legislation. I have not heard any-
one say that the act cannot work--only that it can be interpreted in
such a way that it will not work. But this is a mere exercise in stat-
utory construction. As a practical matter, the act will be interpreted
and applied administratively so that it will work.
George V. Cook
Judging from Mr. Plesent's observations about ground stations, my
statement has resulted in a difference in understanding. The basic
point I was making in attempting to clarify the role of this "system"---
and I use that term in its statutory sense as not including ground sta-
tions--was that there would not be direct broadcasts, at least in the
foreseeable future, from the satellite to home receivers. The im-
mediate future will require the interception of the satellite signals
by means of a sophisticated ground terminal facility for transmission,
in turn, over the established networks of the carriers. Whether that
ground facility is owned by carriers or the corporation is another
matter.
That was all I intended to say. I do not believe I said that the
carriers would own all the ground stations, nor do I think I implied
this.
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6Some International Aspects of
Communications Satellite Systems *
Samuel D. Estep
ENACTMENT OF THE CO:_MUNICATIONS SATELLITE ACT OF 1962 1
brought into being a new type of legal organism. The Communica-
tions Satellite Corporation, incorporated pursuant to the act, is an
unusual organization directed to carry out certain Government policies
and at the same time operate as a profit-making private business con-
cern. These two functions may not always be compatible. In one
sense, of course, many of our public utility companies serve these
dual purposes, and examples can even be found where the national
government has created private corporations to carry out specific na-
tional goals. 2 The degree 5f Government involvement in the Com-
munications Satellite Corporation_ however, the emphasis on profit-
making, and the use of this technique in international affairs make
this organization a most unusual one.
The final version of the bill as enacted by Congress and approved
by the President obviously was a compromise between those who
wanted existing private communications carriers to own and operate
this new communications satellite service and those who desired a
separate corporation with a broadly based general-public ownership.
Another vociferous minority group fought hard for complete gov-
ernmental ownership and operation. One might argue about the
feasibility or at lea_t the desirability of creating this strange hybrid
*Acknowledgment is gratefully made to the Ford Foundation and the W. W.
Cook Fund of the University of Michigan Law School for financial support of
the research on which this article is based. In addition, it would not have been
possible to write this article without very great assistance from a number of
people in government departments and agencies as well as private corporations.
The views expressed, however, are solely the responsibility of the writer.
x76 Star. 419, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-44 (1962) [hereinafter cited to sections of
the act].
• The construction of the Union Pacific Railroad provides an example of a
private corporation created to carry out a government objective.
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corporation with the multiple objectives of making money for the
stockholders, furnishing cheap global commuhication services, and
relieving the Government of some financial burdens, all hopefully
in the near future and, more particularly, before the Russians estab-
lish a competing system. Whatever the merits of this solution to the
original dispute, however, it is now clear that we must live with this
new organism and our concern should be to make it viable.
To derive anything like the maximum benefits, both economic and
psychological, from creation of this new service, nobody interested
in the project should sit back and attempt to recriminate or place
blame on those they think were shortsighted. The imminence of the
1963 International Telecommunications Union Conference to allocate
frequencies for space communic._tions 8 precludes the luxury of such
Monday morning quarterbacking. The legal, economic, and policy
questions facing the Communications Satellite Corporation, the
Department of State, NASA, and the FCC are numerous and difficult.
These problems need immediate discussion, and at least tentative pol-
icy positions must soon be taken by the business and Government
administrators who are involved in the creation and operation of the
satellite communication system.
Although the corporation may not be a truly unique organization,
it certainly has sufficient new characteristics and problems to be called
sui generis. Consequently, although many of the international prob-
lems were created years ago when Marconi's invention first came into
use, there are no really appropriate international legal precedents to
use in analyzing the new dimensions which were added by the dif-
ferent character of communications through satellites. There will be
new and challenging questions to be faced. In addition, in a new
area such as this, it is particularly difficult to separate the legal from
the economic and political policy questions which will inevitably arise.
The purpose of this paper is to identify the questions and suggest
possible answers.
In one form or another, many of the questions have already been
asked, particularly by Mr. Schwartz and Mr. Goldsen in The Rand
Corporation study. 4 For the most part, however, the existing pub-
lished legal discussions have only raised the questions; they have not
been primarily directed to suggesting definite solutions which should
be adopted by the corporation and the various Government agencies
that are vitally involved in the establishment of a communications
8 The conference will begin Oct. 6, 19_3, in Geneva, Switzerland.
SCHWARTz _ GOLDSEN, FOREIGN PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE
SYSTEMS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE ACT OF 1962, The
Rand Corlmration Memoran_lum RM-3484--RC (Feb. 1963).
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satellite system. The task now is to identify and discuss the merits
of various positions which might be taken. A word of caution is in
order, however. The suggestions that will be made in this paper are
presented for the purpose of stimulating critical thinking. No per-
son, particularly not this writer, has any right to claim unusual insight
or infallibility in suggesting answers to these problems. Neverthe-
less, the basic positions to be taken by the United States representa-
tives at the 1963 ITU Conference should be well in hand, even though
in March 1963 the Administrative Council decided to limit the scope
of the discussions in Geneva s in the fall. Many of these items will
not be on the formal agenda, but they will be the subject of informal
discussions among the various delegates, and it is important that the
position of the United States be as firm and well-considered as
possible.
ASSUMPTIONS
To understand and discuss the suggestions made here concerning
various legal, economic, and political policy questions, certain facts
and positions must be assumed. These assumptions should be made
explicit, not left to implication. Therefore, at the risk of reciting
familiar information, the following statements or assmnptions are
made and are believed by this writer to be justifiable in the light of
present knowledge.
1. Perhaps the most important fact of all, and one which has been
often overlooked in discussions of communications satellites, is that
an extensive, diversified, nonpolitical, and efficient international tele-
communications network has been operated for many years by existing
U.S. carriers and their foreign partners. AT&T alone has over 175
formal operating agreements with partners in practically every coun-
try in the world, including the U.S.S.R., Red China, and Cuba. 6
Actually, the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 recognizes this fact
and makes it clear that the Communications Satellite Corporation is
not to be an operating company which serves the ultimate consumer in
the normal sense of communications common-carrier operations.'
Instead it is to furnish the channels and possibly the equipment with
which the satellites can be used to supplement worldwide telecom-
munications services. The act makes it clear that the corporation is
not to engage in telecommunications strictly within the boundaries
'This was done despite some attempts to expand the agenda to consider
other and broader questions.
'This information was obtained from AT&T personnel.
'This is made clear by the act'sdefinitionsof "communications satellitesys-
tem" [§ 103(1)], and "associatedequipment and facilities"[§ 103(4)], and also
by the provisions of §§305(a) & (b). See also discussion of this point in
SCHWARTZ & GOLVS_, Op. tit. supra note 4, at 11-12.
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of a single country even if land facilities owned by ComSat were used
to send messages between land points2
2. The act states that the Communications Satellite Corporation
legally is a privately owned, profit-making company organized under
the laws of the District of Columbia. 9 Nevertheless, the act also
recognizes that the corporation will be carrying out activities and
functions which in many respects are inextricably entwined with im-
portant governmental policies of the United States. 1° In some sig-
nificant respects, therefore, the corporation will be performing gov-
ernmental functions.
3. The corporation is expected to make money; some Congressmen
during recent hearings stated that they even expect the corporation
to furnish much of the money for research and development work
leading to an operational system. 1_ Realistically, however, it is ex-
tremely doubtful that any profits will be made for a 10ng time, cer-
tainly not for 8 or 10 years. 1_ Also, contrary to what may have been
the hopes of these Senators and Congressmen, the corporation prob-
ably cannot provide enough money for research and development, if
vehicle and launching work is included. A great deal of money will
have to be spent by Government agencies such as NASA. This is im-
perative if one of the purposes that Congress and the Administration
had in mind--that the U.S. should be the first to prove commercial
feasibility of international communications satellites---is to be fulfilled.
Otherwise we run the risk of losing our existing leadership to Russia,
thereby suffering another tremendous psychological setback in the cold
war.
On the other hand, ComSat surely can be expected to contribute a
considerable amount of research and development money, perhaps as
much as $100 million23 A substantial share might be spent on a good
attitude- or orientation-control system which would make the antenna
problem much simpler. Certainly work on the satellites and their
s Ibid.
• COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE ACT OF 1962, § 301.
l°Id., § 201 generally, and specifically subsection (4), directing the President
to supervise "relationships of the corporation with foreign governments or
entities or with international bodies" so as to be consistent with the foreign
policy of the United States, and id., § 402, which requires the corporation to
report to the Department of State all of its "business negotiations" with any
"in_rnational or foreign entity."
n Hearings on Nominations o] Incorporators o/ the Communications Satellite
Corporation Before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,
88th Gong., 1st Sess. 70-73. 80-81, 90-91 (1963).
Of necessity this is a judgment, or guess, and cann_)t be demonstrated factu-
ally. The incorporators refused to hazard a guess at the Hearings, id. at 86-87.
This too is a guess, albeit an educated one.
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electronic equipment could be financed with non-governmental funds.
But the launching work could best be done by making use of existing
Government facilities. No extra money would have to be spent to
develop launching capabilities for communication satellites as such.
Even present technical capabilities would probably permit establish-
ment of a limited but operational and useful satellite system if the
Government were to put no more money into communications satellite
work.
4. The act provides, although only by implication, that the corpora-
tion is to have a monopoly on communications that make use of space
satellites." It also explicitly states, however, that the corporation is
to foster competition in the manufacture of equipment which will be
used by the corporation. 15 The economic and manufacturing facts of
life in the communications business must be taken into account in con-
sidering how these policies should be carried out. First, space satel-
lites will not have a monopoly on international communications but
must compete with and can only complement existing facilities, largely
privately owned in the U.S. At the present time such carriers as
AT&T, ITT, WU, and RCA, jointly with their foreign counterparts,
own the facilities and operate the international communications net-
work. Second, we must accept the fact that a satellite system will un-
doubtedly be better and more reliably engineered and will be put into
operation more quickly if the existing giants of the industry are given
overall responsibility. Several other important conclusions or assump-
tions can be drawn from these facts.
5. For this new form of communication service to be most useful,
it is essential that it be integrated into existing systems using under-
water cable and tropospheric-scatter and other radio techniques for
international telecommunications. The normal customer who sends or
receives an international message does not care which channel is used--
long-range radio, cable, or satellites. From this it follows that there
would be no economic basis for charging a customer more per minute
for use of a communications satellite than for an undersea cable or a
long-range tropospheric-scatter radio channel. This fact will create
serious channel-rental rate problems for the Communications Satellite
a, Section 102(d) of the act states, inter alia, that Congress did not intend ¢o
"preclude the creation of additional communications satellite systems, if re-
quired to meet unique governmental needs or if otherwise required in the
national interest." (Emphasis added.) This implies that such services are to
be provided only if Congress enacts further legislation. See discussion in Hear-
ing# on H.R. 110_0 Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 144-47, 162-63, 194-95, 265-66 (1962).
_ Sections 102(c) & 201(c) (1).
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Corporation and the FCC. le In the long run, of course_ international
message costs should be reduced and this saving must be passed on to
all users of such service.
6. For the next 10 years, the only type of service which will be needed
or even available through communications satellites will undoubtedly
be the normal message and TV relay (not broadcast) channels now
provided by overseas telephone, radio, and telegraph facilities. This
is dictated not only by the economics of the situation in terms of de-
mand (or service, but also by the economics involved in the technical
limitations inherent in existing equipment itself. For example, the
same facilities needed to transmit a full-range TV program will carry
600 two-way telephone conversations. If available equipment is used
for data transmission the economy is even more startling: 22 times
better than voice transmission. These technical limitations make it
clear that the most economical use of these channels will be for sending
ordinary telephone and telegraph messages or for data transmission.
Certainly for a good many years there is no likelihood of any kind of
transmission from satellites directly to home receivers for purposes of
general radio or TV broadcasting. Arguably, existing regulations
would even prohibit such broadcasts through spaceY
7. Another economic fact of communications satellites is that, at
least for a good many years, the primary use of the system will be to
transmit messages between large traffic areas, as from the United States
to Europe and the United Kingdom. The satellite system simply can-
not be operated economically unless there is a very high load factor.
This factor is inevitably tied to the number of people making use of
telephone and telegraph services at each end. At the present stage
of technical development small countries cannot afford to spend the
necessary money to build ground terminal stations required for full
use of the satellite system, although some use of channels would be
available to them and they could afford limited terminal facilities, is
The economics of the satellite system are such that even transmissions
between the two coasts of the United States would be uneconomical
when compared with other systems, such as microwave relay or cable
telephone lines. This may not be true, however, for countries with
1, Under § 201(e) (1) of the act the FOC is given responsibility for establish-
ing charges for the corporation's services.
1_ See Estep & Kearse, Space Communication_ and the Law: Adequate Inter-
national Control After 1963f, 60 MICH. L. REv. 873 (1962) ; Persin, Will Space be
Open to Piracy?, 30 T_.LEC0_aMUNICATmN J. 112 (1963).
1_ The regular ground terminals are extremely expensive, but much smaller
ones capable of handling a few channels rather than hundreds might be within
the financial resources of developing countries.
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very large land masses and widely dispersed population centers, such
as Brazil or India.
8. The short-range viability of the Satellite Corporation is ex-
tremely dependent upon assurance that the U.S. Government and
the existing overseas carriers, such as AT&T, will make significant
use of the channels available through the satellite. Without substan-
tial use from these two sources, it is clearly unrealistic to think that
the message load would be sufficient to make the satellite system an
economically successful operation. This fact, when added to the need
for large amounts of capital if the Satellite Corporation is to put
up the necessary satellite equipment and also build and own the
ground terminals, leads to another economic conclusion that seems
inevitable to this writer--that the large communications common car-
riers must be vitally involved l_inancially in the operations of the
Satellite Corporation. Even if the necessary money could be raised
without help from the carriers, they should be involved, if only to
the extent of large stockholdings, in such a way that the absolute]y
essential coordination between the Satellite Corporation services and
those _furnished by existing communications common carriers will
be assured. 19 This does mean, of course, that there may be some con-
flict with the statutory dictate that the corporation foster competi-
tion in the furnishing and purchase of equipment and apparatus. 2°
Such corporations as AT&T and other carriers have their own sup-
plier affiliates in whom they have great faith and whose profits are
also important to the carrier corporation. This may be more of
a domestic than an international problem, but it has some interna-
tional repercussions. In any event, these companies and their sup-
plier affiliates are obviously working hard to create new and cheaper
communication systems, including cheaper underwater cables. For
the next 10 years, the economic advantage of the satellite communi-
cations system, if any, over underseas cables will be marginal at best,.
It is therefore essential, if the communications satellite system is to
be used sufficiently to make it economical, that there be real coordina-
tion between the services already available and those to be furnished
by the Satellite Corporation.
9. Another legal-economic fact of significance in analyzing the
satellite problems is the degree of foreign ownership and participa-
tion which is desirable, but which is limited by the Communications
Satellite Act, 21 at least so far as stock ownership is concerned. For-
_' There is reason to believe that several of the large communications carriers
will subscribe in substantial amounts.
s° COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE ACT OF 1962, §§ 102(e) & 201(e) (1).
Id., § 304(d).
SOMEINTERNATIONALASPECTS 161
eign persons or groups may not own, either directly or indirectly,
more than 20 percent of the Satellite Corporation's stock to be offered
to the general public. This means that if any one foreign group
owns all of this 20 percent, it could have a very significant impact
on the control of the Communications Satellite Corporation. Al-
though this is not likely to be the case, it is perfectly clear that foreign
communications groups, most of which are owned by governments,
will be most insistent upon having a large role in the establishment
and control of the communications satellite system. All existing evi-
dence from past associations between American concerns and foreign
groups shows that the latter want a significant voice in the operations
and a very substantial financial interest in the form of ownership
of equipment. There is every reason to think that they would like
to have, for example, at least the same rough 50-50 ownership ratio
which now exists between AT&T and the British Post Office in under-
seas cables. 22 Nothing in the U.S. statutes would preclude this kind
of arrangement between the Satellite Corporation and a foreign tele-
communications authority, but it could not be done in the form of
ownership of stock of the Communications Satellite Corporation
itself. Participation by/6reign groups in ownership o/the network,
however, is essential if a worldwide system is to succeed. The desire
of foreign countries to have a share of the facilities themselves ex-
tends also to the manufacture of parts and equipment, participation
in research, and perhaps even in launching operations. Each of these
countries, at least in the more industrialized areas of the world, will
undoubtedly want the right to furnish some of the equipment. Cer-
tainly the past experience of U.S. communications common carriers
which have established such links with foreign countries so indicates.
10. Another fact of space communications life is that international
political considerations will have a large influence on the operating
policies of the Satellite Corporation and its foreign partners. There
will be more direct government involvement in the actual operation
of corporate business than ever before. This will certainly be true in
the United States, where in the past such involvement has been indirect
and spasmodic at most. Even in Europe, where most of the com-
munication companies are government-owned, the same will be true.
Although they must go to public treasuries for funds, these govern-
ment-owned companies have, for most purposes, operated as separate
and independent bodies. Typically, the administrative personnel in
these countries have been able to make their decisions as businessmen
" Based on information provided by AT&T personnel. While details of own-
ership vary from agreement to agreement, this is the general pattern.
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operating a communications common carrier, rather than as officials
in the political arm of the government, and will probably continue to
do so for nonsatellite service. Nevertheless, the U.N. _ and the d6vel-
oping countries have already indicated their interest in the communi-
cations satellite system even though they do not have the technological
or economic facilities for creating or even participating in use of the
service in the near future. Therefore, the establishment of such a
system does have political ramifications of tremendous significance to
U.S. foreign policy. Several provisions of the Communications Satel-
lite Act itself take cognizance of these facts, z' which are known to
all who are working in this area. To greater extent than has ever
been the case in the past in international telecommunications, the
actions of the Communications Satellite Corporation will be of con-
cern to the foreign offices of many countries, and particularly to the
officials of the United States. The operating officials who have been
managing existing international communications carriers, both U.S.
and foreign and whether private or government-owned, are very re-
luctant to see the politicians begin to participate in communications
matters with any degree of directness. Nevertheless, in this writer's
opinion, the political arms of the various governments are going to par-
ticipate in considerably greater degree in the operating decisions of the
Communications Satellite Corporation and its counterparts abroad.
This could mean involvement of foreign-offices personnel. One con-
sequence of this prediction, if accurate, is that the traditional attitude
of the International Telecommunications Union engineers and other
technical communications experts, that their decisions are scientific
rather than political in character, may have to change. More and
more countries will come to recognize that even the frequency alloca-
tion decisions made by the International Telecommunications Union
are inherently political as well as technical matters.
11. Economically, and even technically and politically, the only
communications satellite service which makes sense is one which serves
all needs through one coordinated system, regardless of what method
or combination of methods is used. There may be some serious ques-
tion as to whether or not the satellite Corporation can persuade the
other countries of the world to accept the system developed and now
sponsored by the United States as the single operating unit. Cer-
tainly the U.S.S.R. is technically capable of creating such a system;
probably the European Community could soon have such capabilities
n See summary of U.N. actions and resolutions in Gardner, Uo6peration in
Outer f_pace, 41 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 344 (1963); SCHWARTZ & GOLDSEN, 0p. cir.
supra note 4, at 44-48.
J' See note 10 supra.
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as well. For a good many years, however, there would be no economic
sense in duplicating such service. If this is the case, as Schwartz and
Goldsen argue, 25 the Satellite Corporation must move "with all delib-
erate speed" in deciding on the course it will follow in negotiating
with foreign partners to put a system into operation. Realistically
the Satellite Corporation must start with a medium-altitude system
which will require from 12 to 18 and eventually 25 to 50 active repeater
satellites continuously in orbit; the signals transmitted will be very
weak. 2e If the service is to be economically competitive only a mini-
mum number of ground terminal facilities should be established, be-
cause the tracking of a medium-altitude, low-signal-strength satellite
is a difficult and complicated matter. Technical limitations may also
dictate this policy. It follows that hard choices must be made in
locating these facilities. For example, maximum economy dictates
that there should be only one or possibly two receiving units in Eu-
rope, although at the present time such units are in. existence or near-
ing completion in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy.
This does not make the best economic sense, but national pride if noth-
ing else may well require that each of the major countries have ground
terminals. Possibly some of the developing countries will want the
same prestige. If the system is to operate economically, this matter
will have to be solved in some realistic way. This problem would be
greatly reduced if regional cooperation could be achieved, as hopefully
will be the case in Europe. We should encourage such efforts.
12. Some have suggested that the size and character of the problems
involved in establishing an economically feasible system necessitate
the creation of an international body to operate the satellite service.
Certainly no existing international body is in any way equipped or
organized to handle this task. 27 Up to the present time the Inter-
national Telecommunications Union has been largely a technical organ
which limited its function to the allocation and coordination of fre-
quencies for various types of services and to formulation of technical
design and operating standards. The decision of what companies or
organizations are to use the frequencies within a given area has been
left to the individual countries to decide as they see fit._8 Secretary
General Gross of the ITU has stated that this body is not equipped
z Op. tit. supra note 4, at 71-74.
No other system has been proven to the point where large commitments of
money for an operating system's hardware should be spent. If another system
were used, a delay of at least several years would be necessary. See discussmn
in Heamngs, supra note 14, at 107-14, 191-93, 200-01, 293-96.
See discussions of these problems in SCHWARTZ _ GOLDSEN, Op. cir. supra
note 4, at 77--81 ; Estep & Kearse, supra note 17 ; Gardner, supra note 23, at 354.
Estep & Kearse, supra note 17.
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at the present time to handle this kind of job, although he now feels
it might be. 29 If an international group were to be formed to carry
out this function, and should the ITU be selected, great changes
would undoubtedly have to be made in its organization, and establish-
ment of the satellite system would be delayed for many years. There
would be no hope of having an operational system by 1967. At the
present time, of course, there is much opposition both within and with-
out the ITU to giving that body such regulatory power2 °
13. If the Telstar or Relay satellite is used, an area will be needed
around each ground terminal in which restrictions will have to be
placed on band and range of other radio broadcasts. The area, de-
pending upon the surrounding circumstances and terrain, may have
to be as large as 100 square miles or more to make sure that the signals
from other sources will not interfere with the very weak signals to
be received by the terminal station. Although in the United States
either the Satellite Corporation or private communications common
carriers will own the ground terminals, these U.S. organizations
will not generally own them in other countries. The only likely
exception is one or more of the areas where the United States might,
for foreign policy reasons, decide to furnish the money for such
facilities to developing countries which could not afford to pay for
them. The United States might also need to own terminals on some
of the developing continents such as Africa, South America, and Asia
to serve the rest of the countries by land channels.
In neither of these cases, however, is it likely that there will be
U.S. ownership, but rather only U.S. financial assistance. The legis-
lative history of the act indicates members of Congress did not contem-
plate such ownership of foreign ground facilities. 31 The establishment
of such expensive terminal facilities in developing areas where traffic
will not really carry the economic burden will create a difficult
problem for the Satellite Corporation because of its character as a
private profit-making concern. Nevertheless, in the long run it may
be essential that these be established to assure a single global system
operated jointly by the U.S. and its foreign partners. As suggested
by Schwartz and Goldsen, s2 any such uneconomical terminals should
be financed through regular foreign-aid channels as a foreign-affairs
Gross, Space Communications: The Need and Scope For Action, 29 T_LECOM-
MUNICATION J. 229 (1962).
Some of those within the ITU object principally because they do not want
the ITU making politically significant policy decisions while some of those on
the outside feel that it would be unwise to entrust such decisions to the ITU.
See, e.g., Statement of Newton Minow, FCC Chairman, during Hearings, supra
note 14, at 20.
= Op. cir. supra note 4, at 57-58.
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policy matter, rather than by the Satellite Corporation. Undoubt-
edly, this will disappoint the expectations of some Congressmen as
expressed in hearings = on the desirability of having the Satellite
Corporation bear a great deal of the cost of developing the satellite
system. In any event, financial assistance would be needed only
for these uneconomical ground facilities. None should be required
for launching operations. For these the Government should be fully
recompensed by the operating company2 *
14. The same satellites which will be used to communicate between
the major communications centers such as the United States and
Europe can be made available for service between other points when
they are over other parts of the world and not in use for the United
States-Europe service. For example, the same satellites that will
transmit signals between New York and London, Paris, Rome, or
Munich could be used during much of the time of one orbit around
the earth to transmit signals from London to Delhi, or Delhi to
Tokyo. Use of satellite channels between these non-U.S, terminals
might be treated simply as a service which could be sold to these
other countries by the Satellite Corporation. U.S. terminal facilities
would not be used and there would not have to be any connection with
existing consumer services in this country or even in Europe. On the
other hand, a totally integrated global communication system would be
the best for all concerned. Therefore, here again the Satellite Cor-
poration might decide to lease th4 channels to existing carriers who
would themselves make arrangements with countries throughout the
world for use of the available channel time that is not being used
between the major traffic areas.
15. Another technological and economic fact of life must be kept
in mind in establishing the communications satellite system. The
cooperation of the Government, particularly through NASA and
to some extent the Defense Department, is absolutely essential to the
success of the operation. A good deal of the work even on the
development of the satellites themselves, not to mention all the work
on the launching vehicles, was done at Government expense, largely
through NASA. Early realization of our goal of establishing a
communications satellite system is absolutely dependent upon taking
advantage of this great pool of Government knowledge and facilities.
With respect to Telstar, of course, AT&T developed and built the
satellites with its own money, and also paid for the launching. This
= Supra note 11.
Such compensation was made by AT&T for Telstars 1 and 2 and this writer
is convinced that a fair price was paid. See discussions of the problem in
Hearings, supra note 14, at 263-64.
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was not true of Relay, however, and in any event, Government
launching facilities must be used, even though launching expenses
could be paid by ComSat. Certainly the number of communications
launches that would be needed over a period of years would not
justify establishment of a separate launching facility by the Com-
munications Satellite Corporation.
Even though the Government has put tremendous amounts of
money into research and development of rocketry and some money into
communications satellite aspects of the program, _5 it is unrealistic
and doctrinaire to think of this as a give-away to private industry.
This great public expense should not preclude turning over the use of
these facilities or knowledge to private enterprise if private enterprise
van utilize them best for the benefit of the most people.
In any event, it is important that extensive cooperation from NASA
be continued, if for no other reason than that it is necessary to
launch the satellites. If only medium-altitude, active repeater satel-
lites are used, anywhere from 25 to 50 will be needed to have a con-
tinuously serviceable channel having about 99 percent reliability.
Just to launch this number within a relatively short period of time
will be a formidable task. Even if one could be launched every
other day--a very unrealistic expectation in view of existing launching
facilities--from 50 to 100 days would be needed. It is one thing to
launch an occasional Telstar, Relay, or Syncom satellite. It is quite
another to launch a whole series over a short period of time. Actually
the very reliable Thor-Delta boosters which have been used to launch
Relay and Telstar are not powerful enough to do the job for the
permanent operational system. Threfore, greater reliability will have
to be developed in the more powerful Atlas-Agena vehicles, or new
vehicles now being developed by NASA and the Defense Depart-
ment will have to be used. With these new rocketry developments
it should be possible to have a multiple launching of three or more
satellites simultaneously from one rocket vehicle. It would be ridic-
ulous not to use this kind of research and development effort, al-
though financed by the federal government. In any event, a very
close working relationship must be established between NASA and
the Communications Satellite Corporation.
Of the severalbillionsof dollarsinvested in our space program to date,much
has gone for installationsand hardware such as launching and tracking stations
and missiles. Perhaps as much as $283 million has gone into general communi-
cations related research. See discussionsin Hearings, supra note 14,at 65-66;
Hearings, supra note 11,at 74. The Defense Department isalsospending perhaps
$100 milliona year on communications satellitework. See Hearings, supra note
14, at 300. NASA proposes to spend $55 million in fiscal 1964. Hearings, supra
note 11, at 88-92.
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When all of these facts or assumptions are taken into consideration,
it is obvious that there are many conflicting policies and forces at
work in the creation of a communications satellite system ready to
operate in the international telecommunications service. As others
have pointed out, _e it will not be possible to satisfy all of these require-
ments; compromises will have to be made. In approaching the
problem, however, the paramount concern of all those involved should
be to place a reliable and usable system in orbit at the earliest possible
moment. Inevitably there will be a great deal of Government control
of the whole venture; this would be true regardless of who legally
owned the facilities. In spite of all the difficulties--economic, tech-
nical, and political--it is essential that the overall goal be kept in
mind : to get the system in operation as soon as feasible.
If these assumptions are correct, several major problems having
considerable international significance are raised by the creation and
operation of the communications satellite system.
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS
One of the very first nontechnical decisions which the Satellite Cor-
poration officials will have to make is the degree to which they will
conduct negotiations with communications administrations of other
countries. Although the officers of the corporation have been so
recently selected that they have had no occasion to make any state-
ments about these matters, a significant conflict could arise between
the business interests and such agencies of the U.S. Government as
the State Department. Certainly Secretary of State Rusk in his
colloquy with Senator Sparkman during the hearings on the bill in
August 1962 made it clear that many of the problems of negotiation
were to be dealt with by the State Department2 _ They were un-
doubtedly attempting to create legislative history to support this in-
terpretation of the act. On the other hand, representatives of business
have made it equally clear in their statements that they consider most
of the international negotiations to come within the statutory concept
of "business negotiations" and that past operating experience demon-
N SCHWARTZ & GOLDSEN, 0p. C/t. supra note 4, at 1-3.
Hearings, supra note 14, at 178-81. See also exchange between Senator Gore
and Secretary of State Rusk, id. at 209-13, and other testimony concerning the
meaning of "business negotiations," id. at 426-31.
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strates the validity of this approach28 Section 402 places responsi-
bility for such matters on the corporation itself, although notification
must always be given to the State Department.
Government officials, on the other hand, can point to the language
of section 201 (a) (4) and (5) which states that
IT]he President shall . . . exercise such supervision over relationships of the
corporation with foreign governments or entities or with international bodies
as may be appropriate to assure that such relationships shall be consistent with
the national interest and foreign policy of the United States; . . . [and shall]
insure that timely arrangements are made . . . [for] foreign participation In
the establishment and use of a communications satellite system ....
They can also point to section 201 (c) (3) which states that the Secre-
tary of State may determine that a particular foreign point should be
connected with the satellite system. When he does so the FCC is then
directed to "institute forthwith appropriate proceedings . . . to re-
quire the establishment of such communication by the corporation
and the appropriate common carrier or carriers .... " Surely this
question of which things are within the prerogative of the Secretary
of State will prove to be one of the most critical of all those presented
by this new system of communications, although many expect or at
least hope that this matter will be handled in the same way that pre-
vious international telecommunications negotiations have been
handled.
In this writer's opinion, this problem creates the most nearly unique
question raised by the Communications Satellite Act. Personal ob-
servations in the atomic-energy area have left the strong impression
that European businessmen and government officials work much more
closely with each other in establishing overall national government
and business policies than has been true in this country, s9 At the
risk of overgeneralizing from experience in this one area and without
tracing the history of why this is so, the picture in this country is
quite a different one. In general, there tends to be something of an
arm's length attitude between Government and business, each being
somewhat skeptical of the other. This may be attributable to a sus-
picion of the motives of the other, or a feeling of lack of understand-
ing on the part of the other for one's own problems and needs. In
u Much, but not all, of the negotiating between American carriers and their
foreign counterparts has been accomplished withou_ calling on the State Depart-
ment for help. See testimony of Mr. Farley of the State Department, Hearings
on Antitrust Problems o! the Space Satellite _ommunivations System Belore the
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Ju-
diciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 99-100 (1962).
m This cannot be proven by any specific evidence, but the impression was a
very strong one.
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this country, in fact, we have traditionally been very suspicious of too
close cooperation between Government officials and businessmen out
of fear that there will be some kind of overreaching, although this is
less true in the communications industry than most others, perhaps
partly because of the extremely technical nature of foreign negotia-
tions in this field. In other areas some such fear is certainly justified,
but in this case, where we have an already highly regulated industry
which has worked well in close cooperation with the Government, it
is crucial that there be no reluctance to work out common policies
which will serve our foreign relations needs and also make possible
such reasonable business decisions as are required to operate a viable
Satellite Corporation.
Negotiations for establishment of land terminals for transocean
cables and long-range radio have thus far been almost wholly a mat-
ter of business negotiations between private U.S. companies and their
foreign counterparts. These arrangements cover the questions of
responsibility for design and construction of the various parts of the
systems, including the terminal facilities; the division of ownership
between the various parties; the responsibilities for maintenance; and
circuit assignments, including the number of circuits each party may
use. Typically the ownership of the equipment is in the form of un-
divided shares, and the capital contributions as well as maintenance
andrepair costs are split in proportion to the relative use of available
channels. Separate agreements have usually covered the questions
of services to be rendered jointly and the division of revenues. The
arrangements between AT&T and the British and Canadian com-
panies for the first transatlantic cable were of this type. The same
pattern was followed in the second transatlantic cable, which was a
joint project of AT&T and the French and German telecommunica-
tions administrations. These arrangements well illustrate the tech-
nique of working out busic terms and principles with major partners
and then permitting other users to share some of the available facili-
ties on the same basis. The French-German agreement soon became
a multilateral one involving many European countries.
Even assuming similar arrangements for communications satellites,
the real question is whether ComSat or the State Department will do
the negotiating. This decision cannot be made intelligently if the
skeptical, arm's length attitude which has existed in the past in many
other areas of international business is assumed by either party. It
must be a joint venture. On the other hand, one is inclined to think
that it will be much wiser if the lead in negotiations can be taken by
corporate officials. If State Department officials can be convinced that
U.S. foreign affairs policies will be given proper attention by the
728-323 O---64--12
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corporate officials, this may be possible. It may prove necessary, how-
ever, to make distinctions between various matters and have the lead
taken by Government officials on some, leaving others to corporate
personnel.
The location of ground terminal facilities in foreign areas is a good
example to illustrate the basic problems here suggested. Some have
argued that this is a political matter which should be handled by the
State Department. 4° But officials of existing common carriers will
undoubtedly hope that the Satellite Corporation itself will handle these
negotiations. 41 Location of such facilities is an extremely important
operational matter, vital to the whole system, as pointed out above in
the assumptions. Certainly the choice of sites for ground terminal
facilities in regional areas such as Africa, South America, and Asia,
not to mention the much more immediate problem of locations within
Europe, will create serious negotiation problems and may well involve
important foreign-policy questions. Nevertheless, the primary con-
cern in the first few years should be to put a viable system in operation.
Therefore, the first terminal facilities will have to be in Europe and,
in fact, it would probably be wise to limit the operation initially to
this area. Unless operations between the United States and Europe
are successful, a self-supporting global system is impossible for a long
time to come. For at least the first 5 years, business expediency should
determine whether one system or another is to be used, whether one
or more ground terminals are to be built in Europe, what types of s_rv-
ice will be offered, and what satellite channel-rental rates will be
charged, although this last item will create troublesome regulatory
problems for the FCC. 42 This will not be a disservice to the develop-
ing areas in those continents where full-fledged service and terminal
facilities will not be established for some time. The system should be
proved in the areas where it is most likely to be economically feasible;
not until this has been done should these other countries invest the
time, money, and trained personnel needed to build and operate such
facilities. Nevertheless, the public repercussions and consequent pres-
sures of such a decision may be very great. Therefore, the decisions
cannot be made by ComSat without regard to the political position of
the United States as a government. But the lead in actual negotia-
tions could be placed in the hands of corporation officials. The politi-
cal problem will be made somewhat less critical, of course, by the fact
that establishment of the main service does not preclude incidental use
u _upra note 37.
'_ See discussions of this general problem, ibid.
'_ Chairman Minow of the FCC, in his testimony, pointed to this difficulty.
Hearings, supra note 14, at 60. See also id. at 118-24.
SOME INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 171
forlesscompleteservicestoareaswithfewerdemands forinternational
telecommunications.
An equallydelicateproblemhavingbothbusinessand foreign-policy
overtonesisthatof dividingthe revenueswith othercountrieswhich
help establishand have jointownership of the system. This willbe
an even greaterproblem,and expensesas wellas revenueswillbe
involved,when other countriesjoinafterthe systemis established.
Privatelyowned communicationscommon carriersinthiscountryhave,
todate,beenabletowork outsatisfactoryarrangementsintheirinter-
nationalnegotiationswith theircounterpartsabroad. For the most
part,roughlya 50-50basishasbeenusedforsharingownership,supply
of equipment,maintenancecosts,and revenues. In connectionwith
thecommunicationssatellitesystem,however,thisproblemwillnot be
soeasytosolve.
One obviousexample of thisproblem isdetermininghow much of
thedevelopmentcostsalreadyincurredby theU.S.Government should
be allocatedtoeachone oftheforeigncountriesthatwishestojointhe
system eitherinitiallyor later.An argument could be made for
chargingnot onlyforallofthedevelopmentcostsofTelstarand Relay
but alsosomething for the costof researchand developmentof the
launchingsystems. On the other hand, ifa realisticcompensatory
charge ismade for thiscontributionthe figurewould be extremely
high. For some of thecountries,particularlyinthedevelopingareas
but probably alsoinEurope,the amount might be sohighastoblock
effectivelytheirparticipation.In thiswriter'sopinion,expenditures
for rocketrydevelopmentshouldnot be chargedto our foreignpart-
ners. In addition,sucha chargemight wellcausesuchcountriesasthe
U.S.S.R.or aEuropean group toinsiston useoftheirown vehiclesand
launchingfacilities.The rate-basequestionshouldnotbe a verylarge
factorin thesedecisionsbecausesurelythe ratewillhave to be rea-
sonably competitivewith costsof Iong-ranguradioand underseas
cables.The chiefconsequenceofa highratebasewillbetoreducethe
possibilityof realizingprofitsforthestockholderswithina reasonable
number of years,althoughcapital-valueappreciationwillprobablybe
theonlyrealdividendforseveralyearsinany case.
Rather than have foreignpartnersjointlyown thesatellitesystem,
one possiblesolutionto thisproblem would be for theSatelliteCor-
porationto placethe satellitesin orbitand then turnover to U.S.
internationalcarriersthe rightto use the channels.The overseas
carrierscouldthen negotiatein the traditionalway on such matters
asownershipand divisionofrevenues. Ifthissolutionwere adopted,
however, the foreign companies could not have ownership in the
equipment itselfotherthan intheirown ground terminals,inasmuch
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as the U.S. common cartier would not have any title to sell, but only
•_ right to use the channels. It is almost certain, therefore, that
foreign countries would not accept this arrangement.
In the alternative, the Satellite Corporation could make arrange-
ments with foreign countries for ownership, and agree on costs to be
charged to the other countries who subsequently want to join in the
project. Even in this situation, of course, the State Department
would not have to participate if it was satisfied that the arrange-
ments also served U.S. foreign policies. Under either approach it
would not be necessary to charge other countries for rocketry develop-
ment expenses, and in fact such charges should not be made. Because
these expenses were incurred primarily for our own military pur-
poses, foreign countries would be loath to help pay for them, quite
aside from considerations of cost. On the other hand, if a reason-
able charge is made for the basic research and development work
contributed by the United States Government, developing countries
can be practically excluded from participation without giving the
appearance of discriminating against them.
This decision will not be easy to make, and certainly it cannot be
made without proper regard for foreign policy matters. Neverthe-
less, if a close working relationship could be created between the
State Department and the Satellite Corporation officials, as has been
possible in the past between communications common carriers and
the Department, it would be much better for the corporation officials
themselves to negotiate these arrangements with their counterpart
administrations in foreign countries.
Another problem related to this question of the division of nego-
tiating roles between the Satellite Corporation and the State Depart-
ment arises in connection with the customers that may want to make
use of the communications satellite facilities. One example of this
problem is the degree to which U.S. Government requirements for
international communications services are met by use of satellite chan-
nels. At the present time U.S. communications common carriers
lease channels to the U.S. Government for use in military and diplo-
matic communications. This service is dependent upon the coopera-
tion of other countries. So far, at least, no serious difficulties have
been raised in these countries about carrying such messages over what
are clearly international communication lines running through their
territory. Whether or not the same kind of willingness to accept
these messages will carry over into the comnmnications satellite sys-
tem is a question that cannot now be answered, but past experience
indicates that there will be no problem if the facilities are privately
owned and operated.
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If the Federal Government should set up its own separate satellite
system to carry messages_ particularly of a military or secret diplo-
matic nature, as it fully intends to do_ a problem could be created
for ComSat. At least at the beginning_ it is hard to believe that the
satellite system can be economically operated without the message
load provided by our diplomatic and military agencies' needs for
international communications. Actually, the reasons for a separate
Government satellite system are not to reduce costs, but to provide
a system cryptographically secure and relatively immune to incapaci-
tating jamming. There is every reason to expect continuance of the
present policy of making maximum use of private carrier facilities
for most Government international messages. _s
Perhaps here again the negotiations problem can be minimized if
the Satellite Corporation itself is given the primary negotiating au-
thority, provided there is a close working relationship with the State
Department. In this way it would be possible for the privately
owned U.S. international carrier to agree with its counterparts abroad
that this was no more than what all carriers do--that is, lease channels
to any customer, including military and diplomatic agencies of any
government.
The question of State Department or corporation primacy in for-
eign negotiations becomes most sensitive when relationships with the
U.S.S.R. are involved. At present the position of the U.S.S.R. with
respect to joining a satellite system established primarily with U.S.
ideas, materials, and money cannot be known. Some statements made
in 1961 and 1962 indicate that the U.S.S.R. might be willing to coop-
erate. _ On the other hand, the Soviets have not taken any clear-cut
line in these matters and here, as in other areas, their position will un-
doubtedly derive from their overall foreign affairs policy. A realis-
tic U.S. position on this question again might be worked out through
the Satellite Corporation itself, although this certainly is much more
debatable than in the other cases suggested above.
Some European and other countries have shown enough interest in
joining a communications satellite system for us to go ahead regardless
of what position is taken by the U.S.S.R. In general, there may be
a greater chance for cooperation if the satellite communications chan-
nels are simply fitted into existing normal operating procedures of
overseas communications, the channels then becoming an alternate
route for sending messages. At the present time, our carriers have
been able to work out satisfactory arrangements with the operating
personnel in the U.S.S.R., and relations have been maintained with
'*See testimony of Secretary of Defense McNamara,/d. at 290,304.
See discussion of the attitude of the Soviet Union, SCHWARTZ& GOLSEN, Op.
bit. supra note 4, at 41-50. See also Gardner, supra note 23.
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Castro's Cuba. Here again, perhaps we would be wise to treat the
system as simply another communication channel. If this is not
feasible, of course, the question whether to go ahead with the system on
our own in spite of a failure by the U.S.S.R., and perhaps others, to
join, will be presented. In this writer's opinion, we would be well
advised to go ahead with establishment of a system with those coun-
tries who want to participate. If we move fairly rapidly there is every
reason to believe that some European countries will join us.
In the future a very difficult matter involving much greater foreign-
policy effects will arise when it becomes possible to have general
broadcasting directly to home receivers without the intervention of
the terminal facilities required for Telstar or Relay. Nevertheless,
as stated before, the initial operation, probably for a good 10 years,
will undoubtedly be in the form of a message and channel service,
much as is now provided by telephone cables and long-range radio.
The necessary operating arrangements including the division of
ownership, service revenues, and other aspects of operation, should
be worked out as far as possible through normal procedures of inter-
national carriers. Thus it will be possible to determine the technical
and operational feasibility of the system before worrying about other
problems which will involve much greater political-policy questions
than the ordinary message service. _5
Another very important policy question demanding an early de-
cision from the Satellite Corporation is the price to be charged for
satellite channels. As stated before, this writer believes the pricing
policy will have to be answered primarily in terms of the costs of
existing cable and radio channels; communications common carriers
cannot charge a significantly higher or lower price for messages car-
ried over satellite channels. Existing facilities as well as the new ones
must be used nearly to capacity, and a substantial difference in
charges would upset the balance. It would be best if all of the vari-
ous channels, the total nonvoting investment of the carriers, and the
many services are considered as a whole in establishing reasonable
charges which will assure a fair return. Here again, this can be
achieved more easily in the long run if the common carriers themselves
are given the primary policy-making role, subject, of course, to rate
regulations.
a See Estep & Kearse, supra note 17. See also testimony of Mr. Carter of the
State Department, Hearings on Commercial Communications Satellites Belore the
Subcommittee on Applications and Tracking and Data Acquisition ol the House
Committee on Science and Astronautics, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 149 (1962) ; Testi-
mony of Mr. Murrow, USIA Director, Hearings, supra note 14, at 154.
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At least in the beginning, the Government should not set special
rates merely to make the system appear to be an economic success or
to make it more attractive to developing countries. If some subsidy
is to be granted to certain areas of the world or to certain countries,
this should be in the form of direct financial grants to these countries
as a part of our foreign assistance program.
One great potential difficulty with the suggestion frequently made
above, that ComSat carry out most of the negotiations concerning
foreign participation, is that foreign offices of other countries might
take over negotiations from their communications carriers, whether
publicly or privately owned. If this should happen, our own State
Department would feel under great pressure to assume the lead, rather
than leave it to corporate personnel. Perhaps the only feasible solu-
tion would be to form an offc/a/negotiating team for the United States
made up of both industry and Government personnel. This has been
done in the past in an informal way _e but now may be the time to
create such a group on a formal, official basis. The question of who
takes the lead in negotiations will still be an important and perhaps
delicate question, and various situations might have to be distin-
guished in deciding it. Keeping the team stable, however, should
build mutual confidence and respect, and close cooperation could be
achieved with a minimum of wasted motion and friction. Certainly
as to ITU, frequency allocations, and perhaps location of ground
terminals, it would be necessary to have a Government agent speak
officially for the United States. On most other matters, surely corpo-
rate personnel could take the lead, and even on the matters named
it is essential that an industry-Government official team participate
in formulating the policy to be followed by all U.S. groups and speak
for the United States in most cases. If the negotiating team is made
the official U.S. spokesman, it is of no legal concern to other countries
that industry people are included any more than it is our legal con-
cern that government personnel run communications in other coun-
tries, including the U.S.S.R. 4_
,e This is exemplified by the communications negotiations carried out in the past
through ITU where representatives from private industry have worked closely
with State Department officials and have attended ITU conferences.
Russia has been taking the propaganda line that only governments should
launch and operate vehicles in space and will perhaps seek to embarrass the U.S.
position of making use of a profit-making private corporation. See colloquy
between Senator Morse and Director Murrow, Hearings, supra note 14, at 156.
They unsuccessfully proposed this viewpoint before the Legal Subcommittee of
the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. See
SCHWARTZ & GOLDSEN, Op. cir. Supra note 4, at 45-48. See also Gardner, supra
note 23.
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The proper relationship between the State Department and the
Satellite Corporation in negotiations with foreign countries is also
involved in applying the "most favored nation" provisions found in
our commercial treaties with foreign countries. Although this will
be discussed later¢ 8 a good working relationship between the Satellite
Corporation and the Federal Government on this matter is clearly
necessary because of the possibility of violation of our treaty agree-
ments. In this area it is essential that some kind of State Depart-
ment approval be obtained. This will undoubtedly cause consid-
erable delays in the establishment of the system if all arrangements
must be made on a come-one-come-all basis even though an economical
service, at least at the beginning, will _ecessarily be limited to Europe
and possibly one or two other places.
RELATIONSHIPS WITH INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION
The official agenda of the 1963 Conference does not include consid-
eration of any fundamental reorganization of the International Tele-
communications Union. Instead, it will be limited to frequency allo-
cations. In preparation for this fall conference, some of the major
countries have reached agreement as to the general character of the
frequency allocations that should be made for space communications.
If, as is hoped, these allocations, largely suggested by the United
States, are adopted, it will be possible to use a Telstar or Relay
system. This strictly limited agenda for the Geneva Conference will
not resolve some important problems that will certainly arise in the
future. But neither will the official agenda preclude informal dis-
cussion during the conference of the need for reorganization of inter-
national regulatory bodies. It is worthwhile, therefore, to point out
some questions which will be raised by the establishment of a com-
munications satellite system.
One involves registration of use of frequencies allotted to space
communications. The necessity for interference coordination around
the very sensitive receiving and sending ground terminals has already
been mentioned. In the United States this will probably not create
too much difficulty because of the large expanse of land and the
possibility of finding a sheltered area close to places where the signals
can be connected into the regular communications service within the
country. The same may not be true in Europe, where density of
population, scarcity of land, and flat terrain may make location a
real problem. In some situations the potential interference zone
might cut across national boundaries. Therefore, for the first time
48 See text accompanying and following note 61 ialra.
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it may become necessary for the ITU to regulate and register re-
ceiving stations specifically? 9 At present, through the CCIR, sug-
gestions as to power levels and zones are made and users have adhered
to them without legal sanctions. This might work for s_tellite receiv-
ing equipment. In general, only sending stations have been required
to register to assure noninterference, but it may be necessary to register
the sensitive satellite-system receiving stations as well. Existing rules
might be used because the receiving terminal is also typically the send-
ing station. Nevertheless, the real problem certainly arises in con-
nection with receiving, and this may present some difficulty under
existing ITU procedures.
Another problem could arise if military systems are established.
Although military communications are generally considered exempt
from the ITU regulation% 5° a question can occur if the military needs
of a country such as the U.S.S.R. or the United States make it desirable
or necessary to create separate military communications satellite sys-
tems. Certainly our own government is interested in this possibility.
If one is established, the international regulatory problem will be
much greater than is the case with existing military communications.
The signal strength and transmitting characteristics of an orbiting
satellite must be compatible with existing ground uses because the
same frequencies now being used for microwave transmissions from
point to point on the ground will probably be used for communica-
tions satellite transmissions. This raises the very serious question
whether we can continue to exempt military communications from
ITU regulation.
Revision of this provision is not an item on the agenda for the 1963
Conference and, in fact, it could not be; but it is a matter calling for
relatively immediate attention when countries such as the United
States do create a separate military communications satellite network:
Perhaps inauguration of such systems will be the opening wedge per-
mitting a reevaluation of this exemption of military communications
from ITU regulations. This potential interference probably makes
necessary registration and regulation of military communications
satellite systems, at least in peacetime. Otherwise the limited bands
which will be made available for nonmilitary communications satellite
services might be made useless for reliable transmission. If a hot war
should occur, of course, the ITU regulations will be disregarded, but
For a description of existing procedures as to registration and criticisms
concerning them, see Estep & Kearse, supra note 17; Glazer, The Law-Making
Treaties oI International TelecommuNication Union Through Time and in Space,
60 MICH. L. REv. 269 (1962).
5o See discussion in Estep & Kearse, supra note 17, a¢ 890-94.
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during peacetime there is much to be said for bringing military com-
munications_ at least those accomplished via satellites, within the regu-
latory power of the ITU. One of the matters badly in need of
clarification through ITU procedures is the definition of military
installations, particularly as it applies to space. 5_ Under existing pro-
visions_ to mention only one problem, it will be ahnost impossible to
determine the military character of observation_ as opposed to spy,
satellites.
Another crucial issue is that of providing for the case where inter-
ference does occur. The important deficiencies presently existing in
the enforcement powers of the ITU have been discussed elsewhere. _2
The creation of a commercial communications satellite system presents
a perfect opportunity to formulate some method for strengthening the
enforcement provisions of the ITU convention and regulations. Some
type of compulsory arbitration or adjudication should probably be
adopted. Because the use of the frequencies now proposed will over-
lap with existing microwave uses_ disputes will inevitably arise. Pos-
sibly a specialized court could be created to handle these disputes, such
as that which now handles disputes within the common-market coun-
tries2 s Such a court might be acceptable for this specialized pur-
pose and might even demonstrate the feasibility of greater use of
international judicial tribunals to solve international disputes
generally.
The problem of international regulations in this area will become
much more acute when a general broadcasting system is put into use_
as it surely will be at some time in the future. When direct broad-
casts are made from the satellite to home receivers the question of
allocation of frequencies becomes an extremely crucial one with seri-
ous political ramifications. Such a system would be open for use as
a propaganda medium. Although one can always hope such chan-
nels would be used solely for educational and news purposes, this
would be unrealistic in the light of past experience. If they were
used for propaganda purposes the likelihood of jamming, with its
consequence of rendering the whole system inoperable, would become
particularly relevant2 4 On the other hand_ if some attempt is made
to control the content of such broadcasts_ very serious censorship prob-
lems will arise. Our theories of noninterference by government with
normal channels of communications to the general public are not
sl Ibid.
m Estep & Kearse, supra note 17 ; Glazer, supra note 49.
5, The European court is discussed in 1 ST_IN & NICHOLSON, AMERICAN ENTER-
PRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET: A LEGAL PROFILE 68--72 o(1960).
s, See Estep & Kearse, supra note 17.
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accepted by many other countries. One fact, however_ should be em-
phasized in considering this problem : general broadcasting should be
clearly distinguished from the message and channel services which
would be available under the presently proposed satellite system.
This is true not only as to regulatory policy criteria but also tech-
nically, because different frequencies and even separate satellites
would be used.
It is not too early to consider what kind of international control of
such general broadcasts should be adopted. If this is to be done, the
general character of the ITU will obviously have to be changed signifi-
cantly and perhaps some use might be made of a specialized tri-
bunal to license such broadcasts. In making these decisions, however,
it would be important to draw clear lines, to the extent this is possible,
between these general broadcasts and normal message services such
as are now provided by long-range radio and underseas cables. Ba-
sically, general broadcasts would very likely be a continuation of the
services now performed by the U.S. Information Agency and it would
be unwise to mix this with the message services, at least if propaganda
broadcasts were involved. One the other handy one cannot really
divorce news and general-education programs from propaganda broad-
casts. Such broadcasts in any event, even though not of a military
character, might be considered aggressive acts and dangerous to the
security of some country. Under present ITU regulations jamming
in such cases would not be precluded2 5 Jamming an active repeater
satellite at the present time would not be difficult if the satellites were
constructed to make maximum use of the transmission capabilities of
Telstar or Relay. If one had to build a system to preclude jamming,
utilization of the available power and channels would be cut so dras-
tically that the system would not be economically feasible. Jamming
has not been a problem in the past, however, even in wartime, when
radio transmissions were used for the normal message service.
Another problem area in which the services of ITU might be very
helpful is that of equipment compatibility. If the Satellite Corpora-
tion, with the advice of our Government agencies, should unilaterally
decide what equipment to use, at least for the initial system, this
would have tremendous long-range repercussions for other countries
which might later want to participate. These other countries will
have to be given some voice in the initial decision on equipment to be
used; equipment incompatibility would otherwise become a serious
matter. The FCC will have to take this into account in its regula-
tions concerning equipment_ and it must not be ignored in informal
negotiations at the Geneva Conference when frequency allocations are
u l& at 890.
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made. Without doubt the best weapon other countries have in this
bargaining process is that of allocation of frequencies for space com-
munications. The very narrow research and band limitations now
imposed under the 1959 allocation make an operational commercial
system impractical. 56 Therefore, it is essential that the proposals put
forth by the United States and others for broader allocations of
frequencies for space communications be accepted. It is important,
then, to reach agreement, probably through the ITU, on standards
which will assure equipment compatibility and provide nations not
yet ready to participate a reasonable opportunity to become a part
of the global system sometime in the future. The problem has been
solved successfully as to cables and radio transmissions in the past,
and this experience should be followed as to satellite equipment.
In any event, within 1 year, thinking has changed somewhat con-
cerning the role to be played by ITU. Speeches made by Secretary
General Gross of ITU in October 1961 5_ and February 1963 5s indi-
cate a significant shift concerning the desirability of giving some real
regulatory responsibilities to the Union. This would significantly
change the role of the ITU, but very likely some such regulatory
role will have to be played by that body. The Communications Sate]-
lite Corporation and the State Department must take cognizance of
this fact; they must take into account the desires and rights of other
countries. Ultimately, some type of international regulation will be
imposed. If the type of organization and the regulatory pattern can
be developed in the early stages before there are too many vested in-
terests in the area, the problem will be easier to solve. This is a vital
policy question needing immediate attention.
NATIONAL PRIORITIES
With what areas or countries will we first establish a communica-
tions satellite system? The economic and technical matters which
give rise to this problem have already been set out. If, as the 1962
Act contemplates, the corporation is to make profits, agreements
must be made first with England and Europe, where even one or
two ground terminals would make it possible to connect into terres-
trial facilities throughout 1he continent. The European connection
5, Id. at 886-87.
Address by Secretary General Gross, The ITU and Space Communications,
Twelfth International Astronautical Congress, Washington, D.C., Oct. 4, 1961.
Address by Secretary General Gross, Telecommunications and the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Conference on the Applications of Science and Tech-
nology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas; Feb. 1963. (Though deliv-
ered in Feb. 1963, the speech is dated Oct. 1962.)
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could be with major countries such as France, Germany, and Italy,
or hopefully with a multilateral European operating group. If the
fastest possible establishment of an operational and economical sys-
tem is our goal, there is no alternative. Such a decision, however,
would raise a very interesting legal problem under existing commer-
cial treaties which the United States has executed with many other
countries.
Germany and Denmark can be used as examples to illustrate this
problem. One is a potential terminal country, the other is not. Our
treaties with both of these countries contain the typical "most favored
nation" and "national treatment" clauses. The peculiar bifurcated
nature of the Satellite Corporation raises some rather interesting
possibilities under these provisions. Even though a later act of Con-
gress will supersede an earlier treaty 59and, therefore, the provisions
cf the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 supersede any incon,
sistent treaty clauses, it would be unwise to violate our international
agreements, no matter what the domestic law on this matter may be.
If the corporation should decide, for economic reasons, to make con-
nections only with Germany, would this be considered a violation of
our governmental obligations to Denmark under these two treaty
clauses, if Denmark requested the same privilege _.
Article XVII(2)(c) of the treaty with Denmark 6oprovides that
each Party must give the other's "nationals, companies and commerce"
"fair and equitable treatment" as compared with any third country
"with respect to . . . the sale of any service sold by the Government
or by any monopoly or agency granted exclusive or special privi-
leges." If the Satellite Corporation were considered the U.S. Gov-
ernment, Denmark could argue that it had a right to full terminal
facilities on the same sharing basis as that granted to Germany, even
though ComSat would not want to contribute its share because the
amount of traffic would not justify this expenditure. Denmark might
be willing to do so for reasons of national prestige and could claim
that it had a right to the same U.S. contribution made to establish
a connection with Germany.
If the Satellite Corporation were truly a privately owned company,
even though regulated as a common carrier, surely no difficulty would
arise under existing treaty obligations. It has never been suggested
that AT&T's decision to lay a cable first to Great Britain, then to
France and Germany, and eventually to a few other places in the
_Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S.
581 (1889).
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation With Denmark, Oct. 1, 1951,
T.LA.S. No. 4797.
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world in any way violates the "most favored nation" clause. On
the other hand, if the satellite system were owned by the Government
itself, there would be a serious problem of whether we could offer
to share expenses with a few countries and refuse such rights to others
who might wish to participate on the usual "joint ownership deter-
mined by use" basis possibly applied in agreements with those groups
having large concentrations of communication customers. The an-
swer to this question may depend upon whether the Satellite Corpora-
tion .is a private or a Government operation, at least for purposes of
application of these treaty provisions.
As pointed out before, the corporation is sui generis so there are
no clear authorities or precedents which give a satisfactory answer
to this question. In many respects, as indicated in the initial state-
ment of facts and assumptions, the Satellite Corporation nominally
is a private company. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Secretary of
State Rusk and other federal officials, many provisions in the act
attempt to insure that the policies of the corporation will be consistent
with those of the U.S. Government.
In at least one case corporate policy can be dictated by the Govern-
ment. The Government can apparently insist that ComSat take
whatever steps are necessary to permit connections with countries
which construct the necessary ground terminals, even if, for economic
reasons, the Satellite Corporation would not desire connection with
such places21 From this it might be argued that the making of
these important decisions, particularly those dealing with establish-
ment of ground terminals, constitutes U.S. Government action. On
the other hand, in recent hearings before the Senate Commerce Com-
mittee concerning approval of the initial incorporators appointed
by President Kennedy, the Attorney General took the position that
the Satellite Corporation is not a Government agency for purposes,
inter alia, of the federal-employee conflict-of-interest statute. 62 Em-
ployees, including subsequent officers as well as the original incorpo-
rators, are not Government employees because the corporation itself
is not a Government agency, according to the Attorney General. This
opinion, of course, does not settle the basic question whether, for
purposes of these treaty provisions, the actions of the Satellite Corpo-
ration are those of the U.S. Government.
Perhaps this is another reason why the negotiations leading to these
international agreements should be carried on by the SatelOte Corpora-
aa COMMUNICATIONSSATELLITEACTOF1962, §§ 201(C) (3) and (10). See discus-
sion of this problem by FCC Chairman Minow, Hearings, supra note 14, at 19-22,
93-94.
asHearings, supra note 11, at 107-10.
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tion staff rather than by Government representatives. Success in this
undertaking, however, will call for an extremely close degree of co-
operation between the State Department and other federal agencies
on the one hand and the Satellite Corporation on the other. It is
arguable that in effect the corporation is just another arm of the Gov-
ernment, being only nominally private in character.
Even if, for purposes of the most-favored-nation clauses, it should be
decided that the Satellite Corporation is not an agency of the U.S. Gov-
ernment, it may be,considered a "monopoly or agency granted exclusive
or special privileges" and thus be required to give to Denmark the same
rights as are given to Germany. Certainly Congress gave ComSat a
very privileged monopoly position.
One other problem should at least be mentioned at this point. Un-
der the "national treatment" clauses, consideration should be given to
the provision of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 which limits
stock participation by non-U.S, citizens to 20 percent. 68 Does this
deny "national treatment" to foreigners? Article VII(l) of the
treaty with Denmark s4 provides that the nationals of either party
must be given national treatment by the other "with respect to engag-
ing in commercial.., activities." U.S. nationals can buy stock with-
out the 20 percent limitation imposed by the Satellite Act upon foreign
nationals. Clearly these other nationals are not given the same treat-
ment as our own, and arguably the "national treatment" clauses have
been violated.
Similar limitations on foreign ownership or control of activities
in the United States are found in other statutes such as the Atomic
Energy Act 65but, at least as_to atomic energy, our commercial treaties
specifically except it from the "national treatment" clause. 66 It may
be more difficult to justify the difference in treatment in the case of
the communications satellite. An expressio unius argument could be
made. In addition, as now set up, this is clearly a peacetime activity
having no very direct connection with our national security, as is the
case with the atomic energy limitation and some of the others. One
possible answer to this problem is that no other country will raise this
objection, but it may be that we are in violation of our treaty
obligations.
" COMMUNICATONS SATELLITE ACT OF 1962, § 304(d).
Supra note 60.
Sections 103(d) & 104(d) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 936-37
(1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133(d) & 2134(d) (1958).
mE.g, Treaty With Denmark, supra note 60, Art. XXI(1)(b).
184 LAW OF SPACE AND OF SATELLITE COI_MUNICATIONS
CAUTION
An attempt has been made to set out some of the "facts of life" which
we will face in making policy decisions concerning establishment of the
communications satellite system. In addition_ several problems that
have some legal significance and will arise out of the international
negotiations necessary to establishment of this service have been sug-
gested. The caution given at the beginning, however, bears repeating.
Although assumptions have been stated confidently and specific solu-
tions or at least policy lines to follow for some of the problems have
been suggested_ no person can feel he has the answers, particularly
when he cannot possess knowledge which both carrier operators and
Government administrators have acquired as a consequence of their
official positions. Therefore, the assumptions_ suggestions_ and conclu-
sions here stated should be considered an attempt to stimulate thought-
ful consideration of the questions which must be faced and in some
way answered before a successful international communications satel-
lite system can be established. If the critical thought of those in
Government, business_ and the academic community can be focused on
these problems_ we should be better prepared to make maximum use
of our opportunity at the forthcoming conference in Geneva and in
later negotiations, to assure successful creation of a global system of
communications by means of space satellites. If critical evaluation of
these problems is stimulated_ a large part of the purpose of this paper
has been realized.
Comments
Maxwell Cohen
Having put on a space law conference myself_ in Montreal, I'm
impressed with the difference between doing some things "in area"
and doing the same things "in depth." We covered in some respects
a little wider spectrum of subject matter than you did_ but I think
that on the communications side you handled it in :far greater depth
than we were able to do.
As a Canadian_ it seems to me that the first question one must ask
is, Why is so much attention being paid to this subject in the United
States anyway ? Why would you devote this much time to what seems
to be another experiment with a semiregnlated industry which has
some substantive novelty but which_ after all, fits into the main-
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stream of the communications pattern--an industry which, as Pro-
lessor Estep already has indicated, is only one more aspect of the
development of international communications. What is there, apart
perhaps from the "mixed enterprise" aspect, that makes this subject
so much of a novelty ?
I suggest that the real reason for the preoccupation--apart from
the peculiarities of your own municipal law system and the mystique
of your own social order which allows you to engage in fanciful
notions of uniqueness in this area is something that has not, in my
opinion, been touched on. That is, that the satellite program is not
simply another system of communications, having its own special
national and international aspects, but it also is symbolic of a whole
new international experience.
There are three features that are worth thinking about, but to
which I shall refer only briefly here.
There is, first of all, the actual symbolism of the communications
satellite, commonly shared by mankind. It is perhaps, par excellence,
an illustration of a "sharable resource."
Even though it is no more than another transmission channel, its
symbolism, it seems to me, is of a different order from that of a cable
from Newfoundland to Ireland. Spinning out a cable once perhaps
had drama, but nothing like the drama of putting up a system in space
for intercontinental communications. The symbolism itself is im-
portant and gives these instrumentalities a unique status.
Second, there is the international interest in the uses of space--apart
from the symbolism. How is space going to be used ? Here is one
use of space in which all nations are interested, since this is one of the
first nonmilitary, constructive uses of space to be achieved.
Apart from other scientific activities that do not have an immediate
impact on the individual, such as meteorological surveys, none of
the present satellites in orbit has had as significant a public i,lterest
as Telstar or Relay. The average person and the chanceries of the
world, reflecting the evolution of mass opinion_ are all concerned about
the uses of space. And here, now, is a dramati% peaceful use of space
in which everyone wants to share. So this is not merely another
communications system rivaling cables or high-frequency radio. It
is a unique and special use of space in which everyone has an interest.
Third, I think there is another aspect which marks this as quite
distinct from merely the evolution of international communications.
It is the fact that a communications system in space has not merely a
positive side of peaceful use, but also a negative side_ in the sense of
threat. The tl_reat takes the form of possible propaganda and cold-
war abuses in their many variations. These potentially threatening
728---3230---64_18
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aspects seem to me to be something that we will have with us for a
long time to come.
Consequently, there is a desire to share in the regulation of a poten-
tial threat, whatever it may be--a threat of propaganda or a threat
of interference with the use on the ground of existing communications,
either in an economic or educational way.
For these three reasons---the sense of uniqueness, the desire to share
in its use, and the threat--I think there is a special quality that
attaches to this new experiment in intercontinental communications,
which renders it s_.i generis. It cannot, therefore, be put in the same
class as other intercontinental communications.
My second general point is one to which Professor McDougal would
do more justice than myself. I think the communication system is
par excellence an example of a common international exercise, an
example of an "inclusive use" of resources. Here we can see the need
to express that use in jural terms--customary or conventional law.
This brings me to an examination of the substantive issues arising
from this "inclusive use." I see four problems: The monopoly prob-
lem, the participation problem, the military-civilian problem, and the
regulatory problem.
The monopoly problem is rather curious because there is the do-
mestic image of monopoly and the international image of monopoly.
The domestic image seems to raise certain special problems for you
in the United States. You, in fact, have tried not to have either a
governmental monopoly or a private monopoly.
You are now engaged in a great experiment in a "joint" or "mixed"
venture. But what has happened is that somehow or other there has
been projected internationally this sense of a monopoly. The in-
sistence, expressed in Congress, that there be private participation
gave a monopoly image in part---or gave to the private acquisition
of this user certain attributes which, when projected internationally,
have resulted in propaganda consequences that should have been
predictable.
Any friend of the United States could have predicted that if you
played this kind of necessary domestic game, you were bound to get
into some difficulty with your international image. That image was
partly going to be the image of the United States permitting AT&T
to go up there and deprive the rest of the world of its rights in space--
however wrong, in fact, that view might be. Perhaps the inter-
national image would not have been as difficult, from the monopoly
aspect, had there been a purely governmental activity here.
The United States has been somewhat reluctant to accept mixed
ventures abroad for purposes of its foreign-aid program, as shown,
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for example, in the kind of things that are said in Congress about
cutting out aid to countries that encourage state-owned enterprises.
The Telstar joint venture, then, is a welcome line of development in
your public policy.
All that I am saying is it was bad public-relations luck on your
part. The United States may have to bear this erroneous image for
some time. This monopoly image is partly based on the technological
headstart of the existing great American corporations--already years
ahead of everyone else except a few states in the Western World--
since it appears as if you are taking this particular communal resource
and allowing it to become a private venture.
We know this is not wholly true de facto or de _e. But it is partly
true---sufficiently true to give you some difficulty in the future.
The second problem is the question of participation. In Montreal
we raised this matter by asking, "Wouldn't it have been wiser for the
United States, in creating this hybrid, to have given the feeling to
the rest of the world that it could share in this great novel activity
with its symbolic values_." An expert replied, "Oh, you haven't done
your homework, because all non-nationals can own up to 20 percent of
Comsat's stock."
I was taken in by this myself until I realized that this privilege was,
after all, of only limited value. The President is not likely to appoint
a 'Canadian, a Yugoslav, and a Korean to the board of directors in the
near future. It seems to me the likelihood of any real participation
in the policy-making activities of the Satellite Corporation here for
non-nationals is very remote indeed.
Apart from shareholding privileges and their real or fictional
attributes, we are talking about what must be an essentially American
enterprise. Participation in such an enterprise, therefore--whatever
the stockholding may be-_involves, I suggest, five or six related
aspects.
The first is research and development. What chance is there going
to be for Canadians, for Frenchmen, for bright young men in Ghana
and Nigeria, to share in research and development
Is this going to be simply "to him who has," with the race for
excellence in this field progressing geometrically on your part but not
even arithmetically elsewhere ? If so, the United States will become
technically better and better, and the others will simply go along. Or
are you going to subcontract out parts of the R&D work because
Congress has said, in the declaration of policy in section 102, "in
conjunction and in cooperation with other countries."
Does this legislative language mean that, in fact, some part of the
program of research and development will be allocated to the technical
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colleges and universities, the industrial laboratories, and the telephone
systems of the rest of the world ._ It would be very helpful to know
something about the policy here.
The second aspect is manufacture. Obviously, the suppliers of
Comsat are going to be American suppliers in the first instance. The
ground stations, if they are going to meet certain technical specifica-
tions, presumably will be supplied partly by Comsat itself or, with the
encouragement of the United States, be manufactured abroad.
Will it be possible for countries which are not sites for ground sta-
tions but which have a first-class electronics industry--for example,
Sweden might fall in this category--to share in this great internation-
al experiment with this new communications resource which "inclu-
sively" ought to be shared between us ?
Nothing in the discussions at this conference has indicated that there
has been much thinking with respect to the international manufactur-
ing and sharing in the various items required, both for the instrumen-
tality upstairs and for the ground stations downstairs.
A third problem of participation is general policy making. The
directors, like all directors who make policy, presumably will be under
the influence of the various branches of the U.S. Government that
have an interest in the activities of the corporation--Defense, State
Department, NASA, and so forth. Can there really be a sense of
satisfaction in Other advanced countries, to say nothing of t_he ra-
tional and irrational resentments in the less developed countries, if
there is no sense of participation, even if there is only _rremote chance
of contributing technically ?
There are very sound political reasons for giving states in Africa,
Asia, and Latin America a sense of participating in policy making,
even though many of them may have very little to contribute techni-
cally. For _his is a symbolic effort. Unless the flavor of the sym-
bolism is caught and translated into the politics to which it relates,
a great deal of the benefits that are likely to flow from it in political
terms will be lost.
It will not be sufficient for states merely to be told, "We will give
you a fair break, and you can lease channels or lease facilities from
Comsat itself." To many states, advanced and less advanced, the idea
of participation will mean something more than being lessees of a
channel. Participation means, somehow or other, feeling that they
are making a contribution to the total evolution of Comsat and what-
ever other systems may follow in the development of the satellite
communications program.
The fourth aspect is rate making. Multinational experience with
rate making, I learn from Professor Estep's paper, already exists in
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dealing with existing international communications. We ought there-
fore to be able to have a rate-making system that satisfies most coun-
tries. But again, let me remind you of the uniqueness of the instru-
mentality. You may wish to invite into the rate-making mechanism
users who are only marginal users, or even submarginal users, for
purely symbolic and political reasons. I think the degree of resent-
ment on the part of the other, "poorer" half of mankind against the
northern family of mankind often is so profound that the more items
we can add to the list of developing-country participation, the greater
the benefits to our other relations with these developing states.
The fifth aspect is profits and the use of profits. Presumably, again,
this is part of policy making. However, there are two aspects which
may prove to be of some difficulty. One is to determine the position
of states which have no ground station but which may have claims
such as that which Professor Christol suggested when he was at Mon-
treal-less a claim than a position. If you have a synchronous system
with your three communications satellites positioned directly above
Liberia, Sumatra, and Ottawa, for example, can you work out a theory
of rental ? It sounds absurd and is of course absurd.
Also, you face the possibility of a second system ; that is the British
Commonwealth communications system. The British Commonwealth
has, for a long time, had an approach to communications uniquely its
own. It has recently, as a result of the Commonwealth Conference--
I think in 1959 or 1960--put forward a new communications policy.
There is a new cable now being laid across the Pacific to improve com-
munications between the members of the Commonwealth. There are
institutions which link the Commonwealth administratively for this
purely intra-Commonwealth system.
Perhaps they may evince a desire to somehow or other be in this
game. Are you inviting the Commonwealth communications struc-
ture to come in as a cooperating entity before certain vested patterns
of administration develop ? Nothing was said here about that pros-
pect. The question is worth asking.
And finally, on this matter of participation, I ask how you are going
to get a decision very soon on the point that Professor Estep made
with such force; namely, that technically we wish a single system, a
single "compatible" system that integrates easily with all other ground
systems. How do we make sure of this ? What is to be the mechanism
by which we prevent nonintegrated and noncompatible systems from
being sent up into space _. So much for the question of participation.
Now, the third major problem is the military one, about which I
lmow very little. I will therefore pass on with one remark : it strikes
me that the chanceries of the world, and whatever part of literate
190 LAW OF SPACE AND OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
public opinion cares about these things, will wonder about the rela-
tionship between the military and the peaceful uses of the Comsat
system. It is one thing for Professor Estep to say that, in fact, part of
the existing cable and high-frequency load now carries military and
diplomatic messages without arousing complaints and that these mes-
sages may even go through countries which are very much at odds
with each other.
I suggest to you that undersea cables and high-frequency and tele-
graph wires do not have the same effect symbolically as Telstar, Relay,
and the others. Objections, possibly linked to the general problems of
propaganda and malusage, may be raised and we should be prepared
for them.
This brings me, finally, to the regulatory problem. I can see several
aspects to the matter of regulation.
One view is that the world, as Professor Estep says, can be very well
served by a system of private carriers, as it is now served except for
those countries in which the communications systems are owned by
governments. But I was impressed by Professor Estep's summary of
the number of agreements that AT&T has abroad--175 individual
agreements. They have done this with no fanfare and with great
success. Communications "on the ground," therefore, seem to be
carried on with very considerable success, without the intervention of
government except in emergencies.
Therefore one possible system of regulation is to leave it to this
mixed enterprise of private carriers and government-owned carriers
to carry on as if it were any ordinary communications business. For
the reasons I have set out this is likely to be unacceptable psychologi-
cally and politically.
A second method is to set up regulations as a state-to-state matter.
Though the Comsat Corporation in municipal law terms is a private
corporation, with certain mixed private-public attributes, for purposes
of the international forums it may be represented by the government
of the United States in state-to-state dealings. Then all of the deal-
ings would have as an implied regulatory mechanism negotiations
between governments.
It was Professor Estep's view that this might be unnecessary.
United States private carriers have been very successful in private
negotiations, keeping the State Department informed. Negotiating
teams would be organized--if I understood him--and the leadership
of the team would depend upon the situation. In an awkward situa-
tion the United States State Department would lead the team. Given
a less awkward framework, normal commercial techniques would be
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employed with the State Department's participants rather more in the
background.
Perhaps this would work quite well. But a third aspect of the reg-
ulatory problem is what seems to me to be the almost inevitable emer-
gence of international organizational techniques to deal with the
communications problem very soon, because already there are so many
interests involved.
It is true that ITU is sometimes looked upon with a good deal of--
not contempt--but concern for its lack of sanctions_ the rather limited
areas of jurisdiction in which it operates. One forgets that the ITU
J .
charter contains provisions dealing with arbitration. I do not think
that clause has ever been invoked, but it is there. Thus, the machinery
for the administration of the disputes to which Professor Estep re-
ferred is already in existence. ICAO also has interests here on behalf
of international air transport. At the ITU conference in the fall of
1963_ if IC__O requests and receives frequency protection for its air
transportation needs with respect to Telstar, this may be a first step on
the road to a much more elaborate systematic approach to international
regulation.
There are those who argue that excessive regulations at a premature
stage tend to inhibit those who wish to get out into space and do a job.
I have no desire to see that happen. Indeed, on balance, I think we
can only congratulate ourselves that the United States has had the
technology and initiative to get out into space as quickly as it has done.
Those who see her as the leader in the free world wish her to stay in
space in all of its aspects.
But because space communications systems are as important as they
are to all of mankind, they are a natural subject for multinational ar-
rangements rather than the commercial_ entrepreneurial engagements
heretofore employed.
What I look forward to, over a period of time, is a partial solution
of the participation and regulation problems through some good will
and much ingenuity_ perhaps expressed ultimately in the evolution of
some new specialized agency or some advances in ITU itself far beyond
its present structure.
Mvres S. McDouga[
Mr. Boskey has suggested that my task now is to put all wisdom
into a single sentence. I will at least try. to be brief.
I don_t remember when I have been asked to comment upon a
major address with which I have agreed more than with Professor
Estep_s. It isn't often, either, that I have an opportunity to call a
legal audience back to a discussion of legal problems. You highly
192 LAW OF SPACE _D OF SATELLITE C03_CATIONS
practical lawyers, who ordinarily don't have much use for inter-
national law, may be getting yourselves into trouble. Thus far, you
have largely ignored the international-law aspects of your problems.
Though it is by the authority of the United States--the District of
Columbia according to this statute--that you have launched a new
legal entity upon the world, many other nation-states will in fact have
to decide whether you have succeeded by international-law criteria in
launching a new entity and will apply their authority to activities
undertaken in the name of this entity.
Let us build upon some of the facts developed by Professor
Estep in his paper and alluded to by Professor Cohen. It is the
international aspect of this enterprise that I would like to emphasize,
and very concretely. By international aspect I do not mean simply
that your enterprise is going to have effects and consequences for
all mankind. The most important point is that your enterprise
will have continuously to operate, largely beyond the territorial
bonds of the United States, within a domain of shared competence
to which all states have access. It will also have to operate (in very
considerable measure) within the territorial domains of other states.
These facts about the domain of operation must require very
considerable accommodations and adjustments from you who under-
take the enterprise. Professors Lasswell and V]asic and I have just
completed a chapter in a book on the law of space in which we deal
with these problems.
In this book we characterize all organized inclusive activities as
"enterprisory activities." On the first day of this conference a case
was made for the unorganized inclusive use of the domain of space.
_rhat we are now concerned with is arga_i_ed inclusive use. Within
this concept of "enterprisory" we include all organizations which
undertake direct international operations or administration : the pub-
lic international organizations to which states are the parties whether
comprehensive, partial, or regional; the mixed corporations which
have both governmental and private parties, such as that established
by the Communications Satellite Act; and even the solely private
corporations which have multinational ownerships. It may be re-
called that the Communications Satellite Act makes provision for
multinational ownership.
For all these various organizations, we have tried both to identify
the specific types of problems which may arise under customary inter-
national law and to observe what past community experience has been
in the management of such problems. Here I will not do much more
than identify some of these problems and note some of the difficulties
you may confront.
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The first type of problem relates to the establishment of the enter-
prise as a legal personality, sepsrate from its members or agents.
The assurance you require is that you have a legal personality which
will be respected and honored by the states in which the organization
will have to operate and upon which it will have impact. Maybe
you will get away with saying that this organization has all of the
competence which is provided by the corporation statutes of the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Maybe not.
There has been a very strong trend in recent decisions in public-
private international law, in recognition that we do in fact have an
international economy, to accept and honor the legal personality of
entities established by other states. We must all hope that this trend
may continue.
The famous case of Reparation far Injuries Suffered in the Servive
of the United Nation, (1949 I.C.J. Reports 174) which established
beyond dispute the "international personality" of the United Nations,
may give you further support. The Court there concluded that the
United Nations had under customary international law the necessary
legal personality even against nonmembers.
By legal personality I mean, of course, simply the minimum of
access to formal authority--the capacity to make a claim and to be
subjected to claim. This claim to a legal personality is almost always
accompanied by other claims. There are a whole host of claims--in
private international law and in the law of public international orga-
nizations--which are described as relating to the internal affairs or
the constitutive processes of a corporation or an entity.
If you will look at Mr. Wilfred Jenks' little book on The Proper
Law of International Organizations, or Rabel's second volume on
Gonflict of Laws, you will find that most states accord a very con-
siderable deference to the law of the chartering state on this great
range of problems said to refer to the internal affairs or constitutive
process of the entity--problems which relate to tho structure of the
organization, the duties and competences of agents, the control of
assets, the distribution of losses and benefits, and so on. There is,
however, no assurance of uniformity in decision. Policies vary not
only on specific problems but even in the identification of the charter-
ing state.
When we shift from the problems of constituting the entity to
problems relating to access to various geographical domains for the
purpose of carrying on activities, our inquiry becomes even more
difficult.
It seems generally agreed that all states should enjoy free and equal
access to the sharable domain of space. This freedom of access would
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appear to extend to all craft having state nationality, not merely to
state-owned craft ; it is highly improbable that the Soviets will be able
to establish their new claim to confine access to state-owned craft.
You are not likely to be treated as a pirate because of some private
ownership.
In parenthesis, let me say further that you cannot even take for
granted that the recital in this act that you are a private company
and not an agency or establishment of the United States Government
will be accepted by decision-makers outside of the United States.
What is a governmental enterprise for this country will be deter-
mined by other countries and by international decision-makers by their
own criteria. This determination may vary from problem to prob-
lem. You may be private for some purposes, and governmental for
others.
With respect to access to the territorial domains of particular states,
the doctrine is almost unqualified that you will not get access except
with the explicit consent of the particular state. The doctrine still
is that a state may, as an Englishman bars his oak, keep everybody
else out at its arbitrary pleasure. It may be that you can claim the
benefits of some of the treaties of "friendship, commerce, and naviga-
tion." If not, this is one of the matters which will require negotiation.
Another type of problem will relate to the permissible objectives
of enterprise. Upon these problems there is some question whether
the provision in this statute about the Sherman Antitrust Act, about,
monopoly, will stand you in very good stead. Other states have very
different conceptions of monopoly and competition. They prefer
their conceptions to ours. They will regard it as somewhat awk-
ward, somewhat egocentric, that we claim to regulate by our national
agency activities which are in fact international and which have
impacts upon them just as consequential as upon us.
Still other important problems will relate to control over base
values. The most indispensable bases for your purposes will of course
be the frequencies of the radio spectrum. A general community con-
sensus appears to be emerging that these frequencies, like other space
resources, must be regarded as sharable and that every particular
user must manage his enjoyment of the frequencies so as not unreason-
ably to prejudice or interfere with the enjoyment of others. In the
absence of generally accepted inclusive allocation and regulation, the
situation may become most difficult. I do not, however, share Pro-
lessor Cohen's anticipation that underlying states may seek to subject
stationary satellites to actions in trespass: the general consensus upon
freedom of access would appear to preclude this. The more probable
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claim by other states will be for participation in the enjoyment of the
resource which they regard as held in common.
The traditional immunities and facilities accorded state agencies
could serve as important bases of power. Whether you will be af-
forded these immunities and facilities will depend upon whether other
states decide that you are governmental or nongovernmental. You
may of course not even claim to be governmental for this purpose.
The more recent trend is to regard enterprises as subject to jurisdic-
tion of the states, of the particular states in which they operate, if
they are engaged in commercial activities. You are engaged in com-
mercial activities, but we hope that you are also engaged in much more.
It is conceivable, if you should internationalize the operation more,
that you could get many facilities and immunities not otherwise
obtainable. There is an established community policy of protect-
ing international organizations from the dominance of any particular
state that is broader than the traditional immunities of state
instrumentalities.
If we turn from the control of bases of power to problems concern-
ing responsibility for agreem'ents and deprivations, it is possible that
you may be allowed some option about the law which will control
your agreements. You may specify that the agreements you make
which have an international element will be governed by such-and-
such law, preferably by the general principles of the more mature
societies. If you do not so specify, a thousand results are possible.
With respect to deprivations--torts and crimes--there are very
grave problems for counsel. What is the responsibility of the United
States ? What is the responsibility of the corporation._ What is the
responsibility of the individual human beings who engage in activi-
ties ? The answers to these questions involve not only the problems
mentioned above about the consequences of the presence or absence
of "legal personality" but also many delicate issues about responsi-
bility across state lines.
When we turn to the regulation of outcomes achieved--to the dis-
tribution of profits and allocation of losses--decisions will obviously
be affected by many different laws, and not simply by United States
law. In the interest of the widest possible distribution of benefits
for all mankind, I would join with Professor Cohen in hoping that,
perhaps, sometime an undertaking like this could be more inter-
nationalized, and not unilaterally operated by many differing states.
I won't deal with the problems of terminating and modifying the
enterprise, since we hope that it will endure for a very long time.
It has been my purpose in calling your attention to all these prob-
lems to emphasize that they are the kinds of problems to which inter-
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national lawyers and others should be addressing themselves. This
is not intended in criticism of Professor Estep's presentation. My
only purpose has been to build upon his foundations.
I would especially like to join with Professor Estep in his strong
appeal that we bury the hatchet on all internal parochial differences.
We should recognize that the initiative and authority of government
and the initiative, the skills, the resources, and the manpower of
private industry are all needed if we are to take advantage of an
unparalleled opportunity.
I am not very much shocked by the brilliant exegesis of Profes-
sor Rosenblum. One could do this to any charter of any great enter-
prise; certainly, as suggested by others_ to our own national Consti-
tution, i constitutional document is just an invitation to bargain.
Several of us at this conference worked for some years under the
Lend-Lease Act_ which was even vaguer than this statute. One of
the reasons why it worked very well was its vagueness. Possible
abuses were avoided by the responsibility to the Congress for money
and by the responsibility of the President to the electorate.
Given an understanding of the objectives of the Communications
Satellite Act and the circumstances of its enactment, there are many
principles of interpretation, other than that of the allegedly literal
meaning of the words, which may be invoked to insure a viable,
effective enterprise.
In conclusion, I would like to urge again that we not forget the
benefits to all of us, and all mankind, that may be involved in this
enterprise. Professor Estep interpreted correctly when he said I was
suggesting that we shouldn't look too closely at where the funds
come from, or by whom they are spent, so long as they are used to
increase our knowledge and understanding of space and our capabili-
ties of getting greater benefits from space. It is this same concern
for maximizing activities which inure for the benefit of all that causes
me to join with Professor Cohen in his hope that activities of this
kind may be increasingly internationalized as rapidly as possible.
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TO provide for the establishment, ownership, operation, and regulation of a
commercial communications satellite system, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the _enate and House of Representatives of the
United _tates of Xmerlea in Congress assembled,
TITLE I--SHORT TITLE, DECLARATION OF POLICY AND
DEFINITIONS
SHORT
S_.c. 1Ol. This Act may be cited as tile "Communications Satellite comm_oatiom
Act of 1962". SatelllteAot
DECLARATION OF POLICY AND PURP08]$ Of 1962.
SEC. 102. (a) The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of
the United States to establish, in conjunction and in cooperation with
other countries, as expeditiously as practicable a commercial communi-
cations satellite system, as part of an improved global communications
network, which will be responsive to public needs and national ob-
jectives, which will serve the communication needs of the United
States and other countries, and which will contribute to world peace
and understanding.
(b) The new and expanded telecommunication services are to be
made available as promptly as possible and are to be extended to pro-
vide global coverage at the earliest practicable date. In effectuating
this program, care and attention will be directed toward providing
such services to economically less developed countries and areas as
well as those more highly developed, toward efficient and economical
use of the electromagnetic frequency spectrum, and toward the reflec-
tion of the benefits of this new technology in both quality of services
and charges for such services.
(c) In order to facilitate this development and to provide for the
widest possible participation by private enterprise, United States
participation in the global system shall be in the form of a private
corporation, subject to appropriate _overnmental regulation. It is
the intent of Congress that all authorized users shall have nondiscrim-
inatory access to the system; that maximum competition be maintained
in the provision of equipment and services utilized by the system; that
the corporation ereatedunder this Act be so organized and operated
as to maintain and strengthen competition in the provision of commu-
nicat ons services to the public; and that the activities of the corpora-
l ion created under this Act and of the persons or companies partici-
pating in the ownership of the corporation shall be consistent with the
Federal antitrust law_
(d) It is not the intent of Congress by this Act to preclude the use
of the communications satellite system for domestic communication
services where consistent with the provisions of this Act nor to pre-
clude the creation of additional communications satellite systems, if
required to meet unique geverumental needs or if otherwise required
in the national interest.
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DEFINITION8
Szc. 103. As used in this Act, and unless the context otherwise
requires-
(l) the term "communications satellite system" refers to a s_s-
tern of communications satellites in space whose purpose is to_relay
telecommunication information between satellite terminal sta-
tions, together with such associated equipment and facilities for
tracking, guidance, control, and command functions as are not
part of the generalized launching, tracking, control, and command
facilities for all space purposes;
(2) the term 'csatel|ite terminal station" refers to a complex
of communication equipment located on the earth's surface, opera-
tionally connected with one or more terrestrial communication
systems, and capable of transmitting telecommunications to or
receiving telecommunications from a communications satellite
system.
(3) the term "communications satellite" means an earth satel-
lite which is intentionally used to relay telecommunication in-
formation;
(4) the term "associated equipment and facilities" refers to
facilities other than satellite terminal stations and communica-
tions satellites, to be constructed and operated for the prima_
purpose of a communications satellite system, whether for aa-
mimstration and management, for research and development, or
for direct support of space operations;
(5) the term "research and development" l_efers to the concep-
tion, design, and first creation of experimental or prototype
operational devices for the operation of a communications satel-
lite system, including the assembly of separate components into
a working whole, as distinguished from the term "]_roduction,"
which relates to the construction of such devices to nxed specifi-
cations compatible with repetitive duplication for operational
applications; and
(6) the term "telecommunication" means any transmission,
emmslon or reception of signs, signals, writings, images, and
sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire, radio, optical, or
other electromagnetic systems.
(7). the term "communications common carrier" has the same
meaning as the term "common carrier" has when used in the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and in addition in-
cludes, but only for purposes of sections 303 and 304, any indi-
vidual, partnership, association, joint-stock company, trust, cor-
poration, or other entity which owns or controls, directly or in-
directly, or is under direct or indirect common control with, any
such carrier; and the term "authorized carrier", except as other-
wise provided for purposes of section 304 by section 304(b) (1),
means a communications common carrier which has been au'
thorized by the Federal Communications Commission under the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to provide services by
means of communications satellites;
(8) the term "corporation" means the corporation authorized
by title III of this Act.
(9) the term "Administration" means the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration; and
(10) the term "Commission" means the Federal Communica-
tions Commission.
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TITLE II--FEDERAL COORDINATION, PLANNING, AND
REGULATION
IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY
S_c. 201. In order to achieve the obiectives and to carry out the
purposes of this Act-
(a) the President shall--
(1) aid in the planning and development and foster the
execution of a national program for tile establishment and
operation, as expeditiously as possible, of a commercial com-
munications satellite system;
(2) provide for continuous review of all phases of the
development and operation of such a system, including the
activities of a communications satellite corporation author-
ized under title III of this Act;
(3) coordinate the activities of governmental agencies
with responsibilities in the field of telecommunieation_ so as
to insure that there is full and effective compliance at all
times with the policies set forth in this Act;
(4) exercise such supervision over relationships of the
corporation with foreign governments or entities or with
international bodies as maybe appropriate to assure that such
relationships shall be consistent with the national interest
and foreign policy of the United States;
(5) insure that timely arrangements are made under which
there can be foreign participation in the establishment and
use of a communications satellite system;
(6) take all necessary steps to insure the availability and
appropriate utilization of the communications satellite sys-
tem for general governmental purposes except where a sep-
arate communications satellite system is required to meet
unique governmental needs, or is otherwise required in the
national interest; and
(7) so exercise his authority as to help attain coordinated
and efficient use of the electromagnetic spectrum and the
technical compatibility of the system with existing com-
munications facilities [both in the United States and abroad.
(b) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
shall-
(I) advise the Commission on technical characteristics of
the communications satellite system;
(2) cooperate with the corporation in research and de-
velopment to the extent deemed appropriate by the Admin-
istration in the public interest;
(3) assist the corporation in the conduct of its research
and development program by furnishing to the corporation,
when requested, on a reimbursable basis, such satellite launch-
ing and associated services as the Administration deems nec-
essary for the most expeditious and economical development
of the communications satellite system ;
(4) consult with the corporation with respect to the tech-
nical characteristics of the communications satellite system ;
(5) furnish to the corporation, on request and on a reim-
bursable bas_, satellite launching and associated services re-
quired for t_e establishment, operation, and maintenance
of the communications satellite system approved by the
Commission ; and
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(6) to tile extent feasible, furnish other services, on a reim-
bursable basis, to the corporation in connection with the
establishment and operation of the system.
(c) the Federal Communications Commission, in its adminis-
tration of the provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, and assupplemented by this Act, shall--
(1) insure effective competition, including the use of com-
petitive bidding where appropriate, in the procurement by
the corporation and communications common carriers of ap-
paratus, equipment, and services required for the establish-
ment and operation of the commumcations satellite system
and satellite terminal stations; and the Commission shall
consult with the Small Business Administration and sohcit
its recommendations on measures and procedures which will
insure that small business concerns are given an equitable op-
portunity to share in the procurement program of the corpo-
ration for property and services, including but not limited to
research, devel-opment, construction, maintenance, and repair.
_2) insul_e that all present and future authorized carriers
shall have nondiscriminatory use of, and equitable access
to, the communications satelh'te system and satellite terminal
stations under just and reasonable charges, classifications,
practices, regulations, and other terms and conditions and
_gulate the Laanner in which available facilities of the sys-
tem and stations are allocated among such users thereof;
(3) in any case where the Secretary of State, after obtain-
ing the advice of the Administration as to teclmical feasi-
bility, has advised that commercial communication to a par-
ticular foreign point by means of the communications satellite
system and satellite terminal stations should be established
in the national interest, institute forthwith appropriate pro-
ceedings under section 214(d) of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, to require the establishment of such com-
munication by.the corporation and the appropriate common
carrier or carriers;
(4) insure that facilities of the communications satellite
system and satellite terminal stations are technicaUy compat-
ible and interconnected operationally with each other and
with existing communications facilities;
(5) prescribe such accounting regulations and systems and
engage in such ratemaking procedures as will insure that any
economies made possible by a communications satellite system
are appropriately reflectedin rates for public communication
services;
(6) approve technical characteristics of the operational
communications satellite system to be employed by the cor-
poration and of the satellite terminal stations; and
(7) grant appropriate authorizations for the construction
and operation of each satellite terminal station, either to the
corporation or to one or more authorized carriers or to the
corporation and one or more such carriers jointly, as will best
serve the public interest; convenibnce, and necessity. In de-
termining the public interest, convenience, and necessity the
Commission shall authorize the construction and operation
of such stations by communications common carriers or the
corporation, without preference to either;
(8} authorize the corporation to issue any shares of capital
stock, except the initial issue of capital stock referred to in
section 304(a), or to borrow any moneys_ or to assume any
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obligation .in respect of the securities of any other person,
upon a finding that such issuance, borrowing, or assumption
is compatible with the public interest, c?nvenience, and neces-
sity and is necessary or appropriate for or consistent with
carrying out the purposes and objectives of this Act by the
corporation;
(9) insure that no substantial additions are made by the
corporation or carriers with respect to facilities of the system
or satellite terminal stations unless such additions are re-
quired by the public interest, convenience, and necessity;
(10) reqmre, in accordance with the procedural require-
ments of section 214 of the Communicatl_ons Act of 1934, as
amended, that additions be made by the corporation or car-
riers with respect to facilities of the system or satellite
terminal stations where such additions would serve the pub-
lic interest, convenience, and necessity; and
(11) make rules and regulations to carry out the pro-
visions of this Act.
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TITLE III--CREATION OF A COMMUNICATIONS
SATELLITE CORPORATION
CREATXONoF COSPORA_0N
SEc. 301. There is hereby authorized to be created a communica-
tions satellite corporation for profit which will not be an agency or
establishment of the United States Government. The corporation
shall be subject to the provisions of this Act and, to the extent con-
sistent with this Act, to the District of Columbia Business Corporation
Act. The right to repeal, alter, or amend this Act at any time is 6s star. 177.
expressly reserved. D.C. Code
PROCKS8 OF ORGANIZATION 29-901,
SEc. 302. The President of the United States shall appoint incor,
porators, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, who shall
serve as the initial board of directors until the first annual meeting
of stockholders or. until their successors are elected and qualified_.
Such incorporators shall arrange for an initial stock offering and
take whatever other actions are necessary to establish the corporation,
including the filing of articles of incorporation, as approved by the
President.
DIRECTORS AND OFFICEI_
SEc. 303. (a) The corporation shall have a board of directors con-
sisting of individuals who are citizens of the United States, of whom
one shall be. elected annually by the board to serve as chairman. Three
members of the board shall be appointed by the President of the United
8ta[es_ by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, effective the
date on which the other members are elected, and for terms of three
years or untd their successors have been appointed and qualified, ex-
cept that the first three members of the I_oard so appointed shall
continue in office for terms of one, two, and three years, respectively,
andany mem .ber so appointed to fill a vacancy shalfbe appointed onr_
for me unexpired term of the director whom he succeeds. Six mem-
bers of the .board shall be elected annually by those stockholders who
are commumcations common carriers and six shall be elected annually
by the other stockholders of the corporation. No stockholder who
is a communications common carrier and no trustee for such a stock-
holder shall vote, either directl 7 or indirectly, through the votes of
subsidiaries or affiliated compames_ nominees, or any persons subject to
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his direction or co,trol,for more than three candidates for member-
ship on the board Subject to such limitation, the articles of incor-
• " . l •
poratzon to be filed by the incorporators designated under section
30'2 shall provide for cumulative voting under section 27(d) of the
District of Columbia Business Corporation Act (D.C. Code, sec.
29-911(d) ).
(b) The corporation shall have a president, and such other officers
as may be named and appointed by the board, at rates of compensation
fixed by the board, andserving at the pleasure of the board. No in-
dividual other than a citizen of the United States may be an officer
of the corporation. No officer of the corporation shall receive any
salary from any source other than the corporation during the period
of his employment by the corporation.
FINANCING OF THE CORPORATION"
SEo. 304. (a) The corporation is authorized to issue and have out-
standing, in such amounts as it shall determine, shares of capital stock,
without par value, which shall carry voting rights and be eligible for
dividends. The s_ares of such stock initially offered shall be sold at
a price not in excess of $100 for each share and in a manner to en-
courage the widest distribution to the American public. Subject to
the provisions of subsections (b) and (d) of this section, shares of
stock offered under this subsection may be issued to and held by any
person.
(b) (1) For the purposes of this section the term "authorized car-
rier" shall mean a communications common carrier which is specifi-
cally authorized or which is a member of a class of carriers authorized
by the Commission to own shares of stock in the corporation upon a
finding, that such ownership will be consistent with the public interest,
convemence, and necessity.
(2) Only those communications common carriers which are author-
ized carriers shall own shares of stock in the corporation at any time,
and no other communications common carrier shall own shares either
directly or indirectly through subsidiaries or affiliated companies,
nominees, or any persons subject to its direction or control. Fifty
per centum of the shares of stock authorized for issuance at any time
])y the corporation shall be _served for purchase by authorized car-
rlers and such carriers shall in the aggregate be entitled to make pur-
chases of the reserved shares in a total-number not exceeding the total
number of the nonreserved shares of any i .s_le purchased by other
persons. At no time after the initial issue is completed shall the ag-
gregate of the shares of voting stock of the corporation owned by
_utlmrized carriers directly or indirectly through subsidiaries or
affiliated companies, nominees, or any persons subject to their direc-
tion or control exceed 50 per centum of such shales issued and out-
standing.
(3) _t no time shall any stockholder who is not an authorized
carrier, or any syndicate or affiliated group of such stockholders, own
more than 10 per centum of the shares of voting stock of the corpora-
tion issued and outstanding.
(c) The corporation is authorized to issue, in addition to the stock
authorized by subsection (a) of this section, nonvoting securities,
bonds, debentttres, and other certificates of indebtedness as it may
determine. Such nonvoting securities, bonds, debentures, or 0ther
certificates of indebtedness of the corl_, ration .as a comm.umcatlons
common carrier may own shall be eh_ble for inclusion in the rate
base of the carrier to the extent allowed by the Commission. The vot-
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ing stock of the corporation shall not be eligible for inclusion in the
rate base of the carrier.
(d) Not more than an aggregate of 20 per centum of the shares of
stock of the corporation authorized by subsection (a) of this section
which are held by holders other than authorized carriers may be held
by persons of the classes described in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4),
and (5) of section 310(a) of tile Communications Act of 1934, as
amended (47 U.S.C. 310).
(e) The requirement of section 45(b) of tile District of Columbia
Business Corporation Act (D.C. Code, sec. 29-920(b)) as to the
percentage of stock which a stockholder must hold in order to have
tile rights-of inspection and copying set forth in that subsection shall
not be applicable in the case of holders of the stock of the corporation,
and they may exercise such rights without regard to the percentage of
st_ck they hold.
(f) Upon application to the Commission by any authorized carrie_
and after notice and hearing, the Commission may compel any other
authorized carrier which owns shares of stock in the corporation to
transfer to the applicant, for a fair and reasonable consideration, a
number of such shares as tile Commission determines will advance the
public interest and tile purposes of this Act. In its determination
with respect to ownership of shares of stock in the corporation, tile
Commission, whenever consistent with the public interest, shall pro-
mote. the widest possible distribution of stock among the authorized
carriers.
PcR_ AND lOWERS OF THE CORPOe^TZON
SEC. 305. (a) In order to achieve the objectives and to carry out the
purposes of this Act, the corporation is authorized to--
(l) plan, initiate, construct, own, manage, and operate itself
or in conjunction with foreign governments or business entities
a commercial communications satellite system ;
(2) furnish, for hire, channels of communication to United
States communications common carriers and to other authorized
entities, foreign and domestic; and
(3) own and operate satellite terminal stations when licensed
by the Commission under section 901(c) (7).
(b) Included in the activities authorized to the corporation for
accomplishment of the purl:oses indicated in subsection (a) of this
section, are, amon_ others not specifically named--
(1) to conauct or contract for research and development re-
lated to its mission;
(2) to acquire the physical facilities, equipment and devices
necessary to its operations, including communications satellites
and associated equipment and facilities, whether by construction,
purchase, or gift;
(3) to purchase satellite launching and related services from
the United States Government;
(4) to contract with authorized users, including the United
States Government, for the services of the commumeations satel-
lite system; and
. (5) to develop plans for the technical specifications of all
elements of the communications satellite system.
(c) To carry out the foregoing purposes, the corporation shall
have the usualpowers conferred upon a stock corporation by the
District of Columbia Business Corporation Act.
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APPLICABILITY OF COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1984
SEc. 401. The corporation shall be deemed to be a common carrier
within the meaning of section 3(h) of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, and as such shall be fully subject to the provisions
of title II and title III of that Act. The provision of satellite
terminal station facilities by one communication common carrier to
one or more other communications common carriers shall be deemed to
be a common carrier activity fully subject to the Communications
Act. Whenever the application of the provisions of this Act shall
be inconsistent with the application of the provisions of the Com-
munications Act, the provisions of this Act shall govern.
NOTICE OF FOREIGN BU8INES8 NEGOTIATIONS
SEc. 402. Whenever the corporation shall enter into business nego-
tiations with respect to facilities, operations, or services authorized
by this Act with any interuational or foreign entity, it shall notify
the Department of State of the negotiations, and the Department of
State shall advise the corporation of relevant foreign policy consid-
erations. Throughout such negotiations the corporation shall keep
the Department of State informed with respect to such considerations.
The corporation may request the Department of State to assist in
the negotiations, and that Department shall render such assistance as
may be appropriate.
SANCTIONS
SEc. 403. (a) If the corporation created pursuant to this Act shall
engage in or adhere to any action, practices, or policies inconsistent
with the policy and purposes declared in section 102 of this Act, or
if the corporation or any other person shall violate any provision of
this Act, or shall obstruct or interfere with an_y activities authorized
by this Act, or shall refuse, fail, or neglect to discharge his duties and
responsibilities under this Act, or shall threaten any such violation,
obstruction, interference, refusal_ failure, or neglect, the district court
of the United States for any district in which such corporation or
other person resides or may be found shall have jurisdiction, except
as otherwiseprohibited by law, upon petition of the Attorney General
of the UnitedStates, to grant such equitable relief as may be necessary
or appropriate to prevent or terminate such conduct or threat.
(b) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as relieving
any person of any punishment, liability, or sanction which may be
imposed otherwise than under this Act.
(c) It shall be the duty of the corporation and all communications
common carriers to comply, insofar as applicable, with all provisions
of this Act and all rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
_RTS TO THE CONGRESS
SEc. 404. (a) The President shall transmit to the Congress in
January of each year a report which shall include a comprehensive
description of the activities and accomplishments during the preceding
calendar year under the national program referred-to in section
201 (a) (1), together with an evaluatl'on of such activities and accom-
plishments in terms of the attainment of the objectives of this Act
and any recommendations for additional legislative or other action
which the President may consider necessary or desirable for the attain-
ment of such objectives.
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• (b) The corporation shah transmit to the President and the
( ongress, annually and at such other times as it deems desirable, a
coml)rehensive and d_etai_ledreport of its operations, activities, mid
accomplishments under this Act.
(c) The Commission shall transmit to the Congress, annually and
at such other times as it deemsdesirable, (i) a report of its activities
and actions on anticompetitive practices as they apply to the com-
munications satellite _rograms; (ii) an evaluation of such activities
and actions taken by ]t within the scope of its authority with a view
to recommending such additional legislation which the Commission
]]lay consider necessary in the public interest; and (iii) an e_luation
of the capital structure of the corporation so as to assure the Congress
that such structure is consistent w_th the most efficient and economical
operation of the corporation.
Approved August 31, 1962, 9:51 a.m.
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